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SCIENTIFIC, TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC COMMITTEE FOR FISHERIES 
(STECF) 
 
Evaluation of multi-annual plans for cod in Irish Sea, Kattegat, North Sea, and West of Scotland 
(STECF-11-07) 
This report was adopted by the STECF during its 37th plenary meeting held from 11 to 
15 July, 2011 in Copenhagen, Denmark. 
 
Request to the STECF 
 
STECF is requested to review the report of the EWG-11-07 held from June 20 – 24, 2011 in 





A joint ICES / STECF meeting was held in Hamburg 20-24 June 2011, to prepare Impact 
Assessments for Southern hake, Nephrops and Angler fish and Baltic cod and an Evaluations 
of existing plans for Kattegat, North Sea, West of Scotland and Irish Sea cod. The meeting 
involved STECF, ICES scientists dealing with Economy and Biology and included Observers 
(Commission staff, Managers, Stakeholders). Three separate reports to the STECF were 
prepared by the EWG-11-07, one on the Impact Assessment of Southern hake, Nerphrops and 
Angler fish and another on the Impact Assessment for Baltic cod and the third on the 
Evaluation of Cod in Kattegat, North Sea, West of Scotland and Irish Sea. All reports were 
reviewed by the STECF during its 37th plenary meeting held from 11 to 15 July 2011 in 
Copenhagen, Denmark. The following observations, conclusions and recommendations 
represent the outcomes of that review for Kattegat, North Sea, West of Scotland and Irish Sea 
cod report. 
 
This report which is the result of a cooperative work between ICES and STECF on 
management plan evaluations and the report ICES CM2011 ACOM/56 (ICES 1011) therefore 
is identical to the this STECF EWG11-07 report with the exception that a technical peer 
review of sections 13 and 14, which relate specifically to requests to ICES, have been added 
in the ICES version while overall STECF conclusions have been added here in the STECF 
version. 
 
Annex 17 to this report contains an STECF report on Fishermans’ survey carried out in 
cooperation with both NS and NWW RACs. The report was not available for the EWG 
meeting but was considered in full draft by STECF Plenary. The final draft is attached here as 




STECF thanks the EWG-11-07 for its work with the Evaluation of the multi-annual 
management plan for fisheries on cod in Kattegat, North Sea, Irish Sea and West of 
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Scotland. STECF would also like to thank the NSRAC and NWWRAC for their contribution 
to the meeting.  STECF draws the following conclusions and observations from the report. 
Achievement of objectives:  
Given that the plan has only been in place for two and a half years (09, 10, first half of 
2011), it is premature to conclude on the medium term impacts. It is not possible to predict 
how the plan will develop over the next few years as F and effort constraints intensify and 
the number of fleets operating under derogations increases.  Nevertheless the STECF has 
drawn the main conclusions given below. With the data available, it was not always possible 
to assess whether any of aspect the plan has caused observed changes which are in line with 
plan objectives.  Instead, we can, in some cases, comment on whether the desired objectives 
are being achieved, but we cannot say that any observed changes are or are not a result of the 
plans being implemented. 
 
Exploitation rates and State of Stocks. 
North Sea: A full analytical assessment is available for this stock. Objectives of the plan 
have not been met in terms of F. F had declined and SSB had increased prior to introduction 
of plan. There have been continued but minor reductions in F and increases in SSB since the 
introduction of the plan. SSB has increased slowly over the last 6 years, but it is still below 
Blim. 
 
Of the other stocks, there are assessments but these are only indicative of trends in mortality. 
For the West of Scotland and Irish Sea fishing mortality is very uncertain but total mortality 
remains very high and the best estimates of F indicate that it is well above target and not 
declining. In the Kattegat, there is a high degree of uncertainty in F. The uncertainties in 
mortality estimates arise from, among other factors, unallocated removals, and other (non-
fishing) sources of mortality. For all three stocks biomass levels are estimated to be well 
below Blim. For Kattegat and Irish Sea recovery is failing and biomass has not increased. 
For the West of Scotland SSB has increased over the last 6 years. 
 
Medium term simulations based on the current rate of change per year in F suggest that for 
North Sea, Irish Sea and West of Scotland cod stocks, following the current regime is 
unlikely to lead to F=Fmsy by 2015. Currently it is not possible to evaluate the likely success 
in terms of F by 2015 for Kattegat cod.  
 
 
Additional Impacts of the multi-annual plan on the environment and the ecosystem 
Reductions in discards of commercial and non-commercial species, associated with Article 
11 and Article 13 (technical measures), have been significant when these measures have 
been applied in some areas (e.g. North Sea). 
 
Some technical measures have significantly reduced commercial by-catch (e.g. Nephrops 
fisheries with grids have become single-species fisheries).   
 
Reported landings in most areas are in line with the landings limits in the plans, but in some 
areas catches are well in excess of TAC, leading to quota-driven discards of fish, e.g. in 
West of Scotland. This is identified as a problem using scientific data, RAC statements and a 
Fishermen’s Survey conducted on a small sample of interviewed fishers. The Fishermen’s 
Survey reports apparently ‘conflicting’ notions: (i) the feeling that cod avoidance is being 
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carried out, and (ii) that discarding is being carried out because too much cod is being 
caught. This suggests that while cod avoidance is occurring it is currently insufficient. 
  
Various fleets have opted to use more selective gear (Article 11 or Article 13) or to operate 
real time closures (Article 13) or to fish outside the distribution area of cod (Article 11).  
 
Mortality of some other species such as haddock and whiting may have declined to levels 
consistent with CFP objective in some areas, and maybe partly due to the cod plan.  
 
Influence of external factors (global change, ecosystems effects, or other fisheries) 
Increases in biomass may have been hindered by factors external to the fishery (e.g. seal 
predation on the West of Scotland). 
 
Changes in fleet effort and capacity 
The starting baseline used in Article 12 of the plan is derived from the average of either 
2004-2006 or 2005-2007 depending on MS choices. For the North Sea this means that 
allowed effort in the first year of the plan (Effort 2009 = 75% of the baseline) could be 
higher than 75% of effort in the preceding year (2008). Because the stipulated F reductions 
of 25% are relative to 2008, this resulted in effort reductions not being in line with F 
reductions. For the other stocks and years the percentages may have been different, but for 
the same reason the effort reductions were not in line with the F reductions. 
 
Differences have occurred in the respective methodologies used to calculate effort from the 
reference years and methods used in the reported consumption of effort within the plan. This 
difference in methods has resulted in higher than intended deployed effort. 
 
There has been a substantial decline in effort before the introduction of the current cod plan.  
Since the start of the plan, there has been a continued decline in effort although at a lower 
rate or in some cases a levelling out of effort. In all of the stock areas the total recorded 
effort by vessels using the gears for which cuts applied declined slightly, but, in 2009 and 
2010, did not decline in line with the reductions required by the plans. Otter trawl gears 
contribute the highest effort amounts, with the relative importance of TR1 and TR2 otter 
trawl gears varying between areas. Beam trawl (BT2) effort is also very significant in the 
North Sea.  
 
The extent of unregulated effort varies between areas. However, in all areas this is associated 
with minimal cod catches.  
 
Effort associated with Article 11 is relatively low in all areas. 
 
Effort associated with Article 13 ranges from 25% to 75% of total deployed effort and 46% 
to 71% of total cod catch among areas.  
 
There have been positive contributions under Article 13c which appears to provide benefits 
towards achieving the cod plan targets. Article 13 allows a flexible, locally tailored response 
which should provide better governance with measures based directly on catches, landings 
and discards. Notable effects are: redistribution of effort away from higher abundance in 
Kattegat; unwanted bycatch and discard reductions in the northern North Sea by TR1 
vessels; the use of more selective gears, and cod avoidance through real time closures.  
However, the verification aspects of Article 13 are too complex. 
 
There have been reductions in fleet capacity; however, it was not possible from the 
evaluations available to indicate to what extent the plan was responsible for changes in fleet 
capacity. The decision by an owner (or owners) to remove a vessel from a given fishery 
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depends on several factors and most of these factors are not influenced by the long term 
management plans, e.g. operating costs, offers of decommissioning grants, alternative fishing 
opportunities and factors relating to the personal circumstances of business owners.  
Therefore, in any event, the effects of a single species long term management plan are not 
likely to be key in determining any single decision about the removal of a vessel from the 
fishery subject to the plan. 
 
The Fishermen’s survey reports that the effort limits resulted in more time in port, changes in 
patterns of fishing activity, problems due to catch composition rules and discarding, and 
knock-on effects making it harder to keep a crew (see below).   
 
 
Economic benefit/loss during the period of implementation 
It was not possible to conclude that the plan has had any impact on financial performance of 
the fleets involved compared to the situation likely to have prevailed in the absence of the 
plan.  Analysis of changes in profitability at the level of fleet and vessel has not been 
possible due to inconsistency of cost data that were available from both DCR (in place prior 
to the cod plan) and DCF (which start coincided with the implementation of the cod plan). 
There are indications that revenue per vessel may have increased while total revenues of the 
whole fleet declined, but it is not possible to attribute these changes to the plan. 
 
At a fleet and vessel level, reductions in effort may not necessarily result in the same 
proportion of reduction in revenue. Total Operating Costs at a fleet level have fallen in line 
with decline in total effort, but have increased at an individual vessel level due to increase in 
average effort per vessel. 
A meta analysis such as this one, carried out on aggregated economic data can mask 
significant changes at an individual business level. Therefore, to understand the implications 
at an individual business level more detailed analysis would be required. But due to 
confidentiality issues, this type of study would have to be sponsored specifically by MS.   
 
An Economic study based on DCF data and the Fishermen’s Survey concluded that 
employment (number of people employed) has reduced.   
 
Effects on the broader industry  
Although we cannot conclude that the plan has had any effect on vessel numbers or fleet 
capacity applied to the fishery, it may be worth noting that any reduction that have occurred 
will have had knock-on effects upstream and downstream in the economy, that is, for 
businesses supplying to vessels and for those purchasing from vessels. 
 
Economic Indicators 
The economic indicators were only sufficient to describe changes over the period of analysis. 
It has not been possible to attribute any of those observed changes in the indicators to the 
multi-annual plan and hence they are not sufficient, on their own, to enable a robust 
evaluation. 
 
The short run economic impacts of the multi-annual plan are not clear, in part because data at 
the required level of disaggregation is not available, and will depend on the balance of 
benefits resulting from increased cod TAC in the longer run and reductions in total (fleet 
level) costs resulting from reduced effort. The impact on long run economic sustainability 
will also depend on the stock effects of the plan (higher catch per unit of effort) which at this 
stage are unknown. 
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Specific indicators or data that would be useful for a future evaluation of multi-annual plans 
• Fully documented effort allocation and deployment, landings and catch of cod for each vessel 
• Economic data linked to vessels and specification of any derogation Article under which the 
vessel is operating. 
 
Any future revision should consider the following: 
• Several of the Articles in the plan are ambiguous or difficult to apply. As a general point, clear 
and unambiguous phrasing of the elements of regulations will make compliance more 
transparent and potentially more reliable. 
 
TAC and Effort control 
• Fishing mortality can not be expected always to follow proportionally trends in fishing effort.  
• Currently the combination of TACs (enforced as landings) and effort restrictions have been 
found to be inadequate in controlling cod removals, e.g. because enforced landings have 
resulted in discarding of over-quota catch. Reliance on these control instruments is a core 
weakness in the plan. Consideration should be given to use of cod catches (landings plus 
discards), as the main metric for allocating catch opportunities. 
• The HCR in the plan is overly reliant on annual estimates of F which are either absent, 
inaccurate or imprecise. Consideration should be given to multiannual metrics for informing 
decisions.  The lack of analytical assessments in WoS, Irish Sea and Kattegat preclude the 
application of the HCR. Therefore different metrics are needed for the application of the HCR. 
• Short term forecasts for North Sea show bias in estimating SSB and F; specifically, SSB is 
overestimated and F is underestimated; by comparison removals estimates were less biased. It 
is recommended that the current practice of assuming the plan is working for the intermediate 
year, should cease; currently it is preferable to assume Fstatus quo in the intermediate year.  In 
the longer term alternative methods of setting TACs should be tested to see if they are more 
robust for predicting F for specified removals. 
• The cod  LTMPs were designed without consideration of the fishing opportunities for other 
species. Mixed fisheries simulations give an indication of the potential for disparity between 
fishing opportunities and thus implementation error in North Sea cod advice. Actual F may be 
higher than stipulated in the LTMP if there is continued fishing for other species with higher 
TACs as well as of the potential over-catch or underutilization of other TACs. The plan would 




Exemptions under the current plan  
• Exemptions through Article 11 require low cod catches. These exemptions should only be 
approved when the fishing activity is deployed outside the distribution area of cod, or if 
deployed within the cod distribution area, when the used fishing gear is designed and 
confirmed to minimize cod catches.  
• Basing monitoring on percentage of cod in the total catch (as in Articles 11 and 13.2b) is 
flawed, because even when percentages of cod in the catch are low, these catches can still 
contribute significantly to overall cod mortality if overall catch or effort is high or when 
abundance is low. Cod by-catch ceilings expressed as percentages of total catch also have a 
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perverse incentive to maintain or increase catches of other species. STECF identified bycatch 
ceilings as a flaw in the design of the plan. A system based on proportion of total expected cod 
outtake from the whole fishery would be more appropriate, and likely no more difficult to 
monitor. 
Verification of Article 13 exemption, based on expected effects on F, cannot be carried out in most 
cases. By specifying Article 13 exemption on the basis of total catch  (landings and discards) of cod it is 
expected to be easier for fishermen to understand, implement, and verify their compliance with the 




Overall STECF concludes that the plan is not delivering reduced F and additionally in many 
areas does not have stakeholders’ support. A plan which stakeholders support is more likely 
to succeed because the stakeholders’ actions are needed to contribute to its success. Support 
of the plan also should also, in theory, lead to their acceptance of responsibility to fulfil their 
obligations. 
STECF agrees with the findings of the STECF EWG report on the Evaluation of multi-





For observers, it would be desirable if the STECF secretariat could notify the DG MARE 
focal person for the RACs to issue a timely reminder to the RACs of those STECF meetings 
open to observers, to ensure that all appropriate people are invited to register in an 
acceptable time frame. The DG MARE focal persons for specific EWGs should also inform 
the secretariat in due time if Member States representatives should be invited to a meeting. 
 
In preparation for the Impact Assessment of a revised plan, a scoping meeting is required. In 
order for scientific advice to be given, Commission and MS need to indicate in that meeting 
a range of aspects 
• The regulatory measures they might be prepared to implement, and specifically those 
they are not willing to consider, to focus available expertise in the most productive areas.  
• Specific objectives with timescales and if there are multiple objectives some idea of 
the tradeoffs. 
• If catch quotas are to considered for some fleets, those with expertise in compliance 
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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
A joint ICES / STECF meeting was held in Hamburg 20-24 June 2011, to prepare an Evaluation of 
multi-annual plans for cod in Kattegat, North Sea, Irish Sea and West of Scotland. The meeting 
involved STECF, ICES scientists dealing with Economy and Biology and included Observers 
(Commission staff, Managers, Stakeholders). Three separate reports to the STECF were prepared by 
the EWG-11-07, one on the Impact Assessment of Southern hake, Nephrops and Angler fish (STECF-
11-06) and another on the Impact Assessments for Baltic cod (STEC 11-005) and this third on the 
Evaluation of Cod in Kattegat, North Sea, West of Scotland and Irish Sea (STEC 11-07).  
 
Given that the plan is only into place for 3 years, it is premature to conclude on the medium term 
impact, but STECF has drawn the following main conclusions 
Objectives have not been met in terms of F. From a biological perspective all the cod stocks covered 
by the plan are currently likely to have an SSB below Blim. However, for North Sea and West of 
Scotland cod SSB has increased in recent years. Fishing mortality has not declined as envisaged by the 
plan. While mortality is considered to be well above the target objectives in line with the current plan, 
the exact level of F is unknown due to uncertainties in mortality estimates arising from inter alia 
unallocated removals, catches in excess of TAC and other sources of mortality. Medium term 
simulations based on the current rate of change per year in F suggest that for North Sea, Irish Sea and 
West of Scotland cod stocks it is unlikely that following the current regime F will reduce sufficiently 
to reach F=Fmsy by 2015. Currently it is not possible to evaluate the likely success in terms of F by 
2015 for Kattegat cod.  
Impacts of the multi-annual plan on the environment and the ecosystem: Reductions on 
discards, on commercial and non-commercial species, associated with Article 11 and Article 13 
(technical measures) have been significant when used in some areas (e.g. North Sea).Some technical 
measures have significantly reduced commercial by-catch. Reported landings in most areas are in line 
with the plan, but due to high discards in some areas, catches are well in excess of TAC e.g. West of 
Scotland. Positive responses in biomass may have been hindered by external factors (e.g. seal 
predation on the West of Scotland). 
Trends in fleet capacity: There has been a substantial decline in effort, although much of this 
occurred before introduction of the current cod plan. Otter trawl gears contribute the highest effort 
amounts, with the importance of TR1 and TR2 gears varying between areas. Beam trawl (BT2) effort 
is also very significant in the North Sea The extent of unregulated effort varies between areas. 
However, this is associated with minimal cod catches; effort associated with Article 11 is relatively 
low in all areas, effort associated with Article 13 ranges from 25% to 75%  between areas.  
Efficiency: At a fleet and vessel level, reductions in effort may not necessarily result in 
commensurate reduction in revenue as business will be incentivized to maximize revenue from 
available effort. Costs at a fleet level have fallen in line with effort, but have increased at an individual 
vessel level. Meta analysis can mask significant changes at an individual business level. Therefore, to 
understand the implications at an individual business level more detailed analysis would be required. 
According to a sociological study, based on a small sample of interviewed fishers, employment has 
gone down. Additionally results from economic studies show that employment has fallen.   
 
There have been positive contributions under Article 13c which appears to provide benefits towards 
achieving the cod plan targets. Article 13 allows a flexible, locally tailored response which should 
provide better governance with measures based directly on landings and discards. Notable effects are: 
redistribution of effort away from higher abundance in Kattagat; discard reductions in the northern 
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North Sea by TR1 vessels; the use of more selective gears, and cod avoidance through real time 
closures.  However, the verification aspects of Article 13 are too complex. 
 
The Workshop identified a range of aspects to be considered with any revision including inter alia:- 
Substitute alternative metrics for TACs. Consideration of multiannual metrics for informing decisions.  
Account for mixed fisheries as potential implementation error. Fishing mortality should not be 
expected to follow trends in fishing effort. Exemptions through Article 11 should only be approved 
when the fishing activity is deployed outside the distribution area of cod, or if deployed within the cod 
distribution area, when the used fishing gear is designed and confirmed to minimize cod catches. Cod 
catches lower than a certain % (as in Articles 11 and 13.2b) can still contribute significantly to overall 
cod mortality if overall catch or effort is high or when abundance is low. This is a fundamental flaw in 
the design of the plan. A system based on proportion of total expected cod outtake from the whole 
fishery would be more appropriate. Basing monitoring on percentage composition (as in Articles 11 
and 13) provides a disincentive to improve selectivity for other species as reducing overall catch can 
increase the percentage of cod even if cod catches are constant. 
 
2. CONCLUSIONS OF THE WORKING GROUP 
 
Based on the above analyses the Workshop came to the following conclusions and observations 
Effectiveness: Given that the plan is only into place for 3 years, it is premature to conclude 
on the medium term impact, but STECF has drawn the following main conclusions 
• A full analytical assessment is available only for North Sea cod. Objectives have not been met 
in terms of F. F has declined and SSB has increased prior to introduction of plan. There have 
been continued but minor reductions in F and increases in SSB since the introduction of the 
plan. Progress towards target is hindered due to TAC and effort regime failing to constrain 
removals. 
• Of the other stocks, there are assessments but these are only indicative of trends in F and 
biomass. For the West of Scotland and Irish Sea fishing mortality is very uncertain but total 
mortality remains very high. In the Kattegat, there is a high degree of uncertainty in F. Biomass 
levels are estimated to be well below Blim 
• Objectives in terms of F reductions do not appear to have been met in WoS, Kattegat and the 
Irish Sea, but, while mortality is considered to be well above the target objectives in line with 
the current plan, the exact level of F is unknown due to uncertainties in mortality estimates 
arising from inter alia unallocated removals, catches in excess of TAC and other sources of 
mortality. ,  
• Medium term simulations based on the current rate of change per year in F suggest that for 
North Sea, Irish Sea and West of Scotland cod stocks it is unlikely that following the current 
regime F will reduce sufficiently to reach F=Fmsy by 2015. Currently it is not possible to 
evaluate the likely success in terms of F by 2015 for Kattegat cod.  
Impacts of the multi-annual plan on the environment and the ecosystem 
• Reductions on discards, on commercial and non-commercial species, associated with Article 11 
and Article 13 (technical measures) have been significant when used in some areas (e.g. North 
Sea). 
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• Some technical measures have significantly reduced commercial by-catch (e.g. Nephrops 
fisheries with grids have become single-species fisheries).   
• Reported landings in most areas are in line with the plan, but due to high discards in some 
areas, catches are well in excess of TAC e.g. West of Scotland 
• Effort displacement may have had a negative impact. 
Side effects resulting from the plan 
• Various fleets have committed themselves to use more selective gear (Article 11 or Article 13) 
or to real time closures (Article 13) or to fish outside the distribution area of cod (Article 11). 
Influence of  external factors (global change, ecosystems effects, or other fisheries) 
• Positive responses in biomass may have been hindered by external factors (e.g. seal predation 
on the West of Scotland). 
Utility trends in fleet capacity (kW or GT) 
• There has been a substantial decline in effort, although much of this occurred before 
introduction of the current cod plan, and continued decline at a lower rate or in some cases 
leveling out. 
• Otter trawl gears contribute the highest effort amounts, with the importance of TR1 and TR2 
gears varying between areas. Beam trawl (BT2) effort is also very significant in the North Sea  
• The extent of unregulated effort varies between areas. However, this is associated with minimal 
cod catches  
• Effort associated with Article 11 is relatively low in all areas,  
• Effort associated with Article 13 ranges from 25% to 75%  between areas  
 
Capacity: 
• Currently we are unable to estimate the appropriate capacity for these fleets due to the 
complexity of the species mixtures and the shortage of economic data.  
• It was not possible from the evaluations available to indicate to what extent the plan alone was 
responsible for changes in fleet capacity (fuel prices and fish prices have recently been 
volatile). 
Efficiency (cost-effectiveness) 
The costs of this plan in terms employment, gross revenue of the fleet 
• At a fleet and vessel level, reductions in effort may not necessarily result in commensurate 
reduction in revenue as business will be incentivized to maximize revenue from available 
effort. 
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• Costs at a fleet level have fallen in line with effort, but have increased at an individual vessel 
level. 
• Meta analysis can mask significant changes at an individual business level. Therefore, to 
understand the implications at an individual business level more detailed analysis would be 
required. 
• According to a sociological study, based on a small sample of interviewed fishers, employment 
has gone down. Additionally results from economic studies show that employment has fallen.   
Effects on the broader industry  
• Implicit in the reduction in capacity, there are likely to have been negative consequences for 
the broader industry, although there are no specific documented cases which can be attributed 
to the Plan. 
Economic benefit/loss during the period of implementation 
•  Analysis of changes in profitability at the level of fleet and vessel has not been possible due to 
concerns over the quality of the cost data. There are indications that revenue per vessel may 
have increased while falling at the fleet level, but it is not possible to attribute these changes to 
the Cod Plan. 
Indicators 
•  The economic indicators were only sufficient to describe changes over the period of analysis. 
It has not been possible to attribute any of those observed changes in the indicators to the 
multi-annual plan and hence they are not sufficient, on their own, to enable a robust evaluation. 
Sustainability (relative to the initial impact assessment) 
• From a biological perspective all the cod stocks covered by the plan are currently likely to have 
an SSB below Blim. However, for North Sea and West of Scotland cod SSB has increased in 
recent years.  
• Fishing mortality has not declined as envisaged by the plan 
• The long run (i.e. taking account of stock effects) economic sustainability of the plan cannot be 
judged at this stage. 
Conclusions 
Workshop draws the following global judgement on the plan 
With regards to the utility and sustainability of the multi-annual plan and its contribution to the 
objectives of the Common Fisheries Policy. 
• The plan has not controlled fishing mortality as envisaged. 
• Mortality of some other species such as haddock and whiting may have declined to levels 
consistent with CFP objective in some areas, and maybe partly due to cod plan.  
• The short run economic impacts of the multi-annual plan are not clear and will depend on the 
balance of benefits resulting from increased cod TAC and costs resulting from reduced effort. 
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The impact on long run economic sustainability will also depend on the stock effects of the 
plan which at this stage are unknown. 
Success in achieving its stated objectives  
• The plan has not achieved its stated objectives. 
• In all of the stock areas the total recorded effort by the gears for which cuts applied decline 
slightly, but did not decline, in 2009 and 2010, in line with the reductions according to the plan.    
• There have been positive contributions under Article 13c which appears to provide benefits 
towards achieving the cod plan targets. Article 13 allows a flexible, locally tailored response 
which should provide better governance with measures based directly on landings and discards. 
Notable effects are: redistribution of effort away from higher abundance in Kattagat; discard 
reductions in the northern North Sea by TR1 vessels; the use of more selective gears, and cod 
avoidance through real time closures.  However, the verification aspects of Article 13 are too 
complex. 
Specific indicators that would be useful for a future evaluation of this multi-annual plan 
• Fully documented catch of cod by vessel 
Additional data that should be collected in the future to help in evaluating the multi-annual plan 
• Economic data linked to vessels operating specifically under the cod plan by Article along with 
documented catch of cod by vessel 
Other plans this plan should be linked to 
• The plan would benefit from linking to plans for Nephrops and haddock, whiting, saithe sole 
and plaice in the North Sea. 
Any future revision should consider the following: 
• Substitute alternative metrics for TAC (as Total Allowed Landings) or the current effort regime 
to regulate catches. These have been unable to adequately control cod removals. Reliance on 
these control instruments is a core weakness in the plan. 
• The HCR in the plan is overly reliant on annual estimates of F which are either absent, 
inaccurate or imprecise. Consideration should be given to multiannual metrics for informing 
decisions.   
• The lack of analytical assessments in WoS, Irish Sea and Kattegat preclude the application of 
the HCR. Therefore different metrics are needed for the application of the HCR. 
• Short term forecast has been available for North Sea cod and has not been available for other 
cod stocks. 
• Short term forecasts show bias in estimating SSB and F; specifically, SSB is overestimated and 
F is underestimated; by comparison removals were estimated less biased  
• Single-stock LTMPs were designed without consideration of the fishing opportunities for other 
species. Mixed fisheries simulations give an indication of the potential implementation error in 
North Sea cod advice, with actual F being higher than stipulated in the LTMP if there is 
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continued fishing for other species with higher TACs as well as of the potential overcatch or 
underutilization of TACs. 
• It is concluded that we should not necessarily expect fishing mortality to follow trends in 
fishing effort.  
• Exemptions through Article 11 require low cod catches. These exemptions should only be 
approved when the fishing activity is deployed outside the distribution area of cod, or if 
deployed within the cod distribution area, when the used fishing gear is designed and 
confirmed to minimize cod catches.  
• Cod catches lower than a certain % (as in Articles 11 and 13.2b) can still contribute 
significantly to overall cod mortality if overall catch or effort is high or when abundance is 
low. This is a fundamental flaw in the design of the plan. A system based on proportion of total 
expected cod outtake from the whole fishery would be more appropriate.  
• Basing monitoring on percentage composition (as in Articles 11 and 13) provides a 
disincentive to improve selectivity for other species as reducing overall catch can increase the 
percentage of cod even if cod catches are constant. 
• The starting baseline used in Article 12 of the plan is derived from the average of either 2004-
2006 or 2005-2007 depending on MS choices. For the North Sea this means that allowed effort 
in the first year of the plan (Effort 2009 = 75% of the baseline) could be higher than 75% of 
effort in the preceding year (2008). Because the stipulated F reductions of 25% are relative to 
2008, this resulted in effort reductions not being in line with F reductions. For the other stocks 
the percentages may have been different, but for the same reason the effort reductions were not 
in line with the F reductions. 
• Differences have occurred in the respective methodologies used to calculate effort from the 
reference years and those in the reported consumption of effort within the plan. This will have 
resulted in higher then intended effort. 
• Clear and unambiguous phrasing of the elements of regulations will make compliance more 
transparent and potentially more reliable. 
 
 
3. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE WORKING GROUP 
 
For Observers STECF/ICES and Commission should find a way to define exactly who and facilitate 
contact with all those who need to be notified of STECF meetings in the future. 
 
In preparation for the Impact Assessment of a revised plan, a scoping meeting will be required. In 
order for scientific advice to be given, Commission and MS need to indicate in that meeting a range of 
aspects 
• The regulatory measures they might be prepared to implement, and specifically those they are 
not willing to consider, to focus available expertise in the most productive areas.  
• Specific objectives with timescales and if there are multiple objectives some idea of the 
tradeoffs. 
• If catch quotas are to considered for some fleets, those with expertise in compliance should be 






EWG 11-07 met in Hamburg 20-24 June 2011. The WG was organised with STECF members, invited 
experts, observers from Baltic NS, NWW and SWW RACs, and managers from some MSs.  
 
4.1. Terms of Reference for EWG-11-07 
 
The Workshop on Management plans Part 2 (ICES - WKMPROUNDMP2011 STECF – EWG 11-07), 
chaired by John Simmonds, Italy, will meet at VTI, Hamburg, Germany 20–24 June 2011 to: 
1. provide Impact Assessment reports (2 reports) for  
o Baltic Cod 
o Southern hake, anglerfish and Nephrops 
2. provide a combined Evaluation report on cod plans for the following areas:  
o Kattegat 
o North Sea 
o West of Scotland 
o Irish Sea 
3. provide a Clarification on  NS whiting advice  
 
WKMPROUND2001/EWG 11-07 will provide a complete draft report by 1 July to the attention of the 
STECF and ACOM and a final draft by 6 July. 
Procedures and work will follow the work plan specified in the ICES-STECF report 
WKMPROUND2001 EWG11-01, March 2011 for cod plans and the ad hoc meeting 29-30 March, 




The approach to the meeting was to hold discussions on each TOR separately in order to allow 
Observers and Commission Staff to organise their attendance efficiently. 
 
Monday 20 June Open the meeting 1400  
    Report requirements, Section responsibilities and agree Section structure, admin details.  
    Discussion in subgroups to provide detailed timed agendas for Tuesday and Wednesday  
Tuesday 0900 - 1800  
    Presentations on Southern hake, angler, Nephrops, Baltic cod  
        Discussion for conclusions  
 Wednesday 0900 - 1800  
    Presentations on Kat, NS, IS and WoS cod and NS whiting.  
        Discussion for conclusions  
Thursday  
        Draft text and first drafts of conclusions  
Friday  
        Draft text and final drafts of conclusions  
Friday 1500 Meeting close 
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The agenda provided an opportunity for the NSRAC and NWWRAC covering the fisheries dealt with 
under the cod plans, to provide a statement relating their experience with the plan. These statements 
are included as annexes to the report (Annex 2 NSRAC and Annex 3 NWWRAC); these do not 
formally form part of the main body of the report as they are not independent but express an opinion 
of stakeholders. Nevertheless, the STECF group would like to thank the RACs for providing these and 




The TOR requires separate reports of the meeting for each task. This report deals specifically with 
Evaluation of multi-annual plans for cod in Kattegat, North Sea, Irish Sea, and West of Scotland. 
Three other reports are prepared: (i) an overall ICES-STECF report containing details of the whiting 
response, and separate reports (ii) for Southern hake, angler and Nephrops, and (iii) for the Impact 




The full list of participants at EWG-11-07 is presented in section 14. 
 
 
5. OVERVIEW OF COD PLANS FOR IRISH SEA, KATTEGAT, NORTH SEA AND WEST OF SCOTLAND  
 
5.1. Problem statement    
The Regulation 1342/2008 establishing a long-term plan for cod stocks and fisheries exploiting those 
stocks entered into force on the 1st January 2009. The Regulation establishes a plan for four cod 
stocks in the geographical areas (i) Kattegat, (ii) the North Sea including the Skagerrak and the eastern 
Channel, (iii) the West of Scotland and (iv) the Irish Sea. The plan includes an obligation for the 
Commission, on the basis of advice from STECF and after consultation of the RACs, to evaluate the 
impact of the management measures on the cod stock and the fisheries on those stocks in the third year 
of its application, and then each third successive year. 
 
5.2. A review of the historic implementation of the multi-annual plan  
Prior to 2004 emergency recovery measures had been implemented on an individual basis. 
 
Recovery plans for cod were first implemented in the Irish Sea in 2000. Two emergency closed areas 
were established (EC.304/2000) in which fishing for cod was prohibited between 14th February and 
30th April. Subsequent regulations (EC.2549/2000 and EC.1456/2000) established additional technical 
measures for the protection of juveniles. The closed area in the western Irish Sea was continued in 
subsequent years. A derogation to fish inside this closed area has applied in all years for vessels 
fishing for Nephrops. 
 
Emergency measures were enacted in 2001 for the West of Scotland consisting of area closures in the 
Clyde from 6th March to 30th April. An additional closed area, known as the windsock 
(EC.2287/2003) was implemented in 2004 and has remained in force since. In addition there have 
been unilateral closures, by Ireland, of a traditional fishery for juvenile cod off Greencastle. This 
voluntary closure was in force for variable periods of time between 2003 and 2006. 
 
In the North Sea in 2001, a cod closure area was introduced as part of the stock recovery programme 
(EC.259/2001). The area was closed to any fishing activity during this period, with the exception of 
purse seining and trawling for sandeels and pelagics. This temporary closed area was designed to 
cover the main spawning period of cod in the North Sea, and was in force throughout the period 14 
February to 30 April 2001. In addition, TAC reductions in 2001 and 2002 were aimed at reducing 
fishing mortality by more than 50 per cent. Fishing effort restrictions were also implemented from 1 
February 2003 for vessels of overall length greater than or equal to 10m. This restricted the number of 
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days per month different types of vessels (i.e., using different gear types) could employ in different 
parts of ICES areas IV and IIIa (EC.671/2003, amending EC.2341/2002). 
 
Council regulation EC.423/2004 established a raft of measures for the recovery of cod stocks. These 
included multi-annual process for the selection of TACs, restriction of fishing effort, technical 
measures, control and enforcement and accompanying structural and market measures.  
 
In November 2008 COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 1342/2008 established the current plan 
 
5.3. Design Issues 
 
The following aspects detailed by Article number from the cod plan (COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) 
No 1342/2008) have been identified and form the basis for examining design issues:  
5.3.1. Interpretation issues, related to Articles 7 and 8 
When performing the simulations for the Impact Assessment for the HCR components of Council 
Regulation (EC) 1342/2008 (Articles 7 and 8), difficulties were encountered with coding the HCR 
elements. Several assumptions were required. The following details the assumptions that were made 
when performing the impact assessment (MSE), and any differences that subsequently occurred in 
implementation when carrying out annual short term forecasts (STF). 
Interpretation issues Article 7 
7(1a)   Method for calculating expected quantity of discards for the TAC year was not defined 
Solution  MSE: average discard ratio at age for final 3 years of data 
 
Interpretation issues Article 8 
TAC calculations 
8(1)   Expected quantity of discards for TAC year (refer to 7(1a) above) 
Solution  MSE: average discard ratio at age for final 3 years of data (see above) 
STF: discard ratio for final year of catch data  
8(1)   Calculating TAC [refer to 7(1a)]  
Solution MSE: remove unallocated mortality prior to calculating TAC 
STF: landings and discard components scaled up to account for unallocated mortality  
8(3) cuts in F relative to 2008 
Solution: MSE and STF: assume that F2008 is re-estimated by the assessment method, and not 
fixed to the value estimated by the assessment the first time the plan was implemented. 
It is suggested that regulations contain a technical annex that clearly define how quantities will be 
calculated. If needed this annex could be updated by agreement without changing the regulation. 
 
5.3.2. Effort calculations and issues for stocks without assessments  
For both MSE and STF: there is nothing in Article 8 (equivalent to Article 7(4)) to say what should be 
assumed about the effect of effort cuts in the intermediate year. This is because for the HCR, Article 7 
needs an estimate of SSB at the beginning of the TAC year (and therefore needs assumptions about 
what happens in terms of F), while article 8 only needs SSB at the beginning of the intermediate year. 
However, in order to calculate the TAC, one still needs to project the population forward through the 
intermediate year, and therefore one needs to know what happened in terms of F during the 
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intermediate year. In practice the regulation has been assumed to work; this may be an unsatisfactory 
solution, see Section 6.7.  
A particular issue in the implementation of the LTMP for the cod stocks is the absence of accepted 
assessment for a number of these. LTMP have been designed around the classical concept of defining 
a target F and a yearly HCR aiming at moving from current F levels towards this target F.  
However, this can only be achieved in the case where there is an accepted analytical assessment, 
which is not the case for three out of the four cod stocks concerned. Furthermore, even in the case of 
stocks with accepted assessment, uncertainty is often largest for the estimate of the current year (at 
least for VPA-based assessment), and therefore a HCR rule relying too heavily on the final assessment 
year may become unstable.  
As a consequence, it has been difficult to formulate TAC advice based on the LTMP rules, and to 
conduct scientific evaluation of e.g. cod avoidance plans with regards to expected reductions in fishing 
mortality, since this could not be measured.  
Obviously, a LTMP should be designed from the beginning to be easily implemented, i.e. management 
measures should be tailored to the possibility to apply and monitor them. The basis should be the level 
of scientific knowledge used for advice at the time the plan is initiated, as it is illusory to expect that 
the quality of stock assessment will necessarily improve after the implementation of the LTMP. 
Although implementing a LTMP may directly or indirectly contribute to better data through increased 
control and monitoring, this may not be a sufficient condition for solving the recurrent issues in the 
assessment of cod stocks. Indeed successfully achieving a change in the fishery is likely to make an 
assessment, which relies on smoothing assumptions, give poorer results initially. In either case, it is 
unlikely that this improvement of stock assessment would occur in the first years of implementation.  
  
5.3.3. Interpretation issues of Article 11.       
Article 11(2) of the cod plan makes provision for The Council, acting on a Commission proposal 
and on the basis of the information provided by Member States and the advice of STECF, to exclude 
certain groups of vessels from the effort regime, provided certain conditions are met. STECF are then 
requested by the Commission to evaluate each individual request to assess whether sufficient data had 
been presented so as to determine whether the conditions laid out were being fulfilled. A detailed 
summary of the use of Article 11 is included in Annex 1. Since the introduction of the regulation 
STECF has evaluated 34 proposals from France, Spain, UK (Scotland, Northern Ireland, Isle of Mann, 
England), Sweden, Ireland, Poland and Germany. Of them only 6 submissions, from UK (Scotland), 
Sweden, Ireland, France, Poland and Spain, have been approved. The French exemption was revoked 
as it was considered that the application no longer constituted an administrative burden (EC regulation 
57/2011). In the first evaluations, conducted by written procedure (STECF 2009), STECF was 
requested to evaluate a number of exemption cases.  
At the start of the evaluation process undertaken by STECF, the information presented by the 
individual member states varied considerably, and this remained an issue for subsequent applications.  
The variability in the information presented was probably due to a lack of data specification for the 
data requirements.  The implementation regulation that lays down the detailed rules for the application 
of 1342/2009 only came into effect in 2010 (EC regulation 237/2010). This legislative vacuum 
resulted in STECF having to interpret article 11.2, develop evaluation criteria and provide suggested 
data requirements. This led to an adaptive process over several plenary meetings whereby the data and 
criteria STECF considered necessary to undertake evolved over time based on the data provided by 
member states. This, in some cases, led to further requests for additional material to be supplied by 
member states before a thorough evaluation could be made.  
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STECF (2009) noted that catches of cod <1.5% at a fleet or individual vessel level can be achieved 
through three possible mechanisms: (i) Technical decoupling through the application of modifications 
to the fishing gear that inhibits or reduces cod catches; (ii) Spatial and/or seasonal decoupling, where 
the fishing activity is conducted in areas, at depths, and/or in seasons that are historically not 
associated with cod distribution and catches; and (iii) Decoupling through cod stock depletion, where 
historically, cod catches in the area where the fleet/métier operates are likely to have exceeded 1.5% if 
the cod biomass was at a higher level. While in many cases STECF concluded that the submission 
lacked primary data – e.g. landings data were presented as opposed to catch, or it was not possible to 
link observer trips to métiers etc. – STECF also commented on whether it was possible to assess if the 
cod catch levels were due to spatial decoupling or stock depletion, and if there was insufficient 
evidence STECF was unable to advise on such cases. Given the variability in the data submissions and 
the need to disentangle spatial and depletion decoupling, STECF (2009) recommended a range of data 
fields that could be used as standardised and stable criteria for evaluation purposes.  These became the 
basis for a standardised content and format for requests for exclusion in the implementation regulation 
(Annex I of EC regulation 237/2010). However, the specifications for data requirements given in this 
regulation are still ambiguous and open to multiple interpretation and have actually been interpreted 
differently by MSs. Nevertheless, by the time this regulation came into force, STECF had already 
evaluated 31 separate fleets. In many cases, these were repeat evaluations of requests that had been re-
submitted by Member States but with additional data. Where it was not possible to disentangle 
between depletion and spatial decoupling, STECF adopted the precautionary approach, noting where 
depletion decoupling was likely. Seeking clarification, STECF (2009) notes that “The Commission 
clarified that STECF is requested to judge whether, based on the scientific evidence presented, it can 
be ascertained that real decoupling between the fishing activity and the impact on cod stocks exists”. 
However, during the Winter Plenary (2009), STECF was asked again to reassess the submissions 
presented during the previous plenary meeting. The background information from the commission 
noted the following: 
“The Commission's approach to vessel exclusions under the cod plan (Article 11(2) cod plan) has 
taken into account the STECF's concept of technical or biological decoupling, but would in addition 
favour vessel exclusions based on vessel group characteristics that result in current catch rates of cod 
below 1,5% in the vessel group (on average), provided that (i) the effort reduction coming along with 
such an exclusion would be permanent; (ii) the vessel activity would be automatically counted against 
the reduced effort ceilings when either a vessel no longer meets the group characteristics or the group 
catches exceed more than 1,5% cod (averaged over the year), and (iii) the Member State has put in 
place a monitoring system that will provide representative catch data enabling the Commission to 
assess whether the fulfilment of the exclusion criterion at the group level continues to be met.” 
The terms of reference therefore simply asked whether the cod catches were in fact below 1.5% 
with no reference to detailed elements requested previously. STECF (2009) reiterated its previous 
concerns relating to the problems of being unable to disentangle the likelihood of spatial from 
depletion decoupling in any given case and noted “STECF do not consider the third criteria as a 
condition for effort exemptions. Providing effort exceptions to groups of vessels that meet the third 
criterion has the potential to negate any attempts to reduce cod mortality and could inhibit stock 
rebuilding.” The inclusion of point (i) in the Commission’s statement above was to provide a strong 
incentive to ensure that the group of vessels seeking exemption were associated with areas outside the 
historic distribution of cod, as if stocks recovered and cod catches went above 1.5% in the future then 
effort would have to be taken from a reduced effort allocation. However, following the December 
council in 2009, point (i) above was not introduced. 
The industry perception of article 11 is that it is difficult to gain exemption and that it has proved 
impossible to gain exemption for fleets that catch few cod because of problems of providing sufficient 
data (see NSRAC submission Annex 2). It is noted in the submission by the NWWRAC (Annex 3) 
that there is lack of transparency over the criteria to deliver the exemption and over the data to be 
collected. Secondly, the NWWRAC paper notes that where vessels have been shown not to catch cod, 
then the exemption should be provided within a shorter time frame. However, the Workshop notes that 
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the provisions under Article 14 could have been used within a MS to provide groups of vessels with 
effort levels deemed appropriate. The lack of clear guidance and lack of standardised data 
requirements has likely contributed to the view that there is a lack of transparency in the criteria 
needed to achieve exemption and the associated data needs. Clearly, the process has evolved since the 
introduction of the plan, and this has led to the view of ‘moving goalposts’; STECF continues to 
advise on whether there is a risk that low cod catches are due to the severely depleted nature of the 
stocks rather than any active measure. In the case of exemptions based on spatial decoupling, 
consideration will need to be given to the potential for increases in effort in localised areas on species 
other than cod. This attains additional importance if, over the course of time, the exemption attracts 
additional vessels. 
 
5.3.4. Interpretation issues of Article 12.  
Article 12(4) refers to the baseline effort as defined in Art 12(2): in the first year (2009) it is equal to 
the average over either 2004-2006 or 2005-2007, which is higher than the effort in 2008; in 
subsequent years it is equal to the maximum allowable effort of the previous year. This leads to a 
situation where the effort reductions are not in line with the reductions in F; for example, if in 2009 F 
stipulated by 8(3) is 75% of F in 2008, the effort in 2009 stipulated by 12(4) is more than 75% of that 
in 2008. With reference to the cod stock in the North Sea, Table 5.1 illustrates this. 
Table 5.1 Relative target effort based on Article 12. 
 Stipulated fishing mortality Stipulated effort 
2008 100% (actual effort in 2008) 
2009 75% (cf Art. 8(3)) 75% of the baseline (which is 
higher than the effort in 2008) 
hence >75% of effort 2008 
2010 65% (cf Art. 8(3)) corresponding to 
86.7% of F2009 
86.7% of the maximum allowed in 
2009 = 65% of the original baseline 
(which is higher than the effort in 
2008) hence >65% of effort 2008 
A second problem concerns the fact that multiple interpretations of Article 12(4) are possible.  
The successive decrements of 10% in Art 8(3) can be either viewed as decrements in the percentage of 
the 2008 value (55%, 45% etc.), or as year-on-year reductions by 10% of the previous year’s value 
(resulting in respectively 58.5% and 52.65% of the 2008 value). The first of these interpretations leads 
to ever increasing year-on-year reductions in effort: 2011/2012 – 18%; 2012/2013 – 22%; 2013/2014 – 
29%; 2014/2015 – 40%, etc., and eventually to negative effort. The Table 5.2 illustrates this. 
 
Table 5.2  Projected relative effort based on different interpretations of Article 12 
 Interpretation 1 Interpretation 2 
 % relative to 2008 % reduction 
relative to previous 
year 
% relative to 2008 % reduction 
relative to previous 
year 
2008 100  100  
2009 75 25 75 25 
26 
2010 65 13 65 13 
2011 55 15 59 10 
2012 45 18 53 10 
2013 35 22 47 10 
2014 25 29 43 10 
2015 15 40 38 10 
2016 5 67 35 10 
2017 -5 200 31 10 
 
Another interpretation takes the actual current-year predictions of the F values into account: the value 
predicted for the intermediate year (e.g. as status quo) and the value for the TAC year when under full 
consideration of Article 8 (i.e. 8(3) as well as 8(5) limiting year-on-year TAC changes to 20%). For 
example, in 2010 for the North Sea F2010 was assumed equal to the F2009 estimate; F2011 was 
estimated corresponding to TAC2011 as stipulated by Art 8(5); the % effort reduction was then 
advised to be set as F2011 relative to F2010 (in this case 0.48/0.85 = 56%). 
 
The EWG would like to point out that multiple interpretations are possible under the current phrasing 
but will not argue that one or the other of these interpretations is the correct one. The EWG 
recommends that the regulation should clearly and unambiguously point to only one interpretation. 
5.3.5. Interpretation issues of Article 13. 
The group noted the following interpretation issues with Article 13. 
• From the phrasing of 13.2(b) it is not clear whether a vessel is required to opt in for all its 
trips; if this is not the case, a vessel could have some trips, with >5% cod in the catch, covered 
by the normal effort limitation and some trips, with <5%, covered by the increased effort 
provision of this Article. 
• In Article 13.7 STECF is requested to compare the reduction in cod mortality which would 
result from the application of 13.2(c) with the reduction STECF would have expected to occur 
as a result of the effort reduction of 12(4). Even in case an analytical assessment does exist, 
this can only be established post hoc and subject to e.g. (retrospective) bias and imprecision in 
the F estimate. The problem can be illustrated with the example of the Real Time Closures 
under the Scottish Conservation Credits (SCC) scheme (see PLEN-10-02). Here, it was a 
priori calculated how much the fleet’s catches needed to be reduced to remain in line with the 
overall F implied by the TAC stipulated by the HCR of the plan. However, post hoc it 
appeared that the TAC had not resulted in the intended reduction of the estimated F but rather 
in an increase, although the partial F of the fleet operating under the SCC had increased to a 
lesser extent. Thus, as far as the a priori knowledge goes, the SCC was appropriate; only post 
hoc because the TAC appeared less effective than intended the SCC seemed not appropriate 
‘to the letter’.  
• Another problem becomes clear if we follow the regulation to the letter: If, for example, the 
conditions of Article 7.2(a) were the case, stipulating that F must be reduced by 25%, it 
directly follows that according to Article 12(4) effort must be reduced by 25% and that the 
activities under 13.2(c) must cause a reduction in F of 25%. Here, according ‘to the letter’, 
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percentages are set to be equal without overtly stating that this is based on the implicit 
assumption of proportionality. However, in Article 13.7 STECF is requested to compare the 
reduction in cod mortality which would result from the application of 13.2(c) with the 
reduction STECF would have expected to occur as a result of the effort reduction of 12(4). It 
is unclear whether it is implied here that STECF should expect the relation between effort and 
F to be proportional. As argued in section 5.5.3, under some conditions F might be expected to 
be reduced by only a few % under an effort reduction of 25%. In that case, if Article 13.7 is to 
be taken to the letter, the reduction of cod mortality resulting from a particular MS's 
application of 13.2(c) would only have to be of a few % in order to compare favourably to 
STECF’s expectations. It is unclear whether the intention of Article 13.7 is that its application 
should result in the % reduction as stipulated under Article 12(4) – in this example 25% – 
under the implicit assumption of proportionality. 
• Article 13(4) refers to the maximum level of effort that can be allowed through the buy-back 
provisions: it has been interpreted as ‘no more than the level of the previous year’ but also as 
‘up to the original baseline (of 2004-2006 or 2005-2007)’. 
• It was noted that 13.7 does not ask STECF to advise on the uptake of provisions 13.2 (a,b, 
and). Article 13.3 states: “Vessels referred to in paragraph 2 shall be subject to increased 
frequency of monitoring”, but it is not stipulated in the regulation (i) to what extent frequency 
of monitoring should be increased (ii) whether and by whom and with what consequences the 
results of this monitoring will be assessed. 
• Article 13(2.a) based on 1% cod catch appears unnecessary given a less restrictive derogation 
seems to be possible under Article 11(2.b), related to 1.5% cod catch.  
 
5.3.6. Interpretation issues of Article 14.  
Article 14 addresses the proportionality with respect to allocation of maximum fishing effort and quota 
within a Member state to the vessels flying their flag, allowing for allocation towards vessels 
performing ‘good behaviour’. Feedback from Member States indicates a low level of application of 
Article 14. France is the only Member State that indicated specific implementation through the issuing 
of special fishing permits to vessels in compliance with points 2, 3 and 4 of Article 14.  
There are various initiatives within Member States related the criteria set out in Article 14(1), e.g., 
enhanced data collection schemes, cooperative programmes to reduce cod by-catch and discards, 
measures to reduce fuel consumption. There has, however, been no feedback from Member States 
explicitly relating these initiatives to Article 14 or where it directly affects the proportional allocation 
of effort or quota to individual vessels (or group of vessels).  
5.3.7. Interpretation issues of Article 17   
Article 17 of Council Regulation No 1342/2008 (“long-term plan for cod stocks”) provides a 
mechanism whereby Member States can transfer effort across gear groupings in the same geographical 
area.  This mechanism is in place so that changing fishing practices are able to be reflected in the 
effort management scheme. 
Such a movement of effort is subject to the conditions set out in article 17(2-5).  The main 
condition is that such transfers are undertaken with a ‘correction factor’ (17(4)) when the recipient 
vessels have a higher cod catch rate than the donor vessels.  The correction factor is required to reflect 
the relative cod catching ability of the gear, based on the catch per unit effort (cpue) averaged over the 
last three years (17(2)).  Where the transfer occurs to a recipient vessel with a lower catch rate no 
correction factor is applied, and the transfer takes place on a 1 Kw day – 1 Kw day basis (17(3)). 
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5.4. Enforcement and Compliance 
5.4.1. Effectiveness of Article 7 and 8.       
As discussed above for three of the stocks the main control articles were severely hampered by a 
lack of stock assessment.  
There are a number of examples of Harvest Control Rules being established for stocks without 
analytical assessment and forecast, and this could provide some inspiration for designing LTMP in 
simpler and consistent ways. These rules would build on biomass levels rather than exploitation levels, 
as these may often be more easily available. 
For European stocks, a LTMP could be designed alongside the ideas developed in either the most 
recent ICES MSY framework1, or the categories from the 2010 EC Policy Statement (COM(2010)241 
final)2, as both frameworks have emerged after intensive scientific considerations, consultations with 
clients and stakeholders and ongoing adjustments, in order to best cover the great diversity of 
situations across all European stocks. The 2010 Policy Statement included 11 categories, of which 4 
(categories 6 to 9) dealt with stocks whose status is not known precisely. A number of quantitative 
rules were also suggested for assessing if a stock is increasing or decreasing, for example “If the 
average estimated abundance in the last two years exceeds the average estimated abundance in the 
three preceding years by 20% or more,  a 15% increase in TAC applies”. So it is considered that such 
rules could potentially be investigated further and form the basis of a long-term management plan.  
Another source of inspiration could come from Alaska, where a 6-Tier system for Harvest Control 
Rules has been in place since 1998. A detailed description of the system can be found on the Alaska 
Fisheries Science Center3, and a scientific and sociological analysis of it was performed by European 
scientists during the CEVIS EU research project (Wolff and Hauge, 20084). This is also described in 
the WD in Annex 4. In short, each exploited stock, including bycatch, endangered and non-
commercial species, is assigned to a tier, based on the level and quality of biological information 
available.  The tier then defines the Acceptable Biological Catch and Overfishing Level. Tiers 1 to 3 
basically require age-structured models, and each of these Tiers consists of a 3-part rule, reflecting the 
state of the stock related to Bmsy. Tiers 4 to 6 are a one-part rule and apply to stocks without 
analytical assessment. Tier 4 is based on Yield Per Recruit, Tier 5 on estimates of biomass and natural 
mortality, and Tier 6 is an upper catch limit which works largely like the category 11 from the 2010 
EC Policy Statement paper.  
In general, the tier system provides precautionary management. Stock abundances are historically 
high for several stocks. While the design of some of rules is still questioned, all parties seem to have 
confidence in the Tier system and how it is used. 







4Wolff, F., and Hauge, K.H., 2008. Fisheries management innovations in Alaska: a case study report. Chapter 1 in Aranda 
(Ed.), 2008: Evaluation of innovative approaches to fisheries management outside the European Union: The cases of Alaska 
(USA), Canada, Iceland and New Zealand. Combined Deliverable D5 and D6, CEVIS Project (No 022686). 
http://www.ifm.dk/CEVIS/CevisProducts.htm 
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5.4.2. Effectiveness of Article 11.       
Very few applications have been approved for derogations under Article 11 (see Section 5.3.3). 
However, those that have been approved appear to be effective, as catches of cod under this derogation 
can be considered negligible. (Table 5.4.1) 
    Table 5.4.1 The percentage of the catch of cod taken in fleets operating under Article 11 derogation (total cod 







3d West of 
Scotland 
Cod catch taken under Article 11 segments/ total 
regulated cod catch   
5.0% 0.22% 0% 1.0% 
 
5.4.3. Effectiveness of Article 12. 
The objective of the plan 1342/2008 is “to ensure sustainable exploitation” for the respective cod 
stocks through achieving fishing mortality rates (F) of 0.4 or below. In practice, while fishing 
mortality rates are currently too high, this means the plan’s objective is to reduce them to the level of 
0.4 
Traditional instruments 
To achieve and regulate the F targets the plan deploys two traditional instruments, namely TACs 
(total allowable landings)5 and effort limitations, and one novel instrument, in the form of Article 13 
(see below). Of the traditional instruments we have learned over the past decades that they have 
generally failed to control the fishing mortality rate, in particular in the case of mixed fisheries.  
• The setting of TACs only limits the landings but not the catches, and especially in mixed 
demersal fisheries there are various incentives for legal discarding of overquota and 
undersized catches. The assumption that TACs limit total removals is undermined by the 
recent increased discarding of older, above minimum landing size, cod seen in both the North 
Sea (WGNSSK, 2010) and West of Scotland (WGCSE, 2010). For example WGCSE (2010) 
noted that for the West of Scotland cod removals exceed the agreed TAC by approximately 7 
times. 
• The setting of effort limitations is based on the assumption of proportionality between overall 
effort and F, which is known to be generally violated for various reasons, e.g. targeting 
behaviour and aggregation of the species leading to hyper-stability of CPUE (Harley et al. 
2001); this has been pointed out several times by STECF (e.g. PLEN-10-02) and is discussed 
in section 5.5.3. in more detail.  
Due to these limitations, neither the use of TAC (as total allowed landings) nor the proxy use of 
effort constraints to regulate catches, have been able to adequately control cod removals. Reliance on 
                                                 
5 It has long been tacitly understood that ‘TAC’, ‘Total Allowable Catch’, is implemented as total allowable 
landings only while discarding overquota catch is legal. Nowadays, especially in the context of ‘catch quota’, the 
word ‘catch’ is more often taken to mean total removals by fishers, i.e. landings + discards, except in the phrase 
‘TAC’ (where it continues to refer to landings only). If TAC were to be interpreted as ‘total allowable landings + 
discards’ it would become a more appropriate management tool. Control, and even the scientific recording, of 
catches (rather than landings) will then need different methods.  
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these control measures is one core failing in the plan and can be considered a major deficiency in the 
design of the plan. 
5.4.4. Uptake of Article 13 derogations.  
Member States’ usage of the provisions of Article 13 to increase effort 
































DK Yes Yes No Yes No, since effort 
was not used  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
DE Yes Yes No No No, Art 13(2c) 
not involved 





NL Yes No No No No, Art 13(2c) 
not involved 
     Yes Yes 
SE Yes No No Yes No, since effort 
was not used  
       





IR Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes, but advice 
not given owing 
to unavailability 
of information 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
UK Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes, advice 
given in PLEN-
10-02 
? Yes Yes Yes Yes   
 
The 2009 management period 
In the text table it can be seen that Article 13 has been used by various Member States. In the first 
management period (2009) six Member States notified the Commission in accordance with Art 13(5) 
of their intention to use extra effort under the provisions of Article 13. The requests of Denmark, 
Sweden, Ireland and the UK involved Art 13(2c). The German request included vessels for which 
exemption under Article 11 was denied in 2009. Only three Member States, Germany, Denmark and 
the UK, reported on the effort used in the 2009 management period, in accordance with Article 13(6). 
In the cases of Germany and Denmark their effort use was below the initially allocated maximum 
allowable fishing effort and hence the extra effort was not taken up. Sweden and the Netherlands did 
not provide the report in accordance with Article 13(6), but in the case of the Netherlands in the 
Commission inspection mission in 2010 it was verified that the Netherlands had in actual fact not 
taken up its increased effort. Also Sweden had not taken up its increased effort. Only Ireland and the 
UK seem to have taken up their increased effort. As stipulated in Art 13(7) the Commission requested 
STECF advice for the cases of the UK and Ireland; STECF gave advice concerning Scotland in its 
summer plenary meeting of 2010 (PLEN-10-02) but not for England, Wales, Northern Ireland, nor 
Ireland because no information had been made available. No STECF advice was asked for the other 
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two cases where Art 13(2c) was concerned as stipulated in Art 13(7), because – as it turned out – the 
extra effort was not taken up. STECF advice is not required if Art 13(2c) is not involved.  
The 2010 management period 
Four Member States, Denmark, Germany, France, and Ireland, notified the Commission in 
accordance with Art 13(5) of their intention to use increased effort in the 2010 management period. 
These Member States and also the UK submitted reports on used effort in accordance with Article 
13(6); all Member States used (some of) their increased effort. Three cases, Denmark, Ireland, and the 
UK, involved Art 13(2c), and the Commission requested STECF advice as stipulated in Art 13(7); for 
Ireland and Denmark this advice was given in the STECF spring plenary meeting of 2011 (PLEN-11-
01); it is expected that STECF will give advice concerning the UK in its summer plenary meeting 
when all information from the stock assessments becomes available.  
The 2011 management period 
Five Member States, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Ireland, and France, notified the 
Commission in accordance with Art 13(5) of their intention to use increased effort in the 2011 
management period; three cases, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Ireland, involve Art 13(2c). Since this 
period is not over yet, no reports on used effort in accordance with Article 13(6) have been submitted 
yet. The Commission did not yet request STECF advice in accordance with Art 13(7). 
5.4.5. Effectiveness of Article 13.  
Article 13 is, to our knowledge, an entirely new management instrument. It reflects the EC’s 
paradigm shift towards strengthened participation in fisheries governance (Green Paper on the CFP, 
2009). According to this Green Paper, the general framework for fisheries policy would be set on the 
basis of a Commission proposal, but detailed implementing decisions, for example, on types of gear or 
on which area should be closed to fishing and when, could then be taken at a regional level where 
scientists would need to interact with stakeholders and governments. The Green Paper also foresees 
that the industry is asked to develop its own fisheries plans, for which they would need scientific 
advice – especially if this is to form part of a results-based management system. Current thinking in 
fisheries management is that such practices are more likely to be successful with regards to achieving 
the objectives.  
Article 13 provides incentives for cod avoidance in the form of an increase in allowable effort if 
cod-avoidance measures are undertaken. The way in which cod avoidance may be achieved is left 
open to be decided by the Member States and the industry, e.g. through the use of highly selective 
gear, or spatiotemporal modifications of fishing activity. As such, Article 13 is an innovative 
instrument following the new paradigm.  
The objective of Article 13 – cod avoidance in terms of real catches incl. discards – clearly 
conforms to the plan’s aim: in order to reduce fishing mortality on cod, catches of cod need to be 
avoided. The other instruments (limiting landings or effort) are more indirectly related (if at all) to 
fishing mortality. Thus, in principal at least, it appears more appropriate (in terms of actually 
achieving reductions in F on cod) to use measures that actually achieve reductions in cod catches 
rather than proxy (effort) and ineffective (TAC) tools. It may be more appropriate to encourage the 
avoidance of cod catches as the primary focus of the plan and to use effort reductions as an 
‘encouragement (stick)’ to engage in actual fishing patterns that achieve reductions in cod catches. 
Article 13 also allows for measures tailored at a finer scale to specific fisheries than the grand-scale 
overall TACs and effort limitations do.  
For these three reasons – (i) the following of the new paradigm of participatory governance and 
results-based management; (ii) the more direct relation to the objective through controlling the actual 
catches; and (iii) the potential for fine-tuning of measures to specific fisheries – Article 13 should be 
seen as the cornerstone of the plan. 
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Problems identified with the implementation of Article 13 
The practical implementation of the cod avoidance articles has however, been questionable, has not 
yet been subject to thorough review and is complicated or impossible for areas where there is no 
analytical assessment (for F), specifically the requirements of article 13.2(c).  
Article 13 provisions allow for reclaim of effort in the following ways: 
13.2. The maximum allowable fishing effort may be increased within effort groups in which the 
fishing activity of one or more vessels: 
(a) is carried out having on board only one regulated gear the technical attributes of which 
result, according to a scientific study evaluated by STECF, in catching less than 1 % cod 
(highly selective gear); 
(b) results in a catch composition of less than 5 % cod per fishing trip (cod-avoiding fishing 
trips); 
(c) is conducted in accordance with a cod avoidance or discard reduction plan which reduces 
fishing mortality for cod among participating vessels by at least as much as the effort 
adjustment referred to in Article 12(4); or 
(d) is carried out in the west of Scotland area to the west of a line drawn by sequentially 
joining with rhumb lines the positions laid down in Annex IV of the regulation measured 
according to the WGS84 coordinate system, provided that the participating vessels are 
equipped with satellite-based vessel monitoring systems (VMS). 
Given the provisions of Article 11.2, exempting vessels that demonstrate that cod catches are below 
1.5% of the total catch, the inclusion of 13.2(a) seems unnecessary – why would vessels that can show 
cod catches below 1% not apply for exemption under article 11? Unless there is an implementation 
issue, e.g. have demonstrated or notified the use of highly selective gears under article 11, but then fail 
to use it, this seems an unnecessary provision in the regulation.  
Article 13.2(b) using percentages of catch, while attractive from a monitoring perspective, may not 
necessarily achieve the desired reductions in F and may favour smaller mesh fisheries which 
inherently may have ‘high’ overall catch (in fact this could conflict with the promotion of more 
selective gears).  
With regards to Article 13.2(c) it is difficult to disentangle the effects of specific and multiple 
measures on F, particularly when the entire fleet participates in the programme (as in the Scottish case) 
because there is no possibility to compare against vessels that are not participating. 
With respect to Article 13.2(d), there is evidence from Scottish VMS-linked logbook data (see 
PLEN-10-03) that would suggest that there are ‘significant’ cod catches west of the management line. 
ICES (2010) noted that ~60% of UK cod catches were taken west of the line. A more detailed analysis 
of cod catches by MS in this area is required and MS should be asked to submit spatially refined cod 
catch (from observer trips) and landings data. 
Whereas the TACs and effort limitations are, through the stipulated procedures for their setting, at 
least in intention numerically related to the (change in) fishing mortality rate as prescribed by the 
HCR, this is not the case for most of the provisions of Article 13. Therefore it is difficult to evaluate 
the appropriateness of the Article. According to 13.2(a) effort increase is allowed when gear is used 
which results in having less than 1% cod in the catch. The extent of effort increase is not specified in 
the regulation (except for an upper limit). Therefore, it is left undetermined to what extent this 
provision will contribute towards the aim of reduction of cod F. Also, there is no a priori clear relation 
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between the percentage of cod in the catch composition and the fishing mortality rate of cod. A low 
percentage may be achieved when (local) abundance is low but in such a case it would represent a 
high F. A low percentage may also be achieved by increased catches of other species (e.g. while 
keeping cod catches at similar levels). Furthermore, if many vessels have 1% cod in their catch, the 
total amount caught may still be high. The same deficiencies exist in the regulation with regards to 
13.2(b), which allows effort increase when less than 5% cod per fishing trip is achieved, and to some 
extent with regards to 13.2(d), which allows effort increase for vessels fishing west of the management 
line (where cod abundance is expected to be low because it is supposedly mainly outside the depth 
range of cod). Because of these deficiencies, it is not possible to assess a priori how appropriate these 
provisions actually are. Nevertheless, for the post hoc evaluation of the effectiveness of the provisions 
(whether they have actually resulted in a decrease in fishing mortality rate), catch and effort data of the 
relevant vessels might be compared with catch and effort data of similar vessels that were not 
operating under these special conditions, and if estimates of fishing mortality rate are available their 
contribution to the change in F might be estimated. 
Special condition 13.2(c) poses a different problem. It is explicitly and exactly related to the aim of 
the plan, in that it stipulates that the vessels can do anything which results in the same reduction in 
fishing mortality as stipulated by the HCR. In that sense, it is by definition appropriate. However, 
whether a proposed cod avoidance plan qualifies for 13.2(c) can in principal be determined only to the 
extent to which fishing mortality can be estimated (post hoc) if the Article is taken ‘to the letter’. This 
can be seen as a flaw in the design or formulation of the plan.  
New paradigm – new problems – new solutions 
The difficulties regarding Article 13 outlined above, in particular those pertaining to 13.2(c), may 
be unavoidable under the new paradigm. Perhaps the new paradigm does not allow for very strict 
assessment of compliance and effectiveness. Perhaps we need to find new ways of how to determine 
whether results-based management achieves its objectives; we need metrics that are measurable on the 
time-scale on which we want to evaluate effectiveness. Compliance in results-based management is by 
definition difficult to establish, because results-based management implies that fishers are allowed to 
do anything so long as it results in achieving the objective. Then, the assessment of compliance and 
the evaluation of effectiveness merge into one another, and probably have to be deferred a few years 
into the future, when it can be more reliably detected (estimated) whether the intended reductions in F 
have actually occurred and the objectives been achieved. In that case, monitoring whether the plan 
functions as it should and whether it modifies behaviour in the right direction becomes a more 
important aspect of the evaluation. Annual metrics could then focus more on changes in fisher 
behaviour, e.g. changes in catches and discards, shifts in effort allocation to certain gears, métiers, 
areas and periods in relation to cod concentrations, while conventional metrics on the status of the 
stock should perhaps be evaluated at longer time scales. While fisheries managers will have to get 
used to the new paradigm and its opportunities and limitations, another promising paradigm shift is 
happening: real-time high-resolution spatiotemporal data on fishing activity (VMS) and catches 
(electronic logbooks and fully documented fishing) are becoming available. These will allow for 
management measures to be set at a finer spatiotemporal scale and tailored at a finer scale to specific 
fisheries than the grand-scale overall TACs and effort limitations which are based on rough large-scale 
annual estimates at the level of large management area. 
5.4.6. Effectiveness of Article 14.  
As the uptake under this article has been very limited or at least reported as such, the effectiveness 
appears to be limited. 
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5.4.7. Effectiveness of Article 17.   
The implementation aspects of Article 17 are noted in Section 5.3.7, the use of the Article is 
discussed here.  
Two options are available to member states wishing to transfer between effort groups. The first is 
based on the cod catch and effort data submitted to STECF Effort EWG each year; CPUE estimates 
are derived for each area and gear group aggregated across all member states. These international 
transfer ratios are then applied when transferring between gear groups. Secondly, in the event that the 
CPUE estimates from individual member states differ by more than 15%, then member states can, on 
application to the Commission, apply national transfer rates. In some cases there has been a structural 
change in fishing practices or where other EC regulations have prohibited a particular gear group, for 
example the introduction of new technical measures or where particular gear groups are no longer in 
use. This can potentially result in member states permanently redistributing effort from one gear group 
to another if they wish to use their historic entitlement. This can result in two issues. If these gear 
groups had similar CPUE rates to the international estimates, then the effort is transferred based on the 
international rate. However, in situations where the historic difference in CPUE was greater than 15% 
below the international level, member states could potentially be penalised as it is no longer possible 
to gather data on which to base the 3-year average. This could potentially limit the development of 
new fisheries, owing to the lack of effort, that may wish to use gear and mesh bands associated with 
historic fishery but for targeting different species.  
 
5.4.8. Conclusions to review of regulation Articles. 
In all of the stock areas the total recorded effort by the gears for which cuts applied declines 
slightly, but did not decline, in 2009 and 2010, in line with the reductions according to the plan. Some 
of this lack of reduction is associated with cod avoidance measures, implying that mortality should 
have decreased, however, not all fleets that failed to deliver reductions were involved in measures 
under Article 13.   
In summary, by defining catch limits in terms of catch composition, i.e. as % of the total catch, 
there are perverse drivers, and the total catch of cod of a group of vessels is not considered. Currently, 
under various derogations, fleets are allocated effort regulatory status based on a percentage of cod in 
their catch. However, this criterion does not directly relate to the fleet’s total catch of cod, or the 
partial fishing mortality of that fleet segment. If, for example, each fleet segment or vessel was 
allocated a total allowable catch of cod (landings and discards), this would provide fishermen with a 
target that is directly measurable by them and relates well to fishing mortality on cod. It would still be 
necessary for this catch to be monitored to show that this had not been exceeded (as is currently the 
requirement under Article 11/13 criteria). By using catch as the measure rather than F, which 
fishermen cannot measure or monitor, the responsibility for estimating the catch that leads to the target 
F required by managers lies appropriately with the scientists, but the managers and fishermen have a 
responsibility to monitor and control catch, something they can be requested and expected to measure 
under current logbook regulations. 
In this context we recommend (i) that catch limitations refer to all catches (landings plus discards) and 
that high-coverage of monitoring of the catches (and compliance with the catch quota) is in place (e.g. 
fully documented fishing through cameras on board); this way the fishers will experience 
internalisation of the costs of discarding, which they will then have to take into account in their 
business decisions; (ii) that through the participatory governance, such as in Article 13, stakeholders 
are encouraged to phrase plans that suit their fishery practices on a fishery-by-fishery basis; this will 
result in greater stakeholder buy-in and compliance; (iii) that flexibility is allowed at a fine 
spatiotemporal and fishery-by-fishery level suited to the actual stock distribution and the fishing 
practices – different options should be available to the individual fisher; this will help to prevent 
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perverse incentives; (iv) metrics as well as an appropriate time-scale to measure them are established 
to evaluate effectiveness of the management measures (e.g. catches, effort allocation to métiers, areas 
and periods at an annual time scale, stock status parameters at a longer time scale); this will help 
evaluating whether the measures are appropriate for achieving the objectives; and (v) if the approach 
was taken (as suggested above) that fleets for which managers request different effort regulatory status 
because of low cod catch (Article 11 type) would be allocated a total allowable catch of cod, as a 
portion of the total MS’s quota, managers would be required to demonstrate that these cod catches are 
not exceeded. However, the detailed monitoring required could be costly, particularly if a small part of 
the total national catch of cod is taken in a small bycatch fishery that is expensive to monitor. 
Managers should then be given the option to either allocate a very small but sufficient portion of the 
national quota to these vessels and take on the burden of detailed monitoring, or alternatively allocate 
a larger portion of the national quota to these vessels using a less precise monitoring method. It would 
then be cheaper to demonstrate that the larger portion quota was not exceeded.  
5.5. Additional general reviews on the effectiveness of recovery plans and effort management 
will be provided as follows:- 
5.5.1. Uncover project review:  
The UNCOVER project ‘Understanding the mechanisms of stock recovery’ Project no. 022717 
(SSP 8) was funded under the EU 6th Framework Programme. It examined in detail responses to 
management and biological stimuli in the following stocks: Norwegian and Barents Seas (Northeast 
Arctic cod, Norwegian spring-spawning herring, Barents Sea capelin), the North Sea (North Sea cod, 
Autumn spawning herring, North Sea plaice), the Baltic Sea (Eastern Baltic cod, Baltic sprat) and the 
Bay of Biscay and Iberian Peninsula (Northern hake, Southern hake, Bay of Biscay anchovy). 
UNCOVER’s objectives were to identify changes experienced during stock depletion/collapses, to 
understand prospects for recovery, to enhance the scientific understanding of the mechanisms of fish 
stock/fishery recovery, and to formulate recommendations how best to implement LTMPs/recovery 
plans.  
UNCOVER identified the developing of LTMPs with Management Strategy Evaluation (MSE) as 
key to creating plans that work. UNCOVER emphasized that it is essential to set realistic long-term 
objectives and strategies for achieving successful LTMPs/recovery plans. UNCOVER recommended 
that such plans ideally should include:  
1) Consideration of stock-regulating environmental processes;  
2) Incorporation of fisheries effects on stock structure and reproductive potential;  
3) Consideration of changes in habitat dynamics due to global change;  
4) Incorporation of biological multispecies interactions;  
5) Incorporation of technical multispecies interactions and mixed-fisheries issues;  
6) Integration of economically optimized harvesting;  
7) Exploration of the socio-economic implications and political constraints from the 
implementation of existing and alternative recovery plans;  
8) Investigations on the acceptance of the plans by stakeholders and specifically incentives for 
compliance by the fishery;  
9) Agreements with and among stakeholders.  
An analysis by UNCOVER of the development and success of fish stock/fishery recovery plans in 
Australia, Europe, New Zealand and the USA, based on information collected at the project’s start, 
showed that the four best combined factors able to predict successful stock/fishery recovery were:  
a) the rapid reduction in fishing mortality;  
b) the environmental conditions during the recovery period;  
c) life history characteristics of fish stock;  
d) management performance.  
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UNCOVER considered that “recovery is more likely when fishing effort reductions occur through 
regulating days at sea and decommissioning, and inclusion of harvest control rule (HCR) schemes, and 
there are positive recruitment events during the recovery period either stimulated by or coincident with 
effort reductions. Socio-economic factors such as governance and wider stakeholder participation are 
playing an increasingly important role.”  
UNCOVER concluded that “a substantial and rapid reduction in fishing mortality is a key factor 
contributing to the overall success of a recovery plan, whereas ‘too little, too late’ catch reductions 
delay the onset of recovery or prevent recovery at all. The key is the speedy initial reduction in fishing 
mortality. This is because the effect of small reductions may easily be subservient to the uncertainty of 
the assessments. As a result of small reductions there will probably be a sequence of years in which 
recovery responses are not evident, whereas the public debate on further reduction of TAC and quota 
will be continued year after year, as a process undermining the credibility of the scientific advice if the 
effect of previous reductions cannot be shown.” 
UNCOVER identified that preserving the stock’s reproductive potential is critically important. 
“Process studies revealed that sexual maturation schedules are linked to growth rates and in turn are 
related to population densities or sizes, thus maturation at an earlier age tends to be linked with lower 
population sizes rather than larger populations.”  
UNCOVER noted that the consequences of changing habitats can influence recovery: “Stock 
production and recovery dynamics depend on the availability of preferred habitat conditions at various 
stages of ontogeny which influence optimal growth, spawning, recruitment and survival. These 
habitats are defined by abiotic and biotic convictions such as temperature, salinity, oxygen, food type 
and availability, ocean currents, and limitations on pollution or other forms of human encroachment 
that degrade habitats.” “Favourable environmental conditions are associated with successful stock 
recovery but are not alone in influencing recovery.” 
UNCOVER noted the effects of multispecies interactions: “Multispecies interactions and trophic 
controls have a strong influence on stock recovery potential, and the magnitude of impacts depends on 
the prevailing environmental conditions. Predation on small fish has a high impact on recruitment 
success and hence recovery potential of commercially important fish species. Density dependent (i.e., 
intraspecific) but often more important interspecific trophic interactions lead to different and mostly 
slower recovery rates of depleted fish stocks, compared to single species predictions.” 
Conclusions to UNCOVER review 
The most important messages for managers from the UNCOVER project are  
• The need to test policies by MSE, including fishery interactions.  
• If reductions in fishing mortality are required then implement a large change quickly, rather 
than expect a slow decline to work.  
5.5.2. Review of Faroes effort management:  
A detailed review and some analyses of the Faroese effort management is available in Jákupsstovu 
et al. (2007) and Baudron et al. (2010), and the summary here draws on a more detailed analysis in 
Annex 5.  
The Faroe Islands have received growing interest as a case study where relevant lessons could be 
learned. In the mid-1990s, the TAC system in place was rejected by the fishing industry and the 
authorities because it resulted in extensive discarding when single-species quotas were filled. 
Therefore, owing to the general dissatisfaction, the Faroese Parliament developed in 1996 a new 
management system in close cooperation with the fishing industry for all vessel groups targeting 
demersal stocks on the Faroe plateau. This new system (referred to as total allowable effort, TAE) 
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consists of individual transferable effort quotas (fishing days) for each fleet category. Additional 
measures such as area closures during the spawning seasons, area restrictions for larger vessels, and 
minimum gear mesh sizes were also implemented. This represents therefore a unique system of pure 
effort-regulation in a mixed groundfish fishery. 
The initial allocation of fishing days was based on an estimated historical allocation from data on 
partial fishing mortalities. It was also estimated that sustainability of the fisheries could be achieved by 
a target fishing mortality (F) of 0.45 for each stock. Subsequently, the number of fishing days 
allocated has been regulated each year based on ICES advice and input from the fishing industry. 
After more than ten years of implementation, an empirical assessment of the practical effects of this 
management system was conducted (Jákupsstovu et al., 2007). Globally, it was concluded that Faroese 
effort management had not achieved its objectives, and among others that the target of F=0.45 had not 
been achieved.  
Only after this evaluation did cod F decrease to 0.45; but ICES considers anyway this generic 
target to be inconsistent with both precautionary and MSY considerations, as Fpa and Fmsy are 
significantly lower for all three stocks.  In 2011, ICES advice was for an F reduction of 30% and 38% 
for cod and saithe respectively, and no directed fishery on haddock.   
A major issue is that over at least the first ten years of implementation (recent effort updates not 
being available in the ICES advice book) the total number of fishing days allocated has been reduced 
by less than 2% per year in average, significantly less than advised by ICES for the same period. In 
addition, the allocated fishing days were never fully utilized, however, which suggests that the initial 
effort allocation was too high to constrain F to the target. In practice, effort management did not act as 
a restrictive and reactive management tool, but rather as a conservative status quo. 
One of the most fundamental assumptions behind the effort management system proved also to be 
challenged. The fleets were expected to target the most abundant fish species, thus reducing the fishing 
mortality on stocks that are in bad shape. However, low prices on saithe and haddock and high prices 
for cod have kept the fishing mortality high on cod; the economic factors seem to be more important 
than the relative abundance of the stocks in determining which species is targeted (ICES advice 2011). 
Overall, the conclusions reached by Jákupsstovu et al. (2007) and Baudron et al. (2010) were that 
the most important issue in the Faroese fisheries management was not the effort-based system itself, 
but rather its inability to adjust to scientific recommendations and to variability and trends in 
catchability. This in turn is linked to the fact that the initial effort was set by Faroese authorities too 
high, and it could not be reduced easily thereafter. A sustainable TAE system can be accommodated 
only if the initial effort level is set sustainably, as there appears to arise more resistance to large cuts in 
effort than large cuts in single-species TACs (implemented as TALs).  But allowing for adequate year-
on-year flexibility, the TAE would appear to be a more sustainable and economically robust 
management strategy than TAC-based management, considering the fluctuations in the single-species 
HCR and the extensive discarding this could create.  
This conclusion is consistent with the UNCOVER findings described above, that initial large 
decreases in fishing mortality/fishing effort are more efficient than small annual downwards 
adjustments.  
5.5.3. F-Effort studies:  
The cod plan, in its aim to control fishing mortality (F) on cod, heavily relies on the assumption of 
proportionality between fishing effort and F. The proportionality assumption may seem valid 
intuitively but it actually depends on many hidden assumptions which are usually violated (‘all else 
being equal’ is such a tacit assumption). 
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The Working Document (Annex 6) reviews some published studies that identify factors influencing 
the partial F exerted per unit effort (Fpue) by a vessel which may thus deteriorate the proportionality. 
These factors include skipper skills, auxiliary equipment, gear, as well as the area and the season of 
the fishing operation, costs, revenues, and other incentives, leading to business decisions such as 
targeting or avoidance.  
This implies that, depending on the predictability of catchability by fishers, management-imposed 
reductions in effort might not translate directly into a proportional reduction in F. Another effect is 
that spatial distribution of a stock may contract with declining population biomass, without affecting 
the fish densities in the core habitat of the species. When fishers are mainly fishing these core habitats, 
contraction of the spatial distribution will result in a ‘hyper stability’ of the catch rate. Thus, if fishers 
faced with effort reductions ‘contract’ their activity to these core habitats, they may still achieve high 
catches despite the reduced effort. 
The conclusion from the review is that in general it is unlikely that effort reductions will lead to 
proportional reductions in F; under effort reductions it is most likely that the non-proportional relation 
is convex, implying that F decreases to a lesser extent than effort. 
The Working Document also presents a ‘quick and dirty’ illustration of this principle in order to 
gain some idea of the lower bounds of expected % reduction in F under a given % reduction in effort 
(under the extreme, and unrealistic assumptions that (i) the fleet segment maximizes their revenues 
and (ii) fishers have perfect knowledge of spatiotemporal catchability, and (iii) catches are not 
restricted by quota). It is concluded that, depending on fisher behaviour, a 25% effort reduction may 
result in anything between a few % and >25% reduction in F.  
The results in Annex 6 also indicate that directed and bycatch fisheries may be different: the 
relationship between effort an F is much more linear for a situation where cod is caught in a bycatch 
fishery in the Irish Sea. This is also shown for North Sea cod over 2003-2009 (Figure 5.1, cf Annex 
12), where the trends in F are better correlated to the trends in effort of gears catching cod as a by-
catch (Nephrops trawl TR2 and beam trawls) than to the trends in cod-targeted TR1 and for GN1 
where the correlation is apparently good but with little change in effort. Thus effort may regulate 
bycatch but may have less impact on directed fisheries which can change behaviour to mitigate the 

























Figure 5.1. North Sea cod. Correlation between estimated Fbar (assessment 2011) and EC effort by main gear 
category, 2003-2009 based on the 2011 assessment.  
6. EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTS OF THE MULTI-ANNUAL PLAN ON THE FISHERY  
Data on catches, landings and effort were assembled at the STECF EWG 06-11 Effort group. The 
results are preliminary but are thought to be substantively correct for most countries except possibly 
France. Data on landings and effort in Norwegian trawl fisheries from the North Sea 2003-2010 were 
submitted during the meeting. The format is as submitted to the ICES WGMIXFISH. The Norwegian 
trawl fisheries in the North Sea are mainly targeting saithe. 
6.1. Changes in effort for managed units 
Updated information on effort (kWdays) and catches (tonnes) by fleets operating under the cod plan 
was available from STECF EWG - 06 -11 held earlier in June 2011. Results are preliminary and had 
not been reviewed by STECF at the time of this meeting (EWG 07-11). Most countries submitted data 
for 2010 according to the formal EU data call (Ref. Ares(2011)200418 - 23/02/2011) but there were no 
data supplied by Spain. In the context of the cod plan discussions, this shortfall mainly affects ICES 
area VIa (cod plan area 3d). A few revisions to the available data are expected prior to the second 
effort meeting, but for the purpose of drawing broad conclusions with respect to the cod plan these 
preliminary data are considered adequate. 
This section describes broad trends in overall regulated gear effort followed by comments on 
predominant gears used in the different areas of the cod plan and a consideration of the scale of use of 
unregulated gears and the use of provisions in the cod plan (e.g. Articles 11 and 13).  A similar 
summary of catches is also provided.  Detailed information supporting the comments in this section 
can be found in the tables of Annex 7. 
Figure 6.1 (below) shows the overall trends in effort by the main regulated gear types in the four 
areas covered by the cod plan.  Data are available from 2000 but plotted from 2003 only owing to an 
unresolved problem with French effort data for 2002. In all areas there have been marked reductions in 
overall effort, particularly in the early part of the series before the existing cod plan came into force. 
The declines arise from major decommissioning schemes and the previous cod plan. In most areas, 
recorded effort levelled off during the first years of the current plan. Trawling is by far the 
predominant activity in Kattegat, Irish Sea and West of Scotland while in the North Sea beam trawling 
is of comparable importance. The importance of specific regulated gear  categories varies between the 
areas, with TR2 trawl gear (mesh size <100mm) being most important in the Kattegat and  Irish Sea, 
TR1 gear (mesh size >100mm) being most important in the West of Scotland and  BT2 beam trawl 
gear being the most important single gear in the North Sea (only the combined TR1 and TR2 exceeded 
this).  There is no evidence of the use of any regulated gear types increasing significantly in the cod 
plan areas. 
The proportion of the recorded all-gear total effort attributable to unregulated gears varied 
considerably between the areas. The lowest values (6-18%) were obtained in the Kattegat and mostly 
recorded by otter and pelagic trawls.  Intermediate values were observed in the North Sea and Irish 
Sea (23-31% and 18-37% respectively) mainly by beam, pelagic and otter trawls in the former and 
dredges in the latter. Highest values (41-53%) were recorded in the West of Scotland where pelagic 
trawls and pots were the most prominent gears. 
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3c Irish Sea 3d West of Scotland 
Figure 6.1 Trends in effort (kWdays) for the main regulated gear types operating under the cod plan in 
Kattagat, North Sea, Irish Sea and West of Scotland. Data presented for 2003-2010.  
 
Effort attributable to vessels operating under Article 11 (<1.5% cod in catches) generally 
represented a low percentage of total regulated effort (less than 3% in the Irish Sea and North Sea and 
8% in the West of Scotland). The highest percentage (14%) was recorded in the Kattegat where a 
significant proportion of the TR2 trawl fleet operates using the Swedish grid. 
Effort attributable to vessels operating under Article 13 (highly selective gears, <5% cod and cod 
avoidance measures) represented a variable proportion of the total regulated effort depending on area. 
The lowest value (about 25%) was recorded in the North Sea and the highest (close to 70%) in the 
Kattegat.  The variation depended on the numbers of gears and countries operating in each area and 
the extent to which application for the use of Article 13 was made for prominent gear types (e.g. TR2 
in the Kattegat). 
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Effort recorded for fully documented fisheries (FDF) was generally low except in the North Sea, 
where Denmark and the UK have been trialling the use of Remote Electronic Monitoring (REM) 
technologies in pilot catch quota schemes.  
6.2. Changes in cod catch for managed units 
Overall catches by regulated gear and the patterns of discarding through time show different trends 
in the different areas (Figure 6.2). In the Kattegat, catches (mainly by TR2 gear) have declined to less 
than one tenth of the amount in 2003. Discard rates by the main gear appear to be variable (32 -53% 
with no obvious trend). North Sea catches (mainly by TR1 gear) rose until 2008 reflecting improved 
recruitment from the 2005 year class. Catches have since shown a small decline. Discard rates by TR1 
in the North Sea rose to 53% in 2008 but have since shown a marked fall to 20% in 2010.  In the Irish 
Sea, stable catches (mainly by TR1 and TR2 gears) between 2003 and 2008 have been followed by 
two years of lower values. Here the estimated trawl discard rate is very erratic and there is uncertainty 
about their reliability. In the West of Scotland, catches have fluctuated without any trend over the time 
period and remain high despite progressive reduction in TAC. The predominant cod catching gear is 
TR1 and the discard rate for this has risen steadily to over 80% in 2010. 
The catches made by unregulated gears generally represent a low percentage of the overall 
regulated gear catch of cod (below 4% in most cases). There remains some uncertainty about the 
extent to which the available figures for all of the different unregulated gears contain estimates of 
discards and this will be considered further by the STECF effort management group. Where such 
estimates are available, however, they generally indicate that discarded quantities are relatively small 
and appear to confirm that catches from the unregulated gears are not a significant problem in the 
areas covered by the cod plan. 
In all the areas where Article 11 exemptions have been applied, catches of cod by vessels under 
Article 11 represent a small proportion of overall cod catch made by regulated gears (5% or less). 
In the different areas, catches of cod by vessels utilising the Article 13 provision vary between 
about 45% and 75% of the overall catch made by regulated gears (Figure 6.2). Highest percentages 
occur in areas where a significant proportion of the fleet operates under Article 13 (for example the 
Kattegat) and are not to be unexpected.  Evaluation of the impact of Article 13 requires more detailed 
analysis than consideration of catch proportions alone. The provisions of Article 13 are intended to 
bring cod catches in line with what is implied by the forecast consistent with the cod plan HCR and to 
reduce unwanted catches (leading to discards) which exceed the target. This is discussed further in 
Section 5.4.4 
Information on catches by fully documented fisheries (FDF) was also available, but are likely to be 
revised before the second STECF effort management meeting, and at this stage are only indicative of 


































































3c Irish Sea 3d West of Scotland 
Figure 6.2 Trends in catch (landings +discards - tonnes) for the main regulated gear types operating 





6.3. Catch curve analysis    
The objective of a catch curve analysis was to examine if trends in mortality can be detected in 
catch, in the absence of a full analytical stock assessment. A preliminary evaluation of the use of the 
catch at age data (landings and discards) for the main gears identified was carried out; the results were 
rather inconclusive suggesting the individual fisheries do not contain substantive information to 
inform on mortality in the absence of an assessment.  
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6.4. Presentation of VMS information 
The recent development of satellite tracking and global position systems has made it possible to 
study the spatiotemporal distribution of deployed fishing effort at a higher resolution than before 
through the use of VMS (Vessel Monitoring System) information. In a few cases VMS has been used 
to indirectly assess local concentrations of fish (e.g. Poos and Rijnsdorp 2007). In several studies, 
VMS data have been used together with official logbook data in order to estimate fishing mortality for 
non-target species (Piet et al 2009); to calculate the fishing mortality imposed on a stock by single 
fishing operations (Rijnsdorp et al 2006); or to explore the spatial distribution of catch and effort at 
high spatiotemporal resolution (Bastardie et al 2010, Gerritsen and Lordan 2011). Such data will be 
also an important element to evaluate the effectiveness of long term management plan (LTMP) where 
effort regulation is an important component of the plan itself. Moreover, the reform of the European 
Common Fisheries Policy should result in an Area Based Management integrated on the Ecosystem 
Approach and in this context VMS will play an important role to achieve this.  
Kattegat VMS 
VMS records from fishing vessels of both the Swedish and the Danish TR1 and TR2 segment that 
catch cod in the Kattegat were collated for the period 2007-2010 (Morten et al. WD Annex 8). 
Swedish VMS data includes also information on the application of the “Swedish sorting grid”. For the 
use of the SELTRA 300 trawl, no information in the electronic version of the logbook data about the 
actual use of that gear is available. The VMS data classified as “fishing” for the Danish and Swedish 
TR1 and TR2 segment for the period 2007-2010 were selected using speed criteria. The VMS data 
show that the main part of the Danish and Swedish fisheries takes place on shared fishing ground in 
the eastern and deeper part of Kattegat; however, the Danish fishery extends more easterly and 
southerly than the Swedish. Closed areas for protection of cod were established in 2009 in Kattegat. 
Sweden had almost no activity in the permanent closed (“the red area”) area in Kattegat and in the 
Sound (“Kilen”; “the black area”; temporary closure in the spawning season except for fishery with 
selective gears with a very low catch of cod) before the closure in 2009. The “orange” area is closed 
for bottom trawling during the spawning season and all year for all fisheries except fisheries with 
selective gears with a low catch of cod, e.g. sorting grid. 
The effect of the box closures in 2009 is clearly seen for the effort distribution estimated using the 
VMS in the first quarter. Effort seems redistributed more westerly after the closure. For the second 
quarter, effort in the “red” area (closed for all commercial fisheries) was close to zero in 2009, but 
with some activities in 2010. Generally, the effort in the “orange” area (closed for all fisheries except 
fisheries with selective gears with very low catch of cod, i.e. Swedish grid or SELTRA 300) has 
increased significantly in 2010 and it seems to be the most important area in the second quarter. Based 
on the calculated centre of gravity of the fishing effort by year and quarter, the large scale changes in 
effort distribution since 2007 have been rather modest. The same conclusion about a stable fishing 
pattern can be derived from the fished area by year and month.  
In conclusion, the introduction of closed Kattegat areas in 2009 had, as intended, given a very low 
effort in the affected areas in the first quarter of 2009 and 2010. Total annual effort estimated by VMS 
records seems, however, to have been stable (2009) or increased (2010) since the closure. For both 
years, quarter 1 effort was reallocated outside the closed areas, mainly to the more eastern grounds. 
This pattern changed significantly in 2010 where the closed area had the highest concentration of 
effort in the entire time series (2007-2010), which might be linked to a higher CPUE of especially 
larger Nephrops in the area due to the area closure the year before. As cod selective gears are 
mandatory in the area, a shift to such gears will decrease the fishing impact (discards) on cod 
significantly, even though the concentration of cod is relatively high in the area. The closure of the 
northern Sound (“Kilen”) has almost entirely removed effort by segment TR1 and TR2 in the area. 
Scottish VMS 
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The UK authorities have provided maps that show spatial fishing effort (VMS) linked to logbook data 
for six species (cod, haddock, whiting, megrim, monkfish and saithe) for UK vessels only fishing 
along the shelf break (STEFC 2010). The data presented provides information on the spatial 
exploitation pattern. This can not be interpreted as the distribution of the individual species, only the 
distribution of the retained catch. Cod is caught in all areas with significant landings from inside the 
line to the north and north-west of Lewis and to the west of the Orkney Islands. Catches are generally 
associated with the northern part of VIa along the shelf break. In addition, significant landings are also 
taken in waters deeper than 200m, particularly in the depth band of 200 to 300m, with the VMS and 
landings data indicating some minor cod catches in depths greater than 300m. 
Irish VMS 
A VMS dataset of effort (i.e. hours fished) for 2006-2010 was collated for the Irish fleet for area 
VIa and VIIa (Kraak WD Annex 9). The effort was estimated for the three main métiers (TR1, TR2, 
and BT2) catching cod and using only the first three quarters as the data for the last quarter for 2010 
was not available. The amount of effort deployed was estimated in grid cells with zero, low (0-5 kg/h), 
medium (5-10 kg/h), or high (>10 kg/h) observer cpue levels of cod. Data was merged for VIa and 
VIIa but the analysis could be done for the separate regions. An increase in effort in the medium- and 
high-abundance cell-week combinations was observed in 2010. When the fishing hours are treated 
separately for the 3 gear groups TR1, TR2, and BT2, the same trend has been observed. The 
conclusion is that in 2009 and 2010 a reduction of fishing activity in areas with high cod abundance 
compared to 2008 was not observed, countering the objective of the plan.  
Conclusions to VMS studies 
It is generally recognized that the use of official effort and landings data does not allow to 
distinguish between fishing and steaming time, or to account for the discarded part of the catch, 
introducing an important bias in the study of the fishing effort-fishing mortality relationship. 
Integrating VMS information with landings data and catch data through observers or camera systems 
will provide more robust information on effective effort (i.e. trawling time) and cpue, and analysis of 
integrated VMS and logbook data will allow fisheries data to be analysed on a considerably finer 
spatial scale than was possible previously (Bastardie et al 2010, Gerritsen and Lordan 2011). The 
analysis of the Kattegat, Irish and Scottish data has shown how VMS data can be used for evaluating 
fisheries management actions, such as the implementation of closed areas and fleet-specific effort 
regulations for a particular fishery, and evaluates the effectiveness of effort restrictions within a 
management plan. 
6.5. Evaluation of the effects of the multi-annual plan on the stock  
Evaluation of the stock, exploitation (F) and the degree of compliance and effectiveness of certain 
regulations all can in principle be determined post hoc if accurate estimates of (relative) fishing 
mortality rate are available, usually from stock assessments. However, stock assessments may suffer 
from too much noise, too much smoothing, and/or retrospective bias (Dickey-Collas et al. 2007, Kraak 
et al., 2008, Kelly et al., 2006). These are the result of intrinsic difficulties in the stock assessment 
process and can be summarised as ‘deciding on the correct amount of smoothing’ to minimise the 
effect of noise and reduce the bias and bring out the most informative ‘signal’ in terms of SSB or F. 
Choosing this level of smoothing is not a trivial decision. Due to these difficulties for most of these 
stocks (Irish Sea, Kattegat, West of Scotland) analytical stock assessments were not agreed by ICES 
and a short term forecast (STF) giving catch advice was not provided. Nevertheless, in all cases the 
SSB was estimated. In all cases, except the NS, lack of a well-estimated F in the last year makes it 
difficult to evaluate how effective the measures have been in achieving the plan’s aim; it may be that 
this can be assessed well only several years after the measures were set. The following sections use the 
stock assessment, where available, to evaluate the state of stock and its exploitation.  
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6.5.1. Kattegat Cod 
The SSB of cod in the Kattegat steadily declined from around 35 000 tons in the late 1970s to 5000 
tons in the end of the 1990s (Figure 6.3). Since 2000, the SSB is estimated to be below Blim (6000 
tons). The assessment for the latest years suffers from uncertainties, caused by significant unallocated 
removals (UR), estimated based on survey information.  
The benchmark assessment workgroup in 2009 (WKROUND 2009) concluded that the results from 
runs with and without estimating UR should both be considered as final assessments (ICES WGBFAS 
2011). This is because the contributions of fisheries- and biology-driven factors (migration patterns) to 
the estimated unallocated removals could not be specified. Concerning the SSB, both assessments 
(with and without UR) estimate the SSB in 2010 at around 1000 tons, which is in line with fisheries-
independent survey-based biomass estimates (ICES WGBFAS 2011). The estimate for 2011 indicates 
a slight increase compared to 2010. Recruitment in recent years has been among the lowest in the time 
series. The recent survey data indicate the 2010 year-class to be somewhat stronger compared to two 
previous ones but still rather low. The analyses of potential environmental effects on recruitment 
concluded that the current low level of recruitment is mainly due to low level of SSB, rather than due 
to any external factors (Annex 10).  
 
Current level of fishing mortality is unknown and is likely in between the two estimates from the 
runs with and without estimating the UR. Under the assumption of no unallocated removals, F in 2010 
(0.1) is estimated to be well below the target of the plan (0.4) and F decreased by 50% since 2008 and 
by 84% since 2004. Officially reported landings decreased substantially (Figure 6.3) and the reported 
landings of cod in the Kattegat in 2010 were 155 tons, while the TAC was 379 tons. Taking 
unallocated removals into account leads to an F at 1.1 in 2010 with only a marginal decrease in F since 
2008 (2%) and an increase since 2004 (8%). The scaling factor for the estimation of unallocated 
removals increased from 1.61 in 2003 to 8.28 in 2010 (ICES WGBFAS 2011).  
To disentangle recent changes in fisheries-induced mortality on Kattegat cod, two sets of analyses 
were conducted:  
• The fishing impact (proxy for fishing mortality) on cod in Kattegat from the TR2 segment 
was estimated based on temporal and spatial distribution of the cod stock and the fishery 
(see Annex 8 for details).   
• Available information on different sources of catch was combined to evaluate whether the 
estimated total removals could possibly be related to fisheries (see Annex 11 for details). 
The results from the analyses (i) lead to the conclusion that the fishing impact on cod in Kattegat 
from the TR2 segment has decreased in the period 2007-2010 for all age-groups of cod. The fishing 
impact in 2010 is estimated to be around 63% of the impact in 2007, which is equivalent to an annual 
decrease of around 14%. Nominal effort measured as kW-days has remained at the same level since 
2007, so the decrease in fishing impact is due to a combination of closed areas which exclude the 
fishery from areas of high cod densities, and the application of selective gears. The reduction in 
fishing impact was highest in 2009 due to the introduction of closed areas. In 2010, effort increased 
again in these areas, and the estimated reduction in fishing impact was due to application of selective 
gears, required for access to the closed areas. The decrease in fishing impact in 2010 was smaller than 
estimated for 2009, and sensitive to the catchability value applied for selective gears (Annex 8). 
In the analyses (ii), the information on commercial landings, discards and recreational catches of 
Kattegat cod were combined and compared with estimated total removals from the stock. The results 
showed that the available data on fisheries catch cannot explain the discrepancy between the landings 
and estimated total removals from the stock. Even though the available information on discards and 
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recreational fishery indicated that the total fisheries catch in 2010 was about 3 times higher than the 
landings, this estimate of total fisheries catch is still more than 50% lower than the estimated total 
removals from the stock (Annex 11).  
 
 
Figure 6.3: Summary of cod in the Kattegat stock assessment (weights in ‘000 tonnes) represented by two runs 
with (black line) and without (red line) estimating unallocated removals. Shaded area and broken lines represent 
95% confidence intervals for the runs with and without estimating unallocated removals, respectively. (ICES 
WGBFAS 2011) 
 
6.5.2. North Sea Cod 
An analytical assessment of this stock was carried out in 2011 (ICES WGNSSK 2011). This 
assessment estimates the historic stock abundance and fishing mortality including the uncertainty 
about these estimates given the data. The median estimates of the stock development are used in the 
analyses below. The uncertainty around these values should be taken into account. According to the 
2011 assessment, fishing mortality declined since 2000, but it is estimated to be well above the level 
that achieves the long-term objective of maximum yield (0.19) and the target of the current 
management plan (0.4; Figure 6.4).  The fishing mortality in 2010 (0.68) is estimated to be above Fpa 
(0.6) and to be 20% lower than F in 2004 but only 3% lower than F in 2008. The WG indicate that the 
estimate for F in 2010 might be overestimated as the 2011 assessment showed a slight retrospective 
pattern overestimating F in the most recent years (ICES WGNSSK 2011) but there is no indication 
that the bias is large. SSB has increased since its historical low in 2006 (29437 t), but remains (54721 
t) below Blim (70000 t; Figure 6.4). SSB increased by 86% since 2006 and by 29% since 2008.  
Recruitment since 2000 is poor and without obvious trend (Figure 6.4). The 2005 and 2009 year 









































































Figure 6.4: Cod in Subarea IV (North Sea), Division VIId (Eastern Channel), and IIIa West (Skagerrak). 
Summary of stock assessment with point-wise 95% confidence intervals, catch estimated, and adjusted for 
unallocated removals (from 1993), weights in tonnes. 
 
6.5.3. Irish Sea Cod 
According to the latest assessment (ICES WGCSE 2011), the spawning-stock biomass has declined 
ten-fold since the late 1980s and is suffering reduced reproductive capacity (SSB < Blim of 6000 t; 
Figure 6.5). The 2010 SSB was the lowest on record (947 t). SSB has declined by 77% between 2004 
and 2010 and by 45% since 2008. The 2011 SSB is estimated to increase to 2260 t (calculated from 
survivor point estimates). Independent estimates of SSB using the Annual Egg Production Method 
(AEPM) give SSB estimates for cod well above the absolute values given by the assessment. The 
relative trends in cod SSB from the AEPM and the assessment are more consistent than the absolute 
values and both indicate very low SSB in 2010. The AEPM estimates for cod remain well below the 
ICES assessment estimates for the 1970s-1980s, when catch-based estimates of SSB averaged 14kt, 
and are also below the limit biomass reference point (Blim) of 6kt for Irish Sea cod. All sources of 
fishery and survey data indicate a very steep age profile indicating high rates of mortality in Irish Sea 
cod.   
The fishing mortality estimates (including unallocated removals) since 1988 have remained above 
the Flim value of F=1.0 and the stock has therefore been harvested unsustainably during this period to 
2010 (Figure 6.5). There is an increase estimated for F 2009 relative to F2008 (+ 9%), but a reduction 
for F 2010 (-14%). However, unallocated removals play an important role in this assessment and it is 
not entirely clear whether unallocated mortality can be attributed only to fishing mortality. Also 
unknown sources of natural mortality may cause part of the perception of fishing mortality trends.  
Recruitment has been below average for the past eighteen years. The 2002 to 2008 year classes are 
amongst the smallest on record. Data show increased recruitment in 2009 compared the recent period 
of poor recruitment, but still below the long-term average. Preliminary indications suggest the 2010 
year class is below the 2009 estimate. The increased recruitment in the last two years may lead to an 
















































































































































Figure 6.5: Cod in Division VIIa (Irish Sea). Summary of stock assessment (weights in ‘000 tonnes) Landings 
plot: solid line are reported landings; filled squares are landings incorporating sample-based estimates at three 
ports; circles are total removals estimates in excess of M=0.2 with 90% confidence intervals from B-Adapt. 
Recruitment, fishing mortality and SSB: solid lines are median values and dotted lines are 5th and 95th bootstrap 
percentiles. (ICES WGCSE 2011) 
 
6.5.4. West of Scotland Cod 
An analytical assessment was carried out in 2011 (ICES WGCSE 2011) but this has been rejected 
as the basis for advice by ICES because it relied on data from a research survey which changed ground 
gear and statistical design in 2011. The following statements are based on the median values of the 
estimates from the 2010 ICES accepted assessment (ICES WGCSE 2010). It has to be taken into 
account that there is uncertainty around these values. It is considered that natural mortality is probably 
above the constant of 0.2 on all ages, assumed in gadoid stock assessments for WoS, and with a trend, 
but the levels have not been quantified. As a consequence it is not considered possible to partition 
mortality into fishing, discard and unaccounted mortality. Instead assessment results are simply 
described as total mortality minus the input 0.2 for natural mortality, or ‘Z-0.2’. Because the 
assumption for natural mortality M has remained the same since the determination of F reference 
points, values of Z-0.2 can be considered in comparison to those reference points, but this comparison 
does assume any trend in M is small. According to the 2010 assessment, Z-0.2 mortality has, since the 
mid 1980s fluctuated around a level just above Flim. Because catch data are not used from 1995 
onward (concerns over under-reporting), the estimate is very uncertain. However, even the lower 
bound of the 95% confidence limit is higher than Fpa and well above the level that achieves the long-
term objective of maximum yield (0.19) and the target of the current management plan (0.4; Figure 
6.6).  
Z-0.2 in 2009 (0.87) was estimated to be 6.5% lower than Z-0.2 in 2004 and 4.4% lower than Z-0.2 
in 2008. The lowest estimated value of Z-0.2 since 2004, however, was for 2007 and the value of this 
metric has no clear trend over the period.  
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SSB has increased since its historical low in 2006 (3573 t), but remained below Blim (14000 t) in 
2010 at 6227 t; (Figure 6.6). SSB increased by 74% since 2006 but was estimated to have fallen by 
5.4% from 2008 to 2010. An increase from the 2008 value to the projected 2011 value of 16% was 
predicted. Recruitment since 2000 is poor with no obvious trend. The 2005 and 2008 year classes are 




Figure 6.6: Cod in Division VIa (West of Scotland). Summary of stock assessment – 2010 assessment - (weights 
in ‘000 tonnes). Removals: open circles = observed catches, lines = estimated removals. Estimates are plotted 
with approximate point-wise 95% confidence bounds. The vertical line in each plot delineates the last year of the 
historical assessment (2009); estimates to the right of these lines are forecasts.  ICES WGCSE 2010 
6.6. Evaluating if objectives are achieved 
6.6.1. Kattegat Cod 
Whether the objectives of the plan in terms of reductions in fishing mortality are met cannot be 
answered due to the uncertainties introduced by unallocated removals. However, SSB is in any case 
























6.6.2. North Sea Cod 
Downward trends in fishing mortality and upward trends in SSB started during the implementation 
of the previous cod plan (2004-2008) and continued after the new management plan was implemented. 
Recruitment is still very low. The reductions in F in 2009 and 2010 are marginal and are statistically 
not significant given the uncertainty around the point estimates (Figure 6.4). The reduction in F since 
2008 is less than the intended reduction in the plan (intended F2009= 75% of F2008; intended 
F2010=65% of F2008). The WG indicates that the estimate for F in 2010 might be slightly 
overestimated as the 2011 assessment showed a slight retrospective pattern overestimating F in the 
most recent years (ICES WGNSSK 2011). However, this is unlikely to change the overall conclusion 
that F has not declined in line with the plan.  
6.6.3. Irish Sea Cod 
Whether the objectives of the plan in terms of reductions in fishing mortality are met cannot be 
answered due to the uncertainties in the source of unallocated removals. However, SSB is in any case 
still well below Blim. There are positive signs for increased recruitment driven by environmental 
factors which may lead to an increase in the stock in the next years. 
6.6.4. West of Scotland Cod 
It is not possible to answer whether the objectives of the plan in terms of reductions in fishing 
mortality are met because of uncertainties introduced by unallocated removals. In the case of WoS cod 
the concerns about unallocated removals revolve around a suspected high level and trend in natural 
mortality as much as unallocated removals due to fishing. However, as pointed out by the ICES 
assessment, for management purposes the estimated Z-0.2 mortality would still need to fall below the 
level of Flim, as higher levels of mortality over and above M are considered to have led to stock 
decline. SSB is still below Blim and there was a decrease between 2008 and 2010 although SSB 
increased between 2006 and 2008.  
6.7. Evaluation of reasons for deviation 
In order to elucidate the source of the deviations from the plan, several analyses were carried out 
for the four stocks:  
• Estimation of the difference between the TAC advice according to the plan based on the 
historic assessments and forecasts and the actual TAC decided by the council. It was 
elucidated what the TAC decided by the council implies in terms of predicted F and SSB 
developments according to the short term forecasts used as basis for advice and final 
decisions. For this purpose we analysed ICES advice option tables and STECF reviews of 
ICES advice. If the TAC was in between two options in the ICES management table 
presented, a linear interpolation was used. 
 
• Analysis on whether the catches were limited by the TAC (which under current procedures 
only limits landings). To this end it was analysed how the proportionality between the 
different sources in the catch (discards, landings, and unaccounted removals) changed over 
time.  
• Analysis on whether assumptions and results from the short term forecast on which the 
advice was based were consistent in retrospect or whether they have contributed to the 
deviations from the planned exploitation (possible for North Sea cod only).  
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6.7.1. Kattegat Cod 
The agreed TACs have been in accordance with Article 9a of the management plan since the 
implementation of the plan in 2009. In the absence of reliable forecasts the TAC was reduced by 25% 
in 2009 and 2010 (see Annex 12 Table 1). In 2011 the TAC was reduced more than required by the 
plan (-50%) but as suggested by the Commission policy paper from 2010 (EC 2010). The agreed 
TACs, however, were above ICES biological advice. ICES advice was in all three years based on the 
precautionary approach only and aimed for zero catch (no directed fishery in 2011). ICES states that a 
TAC constraint alone (under Article 9) is not precautionary for this stock. STECF agreed with ICES 
advice for 2009, 2010 and 2011, but additionally notes that the TACs based on the management plan 
should be 379 tons in 2010 and 284 tons in 2011 (see Annex 12 Table 1). STECF questions the ICES 
point of view regarding the precautionary nature of the plan by noting that under article 12 of the 
management plan fishing effort is adjusted by the same percentage as the TAC. In the years between 
2004 and the implementation of the plan, ICES and STECF advice was always zero catch based on the 
precautionary approach. Since no short term forecasts were conducted after 2004, no implied changes 
in F and SSB according to short term forecasts were analysed. 
Total removals (landings * scaling factor) estimated by the stock assessment with unallocated 
removals decreased over time (see Annex 12 Figure 2). Total removals decreased since 2008 but there 
is a slight increase between 2009 and 2010. The proportion of landings in total removals declined 
substantially over the last years, i.e. further declined since 2008 (see Annex 12 Figure 3). In 2010 
landings were only responsible for 12% of estimated total removals. Therefore, the TAC alone cannot 
restrict removals from the stock according to the assessment with unallocated removals. The 
proportion of the fisheries (discard, high grading, and black landings) and biological (migration, 
natural mortality) factors cannot be specified making unallocated removals to a black box and a 
serious problem for achieving objectives of the management plan. 
6.7.2. North Sea Cod 
In the years before the implementation of the current management plan, ICES advice was based on 
the precautionary approach since ICES concluded that the old cod recovery plan (EU 2004) was not 
consistent with the precautionary approach. The plan did not include an adaptive element implying 
that fisheries for cod remain closed until an initial recovery of the cod SSB has been proven. 
Therefore, the agreed TACs 2004-2007 were always above ICES advice, but in line with STECF 
advice in 2008 (Table 6.7.1). The estimation of implied changes in F and SSB from the short term 
forecasts was not straightforward for these years. Before 2007 no short term forecast was presented in 
the advice. Only total removals were presented in the forecasts for 2007 and 2008 TAC advice, but not 
landings, discards and unallocated removals separately, although the recent three-year-average split 
was given as a footnote. Under the assumption that future proportions of landings, discards and 
unallocated removals are the same as this recent average, the TACs would imply strong reductions in 
F and substantially increased SSB (Table 6.7.1). However, ICES states in those years that future 
proportions would be difficult to predict. 
For 2009 ICES and STECF advice was superseded since the management plan was agreed in 
December of 2008 after the advice was published. However, it was stated in the 2009 ICES Advice 
that unallocated removals were no longer considered significant for the North Sea cod. Therefore, the 
final TAC decision in 2009 was most likely based on the rationale that the target F of the management 
plan (0.4) would be reached in 2009 as predicted in the short term forecast carried out in 2008 (Table 
6.7.1) and that there are no unallocated removals during the TAC year. This implied an increase in 
TAC above the TAC constraint of the old (15%) and new (20%) cod plan, at the same time it was 
argued that the increase would reduce discards. Therefore, the inter-annual constraint on change in 
TAC was suspended in 2009 under the move to the new management plan (Article 8 (5)).  
For the years 2010 and 2011 the TAC was set in a way that F was predicted to decrease at least as 
intended by the management plan (25% in 2009 and 10% from F 2008 estimated at that time 
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thereafter) and SSB was predicted to increase above Blim during the TAC year for 2009 to 2011 
(Table 6.7.1). However, it was stated by ICES in the 2009 and 2010 advice that this would only be 
valid under the assumption that the management plan is implemented and enforced adequately and that 
objectives of the plan during the intermediate year are met (ICES Advice 2009, ICES Advice 2010). 
Although ICES describes in the advice that this was unlikely to be achieved, the TACs for 2010 and 
2011 were set under the assumption that objectives were met for the intermediate year (i.e. reduction 
in F during the intermediate year) and that there are no unallocated removals during the TAC year. 
Both assumptions turned out to be inappropriate according to the latest assessment and this procedure 
is considered to have contributed to the objectives of the plan not being met, though it is unknown if 
changing the procedure and setting TACs lower would have made any substantive difference to 
catches/removals.  
The total removals of cod in the North Sea are estimated in terms of (i) landings, (ii) discard and 
(iii) unallocated removals. The proportions of landings, discard and unallocated removals in total 
removals changed considerably over the last 10 years according to the latest assessment estimates 
(ICES WGNSSK 2011; see Annex 12 Figure 5 and Table 3). The proportion of landings in total 
removals decreased substantially between 2000 and 2007. In 2007 landings were responsible for 35% 
of total removals. In the last three years the proportion of landings increased and reached 56% in 2010. 
The proportion of discard was less than 17% between 2001 and 2006, but increased to above 30% in 
2007 and 2008. In 2009 and 2010 the proportion of discard decreased again and is estimated to be 
around 21% in 2010. This reduction coincides with the implementation of the management plan in 
2009 but also with the larger 2005 year class losing its importance in catches. It has to be proofed 
when another larger year class enters the fishery whether this reduction in discards is sustainable. 
Unallocated removals comprise an important part in total removals from the stock. Its proportion 
peaked in 2003 (47%) and decreased afterwards. Since 2009, however, the proportion is stable at 
around 23%. Despite a first success in reducing the proportion of discard and unallocated removals, 
the TAC alone is not able to restrict total removals and this hinders the achievement of objectives, 
especially if unallocated removals are not included in the procedure for setting the TACs. 
A hind-casting exercise was conducted to investigate the performance of the short term forecasts in 
predicting the future response of the stock to a given fishing mortality (details see Annex 12). The 
short term forecasts conducted by the assessment working groups in the years 2006 to 2009 were re-
run using the estimates of fishing mortality determined from the most recent (2011) assessment. 
Comparison of the resulting estimates of removals and SSB from these forecasts with those estimates 
of removals and SSB from the 2011 assessment provided an indication of the ability of the short term 
forecasts to adequately predict the future dynamics of the stock in response to the actual level of 
fishing mortality that has occurred in the fishery.  
Using the stock parameters from the 2010 assessment and the estimated population numbers and 
fishing mortalities derived from each of the annual assessments 2006 to 2010, the short term forecasts 
from the B-Adapt assessments were re-calculated.  
The forecast procedure 
The B-Adapt forecasts are based on 1000 bootstrap estimates of terminal values for fishing 
mortality and population number. Each bootstrap estimate is taken forward in time, given the forecast 
assumptions of 3 year means for weight at age, natural mortality, maturity, etc. The exploitation 
pattern was taken as the average of the last 3 years, re-scaled to the Fbar(2-4) of the final year. The 
forecast projected forward using total F to give total catches.  These total catches were then split into 
landings and discard components using the landings fraction, by weight in the final year. In each 
forecast, recruitment values were drawn randomly from the recent time series (1998 to last data year). 
The stochastic forecasts conducted by the assessment working group were run in conjunction with, 
and as part of, the B-Adapt stock assessment software. For this exercise the forecasts needed to be run 
with alternative assumptions of fishing mortality and it was therefore necessary to first recreate the 
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original B-Adapt forecasts before re-running them with the alternative settings (see Annex 12 for 
further details).   
Forecast Results 
Estimates of total removals and SSB from the short term forecasts conducted in 2006 to 2009 for 
those fishing mortality scenarios in accordance with the management/recovery plans are shown in 
Figure 6.7. This shows that for the reduced F levels, total removals from 2007 onwards would have 
been lower than those estimated by the 2011 assessment. Also the corresponding SSB levels from 
2008 onwards were at a higher level. The level of bias in the over-estimation of future SSB is 
approximately equal to the under-estimation of fishing mortality, whilst total removals appear to be 
either relatively well predicted or else predicted to be substantially lower than the observed values. 
Bias in the estimates of SSB peaked with the 2007 short term forecast but have subsequently declined. 
This bias may be a consequence of the large 2005 year-class, which has been successively revised in 
recent assessments, although the full effect of this is not entirely clear.  
   
 
Figure 6.7. Estimated total removals and SSB for the years 2006 to 2011, determined from the short term 
forecasts for 2006 to 2009 as conducted by the WG. Values are shown relative to the 2011 assessment estimates 
of F, total removals and SSB. Top panel shows estimates as conducted by the WG. Lower panel shows estimates 
resulting from the same forecasts but using the F values determined by the 2011 assessment. 
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When the fishing mortality values are replaced with the estimates derived from the 2011 
assessment the level of bias in removals and SSB is dramatically reduced, but is not removed 
completely (Figure 6.7). Predicted SSB from the forecast continues to be greater than that estimated 
by the 2011 assessment, but also, with the higher F values, predicted removals are estimated to be 
higher.  
Conclusions 
Replacing the fishing mortality levels with those estimated by the 2011 assessment yielded forecast 
results that were closer to the estimates of total removals and SSB derived from the 2011 assessment 
(Figure 6.7). This would indicate good internal consistency of the forecast procedure, but it should be 
noted that the forecasts appear to under-estimate the level of fishing mortality that is required to 
achieve the removals that have been observed in the fishery. In other words, a higher fishing mortality 
is required in practice to achieve the level of removals indicated in the short term forecasts conducted 
by the working groups. 
There appears to be a bias in the short term forecast; therefore, the assumptions (such as 
intermediate-year F, the TAC-year F, appropriate selection patterns for discards and unallocated 
removals etc.) should be further evaluated to determine if there is a more appropriate method of 
estimating the relationship between target F, the removals, catch and TAC in the catch year. 
 
6.7.3. Irish Sea Cod 
 The agreed TACs have been in accordance with Article 9a of the management plan (stock 
considered data poor with advice for reduction of catches to the lowest possible level) since 2009. In 
the absence of reliable forecasts, the TAC was reduced by 25% in 2009, 2010 and 2011 (see Annex 
12, Table 5). The agreed TACs, however, were above ICES advice. ICES advice was in all three years 
based on the precautionary approach only and aimed for zero catch. ICES states that the plan is not 
precautionary for this stock. STECF agreed with ICES advice for 2009, 2010 and 2011, but 
additionally notes that the TACs based on the management plan should be 674 tons in 2010 and 506 
tons in 2011 (see Annex 12, Table 5). In the years between 2004 and the implementation of the plan, 
ICES and STECF advice was always zero catch. There were reductions in TAC also before the 
implementation of the plan. Since no short term forecasts were conducted after 2004, no implied 
changes in F and SSB according to short term forecasts were analysed. 
 Total removals (landings * scaling factor) estimated by the stock assessment decreased since 
2003 but increased slightly between 2009 and 2010 (see Annex 12, Figure 14). The proportion of 
landings in total removals declined substantially between 2000 and 2003 (26% in 2003). After 2003 
the proportion of landings increased and is now around 40%. There is no further increase in the 
proportion of landings since 2008. Therefore, the TAC alone cannot restrict total removals from the 
stock. The source of unallocated removals remains unclear, given the proportion of the fisheries 
(discard, high grading, and black landings) and biological (migration, natural mortality) factors cannot 
be specified. This makes unallocated removals to a serious problem for achieving objectives of the 
plan. 
 
6.7.4. West of Scotland Cod 
The current cod management plan has not been accepted as precautionary for the WoS cod stock 
for the reason that to date it has not been possible to assess unaccounted mortality accurately. The 
previous cod recovery plan was also not accepted as precautionary for the same reasons. Based on the 
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precautionary approach ICES has recommended zero catch since the advice for 2003 (Table 6.7.2). 
STECF either explicitly or implicitly agreed with the advice for zero catch. 
 The TAC was reduced by 40% in 2009 (Table 6.7.2). This was well in excess of what was 
estimated as necessary to achieve a 30% increase in SSB (a target of the old management plan) and 
also above the 25% reduction that should be applied via Article 9a of the current management plan 
(stock considered data poor and there is advice for reduction of catches to the lowest possible level). 
The TAC for 2010 did not change for area VIa and Vb (EU) compared to 2009. STECF agreed with 
ICES that no fishing should take place on cod in VIa and both organisations considered that if the 
management plan were applied article 9a should be invoked leading to a 25% cut in TAC. The final 
TAC was 240 t compared to 180 t if article 9a were invoked. Although unconfirmed, it is possible the 
2010 TAC resulted from an administrative error. Up to and including the advice for 2009 TACs the 
TAC for areas VIa and Vb (EU) was declared as part of a larger TAC for areas VI, Vb EU, XII and 
XIV. From 2010 the TAC for VIa and Vb (EU) continued and a TAC for VIb (Rockall), VII and XIV 
was declared separately (Table 6.7.2). The difference between the larger area TAC for 2009 and the 
VIa-Vb TAC for 2010 is 21%. The 2011 TAC was set approximately in line with article 9a of the 
management plan; 24% reduction vs. 25% in plan (Table 6.7.2). 
 ICES advice for several years (e.g. 2005) has highlighted the technical interaction between cod 
and other stocks for vessels fishing for other gadoids (haddock and whiting) and Nephrops. In 2005 
ICES also highlighted the high discarding rate of cod. The recorded rate of discards became 
considerably higher from 2006 and further increased after 2008 (see Annex 12, Figure 17). From 2006 
discarding was observed at older ages (including ages 3 and 4 compared to only ages 1 and 2 
previously), suggesting new legislation to eliminate under-reporting introduced in that year had been 
successful but also that it was still not able to reduce the mortality on the stock. The concerns, over 
under-reporting in earlier years, meant commercial data after 1995 has been excluded from recent 
stock assessments. Estimated total removals rose – by the mid 2000s - considerably above landings 
plus raised discards, even taking into account the significant increase in recorded discards (see Annex 
12, Figure 18). The discrepancy has reduced in more recent years (i.e. between 2008 and 2009) but is 
still significant. In addition, estimates of cod consumed by grey seals to the west of Scotland by the 
Sea Mammal Research unit (SMRU, 2006, Pope and Holmes, 2008) suggest predation mortality on 
cod is greater than can be accommodated by the standard value of natural mortality used for WoS 
gadoid species. Estimates of increasing seal population also suggest there may be a trend in this 
predation mortality. The high discard rates and unallocated removals can be considered a serious 
concern preventing the plan from being successful in terms of lowering total mortality on the stock. 
The effort limits and catch composition rules associated with the management plan WoS are only 
in effect for part of the stock area. For vessels of length 15m and over operating west of a management 
line (STECF 2010) effort is restricted to a lesser degree. The figure also shows locations of fishing 
activity using TR1 gear (from VMS data) linked to cod landings (Scottish vessels). It can be seen a 
large proportion of the effort falls outside of the cod management area. 
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Table 6.7.1: Overview of advice and agreed TACs for cod in IIIa west, IV and VIId in the years 2004 to 2011 in addition to implied changes in F 















































































Table 6.7.2: Overview of advice and agreed TACs for WoS cod in the years 2004 to 2011 in addition to implied changes in F and SSB according to 


























2004 0#1 Precautionary approach 814 (848)#4 0.37 1.01 ‐63% 3213 2170 48%
2005 0#2 Precautionary approach 692 (721)#4 ‐15%
2006 0#2 Precautionary approach 588 (613)#4 ‐15%
2007 0#1 Precautionary approach 490 (556)#4 ‐17%
2008 0#1 Precautionary approach 402 (447)#4 ‐18%
2009 0#1 Precautionary approach 240 (302)#4 ‐40%
2010 0#3 Precautionary approach 240 (80)#5 0%

















6.8. Reference points and MSY by 2015 
6.8.1. Reference points 
Regarding precautionary and MSY reference points, ICES WKCOD provide the following 
view for North Sea cod (redrafted here without changing the meaning). 
Although the SAM model structure agreed at WKCOD is considered the most appropriate that 
could be fitted in the time available, a refined model structure will only be completed with further 
work. Consequently, WKCOD considered that if further refinements are found to be required 
before the WGNSSK 2011 meeting, these be presented to that meeting for adoption (WGNSSK 
comprises a large part of WKCOD participants). In the medium term WKCOD considered that 
the development of a model structure that models discard and landings separately is required due 
to the differing levels of noise associated with each data set. WKCOD recommended that the 
reference points are not revised in the short term until the assessment model has been finalised as 
revision may not be sufficiently stable if further amendments to the model are included.   
This Workshop concluded that it is appropriate to wait for these results and continue to accept 
the current values of precautionary and MSY reference points as they are currently not impacting 
on exploitation. 
6.8.2. Achievement of MSY by 2015 
For cod in the Kattegat, no medium term simulations were performed. In a present situation 
where the fishing mortality is unknown, and landings and assumed natural mortality are not 
representing the removals from the stock, simulations of future developments are not considered 
informative. 
For cod in North Sea, West of Scotland and Irish Sea the assessment provides some indication 
of state of the stock and possible changes in mortality during the plan. In order to answer the 
question “Is the plan likely to achieve MSY by 2015?”, simulations were carried using the MSE 
simulation framework previously used for an Impact Assessment of the HCR components 
(Articles 7 and 8) of Council Regulation (EC) 1342/2008 for West of Scotland and Irish Sea cod, 
and using a similar framework for North Sea cod (Annex 13). The probabilities of achieving 
reference levels for each stock and scenario are presented in Tables 6.8.2-6.  
If the catches under the plan were to be implemented in terms of F, North Sea and West of 
Scotland cod have a high probability (>95%) of recovery above Blim by 2015 for both 
recruitment models (“standard” and “low”) for the scenarios that correspond to the way in which 
these stocks are currently assessed (bias in catch). This drops to 80% for “standard” recruitment 
and <60% for “low” recruitment for Irish Sea cod, because of the poor state of this stock. 
A common feature across all stocks is if the catches under the plan were to be implemented in 
terms of F and TAC constraint, fishing mortality would be driven to levels much lower than 
previously seen, because the imposition of TAC constraints (± 20%) prevents TAC increases 
from keeping pace with the potentially rapid recovery that occurs as a result of the target F (0.4) 
of the management plans. A consequence is that in all cases for “standard” recruitment and for 
the way in which the stocks are currently assessed, following the fishing mortality objectives for 
the plan has a high probability of reducing to Fmsy or below by 2015: 100%, 100% and 90% for 
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North Sea, West of Scotland and Irish Sea cod, respectively. This very high probability reduces 
somewhat for “low” recruitment, but nevertheless remains relatively high: 84%, 99% and 76% 
for North Sea, West of Scotland and Irish Sea cod, respectively. 
When TAC constraints are removed, and the F targets under the plan implemented all stocks 
have a fishing mortality in 2015 that is closer to the target of 0.4, and higher yields in the case of 
“standard” recruitment, than when TAC constraints are imposed. This is also the case for “low” 
recruitment for North Sea and West of Scotland cod, but not for Irish Sea cod, where performance 
of the management plan in terms of both recovery and yield is poorer when TAC constraints are 
removed compared to when they are imposed. This implies that for a stock in particularly poor 
condition, it may be beneficial to impose TAC constraints to prevent a harvest control rule from 
setting TACs too high based on inaccurate information, thus damaging the resource further. 
In order to reflect the current rates of change in exploitation simulations were also carried 
projecting future fishing mortality rates at the recently observed trends for each stock; no 
reductions in F for the Irish Sea and West of Scotland stocks and a 1.5% annual reduction in the F 
in the North Sea, without any specific feedback from the management plan, which is treated as if 
its recent performance will continue. This means that only the OM=cat/M and SR=1/0.5 options 
in Table ii are needed. Tables 8.2.4, 5 and 6 for North Sea West of Scotland and Irish Sea 
respectively. For North Sea the predictions show relatively high probability of SSB>Blim by 
2015, but low probabilities of being above Bpa, though the actual percentages depend on the 
recruitment assumptions. For West of Scotland the probability of SSB>Blim depends mostly on 
recruitment assumptions, if recruitment follows the low recruitment assumption these simulations 
suggest that SSB with remain below Blim, however, if the higher recruitment assumption is 
correct, SSB is expected to rise close to Blim. There is a low probability of reaching Bpa under 
all the assumptions if F remains the same. For the Irish Sea there is a low probability of 
SSB>Blim (or Bpa) if F remains at current levels.   
 
In conclusion the medium term simulations indicate that the primary factor in recovery is the 
assumption or not of success in reducing F. A secondary but important effect is the underlying 
assumption of S-R relationship. For the North Sea cod the source of unaccounted mortality (catch 
or M) changes predicted responses, but mostly in the longer term or at larger stock size. For the 
West of Scotland the uncertainty about the unaccounted mortality has an important contribution, 
and does influence the expected response in the short term.  For the Irish Sea current estimates of  
unaccounted mortality  indicate this does not greatly influence the expected stock response.  
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Table 6.8.1. North Sea cod. Summary results for 14 scenarios for the year 2015. The columns labelled 
“OM”, “SR”, “OEM”, and “TAC con” refer to the different permutations of the assumptions underlying the 
simulations, as explained in Table ii, Annex 13. Values for the reference points used are given in Table I, 
Annex 13 , and the summary statistics are described in Table iii Annex 13. Values for SSB, L, D and C are 
in thousand tons.  












SSB L D C FL FD FC 
1 cat 1 cat 20% 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 370 53.3 14.8 68.2 0.06 0.02 0.08 
2 cat 1 m 20% 1.00 1.00 0.98 1.00 1.00 357 56.8 15.7 72.9 0.06 0.02 0.09 
3 cat 1 wg 20% 1.00 1.00 0.82 0.94 1.00 330 70.9 20.6 92.0 0.09 0.03 0.12 
4 m 1 cat 20% 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 274 40.4 12.1 52.8 0.06 0.02 0.08 
5 m 1 m 20% 1.00 0.99 0.98 1.00 1.00 266 43.0 12.9 56.1 0.07 0.02 0.09 
6 m 1 wg 20% 1.00 0.97 0.82 0.94 1.00 248 53.6 16.7 70.8 0.09 0.03 0.12 
7 cat 0.5 cat 20% 1.00 0.98 0.65 0.84 1.00 241 52.2 11.6 64.1 0.11 0.04 0.14 
8 cat 0.5 m 20% 1.00 0.96 0.53 0.75 1.00 227 54.1 12.1 66.4 0.12 0.04 0.16 
9 cat 0.5 wg 20% 1.00 0.83 0.10 0.25 0.98 197 67.7 16.4 84.7 0.17 0.06 0.23 
10 m 0.5 cat 20% 1.00 0.75 0.59 0.80 1.00 177 39.2 9.6 49.2 0.11 0.04 0.15 
11 m 0.5 m 20% 1.00 0.70 0.50 0.74 1.00 169 39.9 9.9 50.3 0.12 0.04 0.16 
12 m 0.5 wg 20% 1.00 0.49 0.09 0.23 0.99 149 50.5 13.3 64.6 0.17 0.06 0.23 
13 cat 1 cat - 1.00 1.00 0.08 0.17 1.00 324 131.5 40.1 173.8 0.18 0.06 0.24 
14 cat 0.5 cat - 1.00 0.97 0.02 0.05 0.98 219 86.1 20.4 107.8 0.21 0.07 0.28 
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Table 6.8.2. West of Scotland cod. Summary results for 14 scenarios for the year 2015. The columns 
labelled “OM”, “SR”, “OEM”, and “TAC con” refer to the different permutations of the assumptions 
underlying the simulations, as explained in Table ii, Annex 13. Values for the reference points used are 
given in Table I, Annex 13 , and the summary statistics are described in Table iii Annex 13. Values for 
SSB, L, D and C are in thousand tons.  












SSB L D C FL FD FC 
1 cat 1 cat 20% 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 54.4 0.844 0.777 1.581 0.01 0.02 0.03 
2 cat 1 m 20% 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 54.5 0.618 0.627 1.263 0.01 0.02 0.02 
3 cat 1 wg 20% 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 54.5 0.774 0.714 1.486 0.01 0.02 0.03 
4 m 1 cat 20% 0.72 0.39 0.95 0.97 1.00 19.9 0.377 0.545 0.902 0.02 0.04 0.06 
5 m 1 m 20% 0.72 0.40 1.00 1.00 1.00 20.0 0.252 0.360 0.610 0.01 0.03 0.04 
6 m 1 wg 20% 0.72 0.40 0.98 0.99 1.00 19.9 0.330 0.481 0.796 0.02 0.03 0.05 
7 cat 0.5 cat 20% 0.99 0.89 0.98 0.99 1.00 32.6 0.788 0.533 1.307 0.01 0.03 0.04 
8 cat 0.5 m 20% 0.99 0.92 1.00 1.00 1.00 33.0 0.442 0.313 0.742 0.01 0.02 0.03 
9 cat 0.5 wg 20% 0.99 0.90 0.99 0.99 1.00 32.9 0.655 0.460 1.105 0.01 0.03 0.04 
10 m 0.5 cat 20% 0.32 0.10 0.86 0.90 0.98 10.5 0.377 0.364 0.712 0.03 0.06 0.09 
11 m 0.5 m 20% 0.33 0.10 1.00 1.00 1.00 10.8 0.143 0.181 0.329 0.01 0.03 0.04 
12 m 0.5 wg 20% 0.33 0.10 0.94 0.97 1.00 10.5 0.252 0.287 0.555 0.02 0.05 0.07 
13 cat 1 cat - 0.84 0.59 0.13 0.16 0.32 25.8 3.765 5.961 10.173 0.15 0.35 0.50 




Table 6.8.3. Irish Sea cod. Summary results for 14 scenarios for the year 2015. The columns labelled 
“OM”, “SR”, “OEM”, and “TAC con” refer to the different permutations of the assumptions underlying the 
simulations, as explained in Table ii, Annex 13. Values for the reference points used are given in Table I, 
Annex 13 , and the summary statistics are described in Table iii Annex 13. Values for SSB, L, D and C are 
in thousand tons.  












SSB L D C FL FD FC 
1 cat 1 cat 20% 0.80 0.54 0.68 0.90 0.94 10.7 2.188 0.000 2.188 0.18 0.00 0.18 
2 cat 1 m 20% 0.90 0.62 0.95 0.98 0.99 11.9 1.300 0.000 1.300 0.10 0.00 0.10 
3 cat 1 wg 20% 0.80 0.56 0.71 0.90 0.94 11.0 2.097 0.000 2.097 0.17 0.00 0.17 
4 m 1 cat 20% 0.26 0.08 0.48 0.80 0.90 3.4 0.758 0.000 0.758 0.25 0.00 0.25 
5 m 1 m 20% 0.28 0.08 0.86 0.98 0.99 3.6 0.457 0.000 0.457 0.14 0.00 0.14 
6 m 1 wg 20% 0.26 0.08 0.54 0.81 0.90 3.4 0.699 0.000 0.699 0.23 0.00 0.23 
7 cat 0.5 cat 20% 0.57 0.24 0.52 0.76 0.84 6.6 1.685 0.000 1.685 0.25 0.00 0.25 
8 cat 0.5 m 20% 0.65 0.31 0.87 0.94 0.97 7.5 0.992 0.000 0.992 0.12 0.00 0.12 
9 cat 0.5 wg 20% 0.58 0.24 0.49 0.71 0.80 6.6 1.652 0.000 1.652 0.25 0.00 0.25 
10 m 0.5 cat 20% 0.04 0.00 0.18 0.47 0.66 1.6 0.519 0.000 0.519 0.41 0.00 0.41 
11 m 0.5 m 20% 0.04 0.00 0.53 0.76 0.89 1.8 0.330 0.000 0.330 0.24 0.00 0.24 
12 m 0.5 wg 20% 0.04 0.00 0.23 0.48 0.63 1.6 0.480 0.000 0.480 0.41 0.00 0.41 
13 cat 1 cat - 0.54 0.25 0.20 0.42 0.60 6.2 2.607 0.000 2.607 0.45 0.00 0.45 
14 cat 0.5 cat - 0.25 0.07 0.25 0.49 0.64 3.8 1.238 0.000 1.238 0.40 0.00 0.40 
 
Table 6.8.4. North Sea cod. Summary results for 4 scenarios for the year 2015. The columns labelled 
“OM”, “SR”, “OEM”, and “TAC con” refer to the different permutations of the assumptions underlying the 
simulations, as explained in Table ii, Annex 13. Values for the reference points used are given in Table I, 
Annex 13 , and the summary statistics are described in Table iii Annex 13. Values for SSB, L, D and C are 
in thousand tons. 










SSB L D C FL FD FC 
1 cat 1 0.99 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 134 128.4 46.4 176.6 0.40 0.14 0.54 
4 m 1 0.98 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.50 126 93.0 34.1 128.4 0.31 0.11 0.42 
7 cat 0.5 0.85 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 94 74.6 21.9 96.7 0.40 0.14 0.54 
10 m 0.5 0.78 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.50 87 53.5 16.1 69.9 0.31 0.11 0.42 
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Table 6.8.5. West of Scotland cod. Summary results for 4 scenarios for the year 2015. The columns 
labelled “OM”, “SR”, “OEM”, and “TAC con” refer to the different permutations of the assumptions 
underlying the simulations, as explained in Table ii, Annex 13. Values for the reference points used are 
given in Table 1, Annex 13 , and the summary statistics are described in Table iii Annex 13. Values for 
SSB, L, D and C are in thousand tons. 










SSB L D C FL FD FC 
1 cat 1 0.38 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.9 2.509 5.906 8.299 0.28 0.65 0.93 
4 m 1 0.43 0.15 0.00 0.01 0.61 12.6 1.027 1.925 2.970 0.09 0.22 0.31 
7 cat 0.5 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.0 1.398 2.479 3.957 0.28 0.65 0.93 
10 m 0.5 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.61 6.6 0.597 0.843 1.457 0.09 0.22 0.31 
 
Table 6.8.6. Irish Sea cod. Summary results for 4 scenarios for the year 2015. The columns labelled “OM”, 
“SR”, “OEM”, and “TAC con” refer to the different permutations of the assumptions underlying the 
simulations, as explained in Table ii, Annex 13. Values for the reference points used are given in Table 1, 
Annex 13 , and the summary statistics are described in Table iii Annex 13. Values for SSB, L, D and C are 
in thousand tons. 










SSB L D C FL FD FC 
1 cat 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.4 2.544 0.000 2.544 1.39 0.00 1.39 
4 m 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 2.6 0.908 0.000 0.908 0.46 0.00 0.46 
7 cat 0.5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.2 1.211 0.000 1.211 1.39 0.00 1.39 
10 m 0.5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 1.3 0.447 0.000 0.447 0.46 0.00 0.46 
 
7. EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTS OF THE MULTI-ANNUAL PLAN ON THE 
ECOSYSTEM (ADDITIONALLY TO STOCK AND FISHERY). 
7.1. Mixed fishery and discarding  
Implicitly, a TAC assumes that the level of fishing activity will adapt to the quota available for 
a particular stock, and will lead to the targeted level of fishing mortality. The simplest link is to 
assume that vessels will stop catching a given species once their quota for that species is 
exhausted. The likelihood this assumption holds true lessens for complex, multispecies, multigear 
fisheries, where fleets are given a set of different fishing opportunities for the various stocks. The 
recent history of the North Sea cod is a good example of the problems of using TACs to manage 
mixed fisheries. In 2005-06, the North Sea cod stock was at a historic low biomass whereas the 
stock of haddock, which is to a large extent caught together with cod, was at its highest biomass 
in 30 years (ICES, 2009b). Single-species TACs were set with no consideration of the status of 
the other stocks caught in the same fishery. Fishermen were faced with a dilemma when the quota 
for cod was exhausted: stop fishing and underutilize the quota for haddock, or continue fishing 
and discard or illegally land overquota cod. If they choose either of the latter options, the cod 
TAC does not achieve its intended conservation objective. Moreover, the reliability of the 
assessment of the cod stock is jeopardized because the catch data on which it is based tends to 
become more uncertain as a result of discarding or non-reporting of landings (Reeves and 
Pastoors, 2007; Hamon et al., 2007). 
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In the early 2000s a fleet based allocation key (MTAC) was developed with the aim of 
maximising catch allocations across fleets involved in mixed fisheries including cod, by selecting 
an optimal allocation by fleet to maximise total yield from the available set of single species 
TACs, while conforming to limits on cod. Advice based on this method was produced annually 
by STECF. However, once this allocation key was derived, giving advice on the highest catch 
overall possible, conditional on the allocation, no action was taken to enforce the management 
implied by the process.  In consequence the optimal choice could not be achieved, and catch 
exceed TACs for cod as a result.   
Following this, and to shed light on the consistency of single species TACs within a 
management area, a simple approach, using existing catch and effort information was developed, 
estimating catch potentials for distinct fleets (groups of vessels) and métiers (type of activity), 
and hence quantifying the risks of over- and underquota utilization for the various stocks. This 
method, named Fcube (Fleet and Fisheries Forecast, Ulrich et al., 2011), has been applied to 
North Sea stocks to date (ICES WKMIXFISH and ADGNS, 2009; ICES WGMIXFISH 2010). 
The method as currently used assumes constant fleet specific catchabilities on the different 
stocks and constant relative effort between métiers within each fleet going forwards in time and 
each year, (though other options are available)_a number of scenarios are run, of which 3 are of 
interest for the current evaluation: 
• cod: The underlying assumption is that all fleets set their effort at the level corresponding 
to their cod quota share, regardless of other stocks. 
• sq_E: The effort is simply set as equal to the effort in the most recently recorded year for 
which there are landings and discard data. 
• Ef_Mgt: The effort in métiers using gears controlled by the EU effort management 
regime have their effort adjusted according to the regulation (Council Regulation (EC) 
No 1342/2008), i.e. -25% in TR1 and TR2 effort in 2009, and additionally -10% for each 
successive years. 
Comparison to single species advice for 2010 
In 2009 (TAC advice for 2010), the target F for the intermediate year 2009 in the individual 
single-stock forecasts implied a F reduction of 25%, 11% and 5% for cod, haddock and saithe 
respectively. Considering the cod scenario, the mixed fisheries analyses indicate that the 25% 
reduction in F required for cod also implies that the catch potential for other species, notably 
plaice and sole, would be undershot by 15 to 25%. Assuming the 25% reduction of effort in the 
gears TR1 (bottom trawls and seines > 100mm) and TR2 (bottom trawls and seines 70-100mm) 
was applied in 2009 (Ef_Mgt scenario), lead to lesser reductions of potential catch for some 
species (especially sole), but comparatively stronger impact on catch potentials for haddock, 
whiting and Nephrops. Assuming again that there should be no overshoot of the cod TAC in 2010 
(cod scenario) or that the effort reductions would be adhered to (Ef_Mgt) implied strong 
reductions in effort, leading to potential TAC undershoots of between 15 and 40% for the other 
stocks compared to the single-stock forecast.  
STECF estimates that between 2008 and 2009, the effort decreased by only 1% in TR1 and 
6% in TR2, implying a scenario closer to the sq_E scenario and according to the latest ICES cod 
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assessment, F(2009) hardly decreased compared to F(2008). In the MIXFISH projection, this 
sq_E scenario estimated the potential cod “landings” (i.e. the non-discarded part of the catches) to 
be 29% above the single-stock cod forecast, implying a SSB at the start of 2010 22% lower than 
suggested. With TAC enforcement controlling landings, these additional ‘landings’ might be 
expected to be discarded. Accounting for the additional catches in the sq_E scenario outcomes in 
the single-stock cod forecast for 2010 would have resulted in lower recommended catch and 
reducing the 2010 TAC down by a further 20% to 31 kt instead of 38 kt.    
Comparison to single species advice for 2011 
In 2010 ICES provided advice according to both the long term management plan and the 
FMSY framework, and both lines of advice were tested in the mixed fisheries framework. Status 
quo F was assumed for all stocks for the intermediate year (2010) in the single-stock forecasts 
under the MSY Advice Approach. In the MP Advice Approach, a 13% F reduction was applied to 
cod. 
Differences in outcomes from the scenarios considered were noticeably smaller than found the 
previous year indicating greater consistency both across the individual single-stock forecasts and 
advice and between the single stock TACs and the sq_E scenario.  However, the cod scenario 
always gave the lowest catch potentials for all stocks, indicating again that the cod stock is the 
most limiting stock for 2011, and that those reductions/redirections in effort are needed if the cod 
advice is to be followed. The Ef_Mgt scenario implied large effort reductions in 2010 in the main 
cod métiers (TR1, TR2 and BT2; beam trawls 80-120 mm), and this was expected to have a 
considerable impact on the catch potential of all other stocks considered (15 to 30% reductions). 
Overall, this scenario indicated a larger reduction in F in 2010 compared to the single-stock cod 
forecast. For the TAC advice in 2011, strict implementation of the simulated effort reductions 
would bring the fisheries to a level (estimated Fbar=0.45) almost equivalent to the expectation of 
the cod management plan (target F=0.44), but with potentially large catch undershooting for all 
other stocks compared to the single-stock advice (around 40% undershoot for haddock and plaice, 
60% for all Nephrops and 20-30% for sole and saithe). 
In conclusion, it was earlier shown that a one issue in the implementation of the North Sea cod 
LTMP was the overoptimistic short-term forecast that assumed perfect achievement of the LTMP 
objectives in terms of F reduction. The mixed-fisheries analyses conducted by ICES 
WGMIXFISH shed some light on a potentially important source of implementation error, with a 
real F being potentially higher than expected due to technical interactions. This allows also 
estimating its potential consequences in terms of scientific advice.  
7.2. Approaches for reduction of impact 
Adaptations by member states to reduce cod catches have focussed on two primary tools (i) 
modifications to fishing gear design aimed at reducing cod catchability or (ii) tactical avoidance 
of areas with higher cod abundance through spatially and temporally closures e.g. Real Time 
Closures under UK conservation credits scheme, or through spatially fixed closures e.g. Irish VIa 
Cape Closure, Swedish and Danish closures in the Kattegat.  
7.2.1. Gear modifications used under Article 13(c). 
Here we review the fishing gear modifications applied to date, the level of uptake by 
individual member states and what their potential impact may be on catches of cod and other 
species.  
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Thus far, most of these gear modifications have been used to increase effort allocations under 
the provisos of Article 13(c). One gear modification, commonly referred to as the ‘Swedish grid’ 
has enabled two member states (Sweden and Ireland) to obtain exemptions under the provisions 
of Article 11(2). 
Without exception, all modifications are associated with towed gears belonging to the TR2 
and TR1 categories. While there are technical modifications applicable to beam trawls (BT1 and 
BT2), there has been no application of these under the provisions of Article 13(c).  
Most of the modifications rely on exploiting differences in behavioural reactions between cod 
and the target species. So far, two gear designs have been formally used. The ‘eliminator’ or 
Orkney’ trawl is used to a limited degree by the Scottish TR1 fleet under the Scottish 
Conservation Credits Scheme  and the SELTRA 180 has recently been introduced into the Danish 
TR2 fleet operating in the Kattegat. The uptake of the SELTRA 180 trawl has been incentivised 
by permitting fishing inside an otherwise closed area.  
The Eliminator or Orkney trawl 
The eliminator trawl (Fig. 7.2.1) was first developed and used in the mixed demersal fisheries 
in the North Eastern US to maintain access to the haddock fishery that would otherwise be closed 
due to restrictive fishing opportunities for cod (Beutel, 2008). The design achieved cod reductions 
by 80% while still maintaining haddock. 
 
Figure 7.2.1. The forward sections of the Orkney gear has 300 mm diamond mesh netting in place of the 
160 mm forward sections usually towed by the commercial vessel used for the experimental evaluation. 
Collaborative experiments conducted between Marine Science Scotland and the Scottish 
Fishermen’s Federation (Campbell, et al, 2010) tested the effectiveness of a trawl where the 
normal 160 mm mesh size netting in the forward sections of the gear was replaced with 300 mm 
mesh size netting in the North Sea mixed whitefish fishery. This mesh size is considerably 
smaller than the 2400mm mesh size used by Beutel (2008). Despite the reduced mesh size, the 
results show that the modified gear retains significantly fewer cod (27%), the reduction was 
length dependent, with no significant difference in cod catches >78cm. While there was no 
significant difference in whiting catches, the haddock catches were significantly higher. This is 
attributed to an increase in the vertical opening of the trawl. However, catches of both megrim 
and monkfish were significantly reduced, although there was no significant difference in catches 
on monkfish >55cm.  Figure 7.2.2 show the relative catch rates of cod, monkfish and megrim 




Figure 7.2.2 The left panels show the length frequencies of cod, monkfish and megrim catches in the 
control (black line) and Orkney (grey line) gears. The right panels show the mean catch rate of the Orkney 
gear relative to the control gear (solid line) with pointwise 95% confidence intervals (grey shaded area). 
The horizontal dashed line indicates a constant relative catch rate of unity. The mean catch rate curves are 
restricted to lengths found in at least half the hauls and hence there may be some interpolation at some 
length classes. 
The impact on catch rates of a wider range of species are reported by Kynoch et al (2011). 
Comparative fishing trials investigated the effect of increasing the mesh size in the forward 
sections of a trawl from 120 and 160 mm to (i) 300 mm and (ii) 600 mm on the catches in the 
Shetland mixed whitefish fishery. The 300 and 600 mm trawls respectively caught an estimated 
49 and 75% fewer Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua), 79 and 93% fewer megrim (Lepidorhombus 
whiffiagonis), 36 and 68% fewer ling (Molva molva), and 28 and 53% fewer hake (Merluccius 
merluccius) than the control trawl at all lengths. The 300 mm trawl caught ~40% more haddock 
(Melanogrammus aeglefinus) than the 600 mm and control trawls which had similar catch rates. 
The catch rates for monkfish (Lophius piscatorius) were length dependent and the 300 mm trawl 
caught ~50% fewer monkfish at 30 cm with no significant difference > 76 cm. The 600 mm trawl 
caught ~90% fewer monkfish at 30 cm with no significant difference > 83 cm. Both the 300 mm 
and 600 mm trawls caught significantly fewer saithe (Pollachius virens) above 53 cm. Figure 
7.2.3 shows the catch rates for seven species relative to the standard gear, the horizontal dashed 
line indicates no difference between the standard and test gears. 
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Figure 7.2.3. The data are summarised by the proportions of fish retained in the test codend (of those 
retained in both codends) pooled over hauls for each test trawl and species (points). The effect of length on 
relative catch rates is captured by the fitted linear logistic functions of length (solid lines), with their 
pointwise 95% confidence bands (shaded areas). The horizontal dashed reference line indicates no 
difference in catch between the test and control trawls (from Kynoch et al, 2011). 
The results from both experiments show that the use of the Orkney trawl significantly impacts 
on catches of other species. Figure 7.2.4 shows the difference in mean catch weights per haul (kg) 
by species between the standard trawl and the Orkney trawl with 300mm mesh. Figure 7.2.5 
shows the comparison between the standard trawl and the Orkney trawl with 600mm mesh. 
Contrasting the two figures, it is clear to see the impact on cod catches is greater with the 600mm 
net but losses of other commercial species are also greater.  
To incentive the use of the Orkney trawl the UK (Scottish) authorities 2009 SCCS there was 
an incentive of either an additional 20 days or 12% of track record allocation for using gears with 
300 mm diamond mesh netting in their forward section. In recognition of the greater impact on 
cod catches, the incentive offered by the SCCS for using the Orkney Gear with 600mm mesh was 




Figure 7.2.4. Impact on mean catch weights (kg) per haul between a standard trawl and an Orkney trawl 
constructed with 600mm mesh in the forward section of the trawl. 
 
Figure 7.2.5. Impact on mean catch weights (kg) per haul between a standard trawl and an Orkney trawl 
constructed with 600mm mesh in the forward section of the trawl. 
Since 2009, from a fleet of 120 TR1 North Sea vessels, 25 Scottish vessels have opted to use 
the 300mm Orkney trawl. This is currently only being used in the North Sea. Evaluating the 
impacts of these modifications in practice is difficult given that they are confounded by other 
external factors. Contrasting cod CPUE between the TR1 vessels with and without the Orkney 
trawl in principle should show differences, however, given the degree of variation in cod catches 
due to for example spatial distribution and individual vessel quota allocations, finding significant 
differences may be difficult. Contrasting the CPUE of the other species, such as monkfish, ling 
and megrim, may be more informative.  
Square mesh panels 
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Square mesh panels have been used in many fisheries around Europe since the mid-1990’s. 
The panels have been shown to reduce unwanted by-catch of juvenile fish, particularly haddock 
and whiting in fisheries targeting whitefish (Graham an Kynoch, 2001; Graham et al, 2003; 
O’Neill, 2004); and Nephrops fisheries (Briggs, 1992; Armstrong et al, 1998; Madsen et al., 
1999; Krag et al, 2007). The impact square mesh panels have on cod catches are limited, some 
authors note significant difference in cod catches when using a 120mm square mesh panel while 
others note significant reductions in the retention of small cod.  Drewery et al, (2010) investigated 
the impact of square mesh panels inserted 6 to 9m and 9 to12m from the codline and note that the 
gears caught significantly fewer cod than the control for lengths ≤ 32 cm and between 26 and 42 
cm respectively, with retention estimated to be between 40 and 70%. Frandsen et al (2009) noted 
no significant effect on cod catches with a 120mm square mesh panel inserted 6-9m from the 
codline and Krag et al, (2008) actually noted an increase in cod catches when contrasting a 90mm 
and 120mm square mesh panel. In its evaluation of the square mesh panel in the Danish cod plan, 
STECF (2011) concluded that there is insufficient evidence to show that the use of the square 
mesh panel has contributed to a reduction in cod mortality. The differences  are likely to be 
associated with the mesh size used in the panel, the panel position, and the lack of significant 
difference in cod retention. Work has shown that inserting the panel further back in the trawl can 
improve the efficiency (Krag et al, 2008) and the BACOMA panel, a square mesh panel inserted 
in the codend has been shown to regulate the size of cod catches (O’Neill et al, 2004).   
Since 2009, all Danish TR2 vessels operating in the Kattegatt have been using 120mm square 
mesh panel. 
SELTRA 180 
Recent studies with square mesh panels constructed from large mesh sizes (e.g. 300mm) have 
shown significant reductions in cod catches in the Nephrops fishery when the panel is inserted  
inside a stable framework (Madsen et al, 2010) estimates that ~90% of the cod that enters the 
trawl will escape through the large meshes of the square-mesh panel. Subsequent experiments 
with a reduced panel mesh size (180 mm) conducted in the North Sea reduced the catch of cod by 
67% in total. Denmark has proposed to use the SELTRA 180mm to obtain derogation to effort 
restrictions in the Kattegat. STECF (2011) noted that the estimates of reductions in cod catches 
are based on experimental data collected from research trials conducted in the North Sea. These 
demonstrated reductions in the order of 67% in number. The Danish authorities estimate that the 
mandatory introduction of this gear year round will result in a 44.2 reduction in the Danish partial 
fishing mortality for cod. This is based on the fact that the TR2 gear accounts for 66% of the 
catches and if the SELTRA 180 mm is applied year round the reduction in fishery impact (a 
proxy for fishing mortality) will be the proportion of cod fished by SELTRA times the effect of 
using SELTRA (66% out of 67% equal 44.2%). However, to maintain a viable flatfish fishery 
during the last quarter, it is proposed to use the SELTRA during the period January to September, 
where 78% of the cod landings from the TR2 segment take place. The estimated reduction in 
fishing impact is adjusted by 0.78 resulting in an estimated reduction in fishing pressure of 
34.5%. This is based on the assumption that because the cod population structure in the trials area 
of the North Sea comprises greater proportions of fish >85cm, the effect of the gear when used in 
the Kattegat will be greater as catches from this area are smaller in size comprises mostly of fish 
in the range 20-40cm.. STECF notes that due to the absence of length frequency data from the 
two areas it is not possible to confirm that this is likely to be the case. STECF considers that the 
use of the SELTRA trawl is potentially an efficient tool to reduce fishing mortality on cod. 
However, for future evaluation of the effectiveness of the gear, STECF recommends that 
population independent selectivity parameters are obtained for both the current gear and SELTRA 
gear. This will allow for the estimation of what the catches of cod would have been without the 
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SELTRA gear by comparing the catch at length and the difference in the proportion at length 
between the current and new SELTRA trawl. Given that the use of the SELTRA trawl provides 
the basis of the majority of fishing mortality reductions for the future development of the plan, 
STECF considers that it is important that the use of the gear is fully implemented. The Danish 
plan intends that the new SELTRA gear will be implemented from July 1 2011 and in subsequent 
years from January 1 to September 30, coinciding with 78% of the cod landings associated with 
the TR2 fleet. During the period October 1 to December 31, the plan envisages the use of the 
120mm square mesh panel. STECF reiterates that the 120mm square mesh panel is unlikely to 
have any significant effect on cod catches.  
 
7.2.2. Review of spatial measures used under Article 13 
Denmark, the UK and Ireland have all introduced spatial and temporal closures to reduce cod 
catches. In Ireland, the authorities have introduced a seasonal closure (to all fishing gears) in 
ICES division VIa. The area bound by ICES statistical rectangle 39E3 (Figure 7.2.6) is closed 
from 1 October to 31 March to all Irish vessels, irrespective of fishing method. This period 
coincides with peak cod catches (Irish Statutory Instrument [Fisheries Management Notice No. 
07 of 2011]).  
 
Figure 7.2.6 Location of the Irish seasonal closure  
Historically, over 40% of Irish cod landings are attributed to the closed area. For contrast, 
standardised CPUE rates observed from a dedicated survey conducted inside the closed area in 
2009 were on average 26.8 kg/hr while CPUE rates estimated from observer trips outside the 
closure in 2009 were 0.015 kg/hr. The Irish authorities estimate that the introduction of the 
closure will have resulted in an approximate reduction in cod catches of 17%. In its assessment of 
the Irish submission made under the required reporting procedures to the Commission, STECF 
(2011) concluded that STECF considers it likely that the mortality due to the Irish fleet has 
reduced by at least the 17% required reduction.  
All  Danish  vessels  fishing  in  Kattegat  with  TR2  gear  are  subject  to  the  joint  Danish  
and  Swedish  seasonal  and  permanent  area  closures  in  Kattegat  and  the  Northern  part  of  
the Sound.  Area 1: The “black” area is closed during the 1st January-31st March (spawning 
season), except  for fishery with selective gears with a very low catch of cod; The “black” area in 
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the Northern  Sound (”Kilen” or the triangle) is closed 1st February -31 March, except for fishery 
with selective gears; Area 2. The “orange” area is closed for all fisheries except fisheries with 
selective gears. Area 3: The “red” area is closed for all fisheries, including recreational fisheries 
(figure 7.2.7) 
 
Figure 7.2.7 Location of Danish and Swedish spatial closures in the Kattegat with Bathymetry 0-100 m 
depth (orange to blue).   
Estimating  the  impact  of  closed  areas  in  terms  of  reductions  in  fishing  mortality  is  
complex,  given  that  trying  to  disentangle  what  vessels  would  have  caught  in  the  absence 
of the area closure and  estimates the impacts associated with effort displacement is very  
difficult.  The Danish authorities adopted a modelling  approach, through the definition of  CPUE 
contours based on fishery independent survey data across  the entire  area  and overlaying the 
effort data based on VMS ‘pings’.  While  this  is  not  predictive  but  estimates  a  relative  
change  in  cod  catches  from  a  situation if the closure had not been in place. The analysis 
shows that that fishing effort has been redistributed into areas of lower CPUE (based on modeled 
survey data). STECF (2011) concluded that the closures are likely to have resulted in 
redeployment of effort from areas with relatively high catch rates to areas with relatively lower 
catch rates.  STECF (2011) also concludes that such redeployment of effort  is  likely  to  have  
resulted  in  a  lower  fishing  mortality  on  cod  in  the  Kattegat  than  would  otherwise have 
occurred. STECF considers that the estimated reductions in fishing pressure of 24%, defined as 
the product of cod density and effort, provide the best proxy estimate for the expected local 
removals of vessels monitored with VMS. 
 
Scottish Real Time Closures  
In Scotland, the provisions of Article 13c have been utilised in a co-management scheme 
known as Conservation Credits that rewards the adoption of cod avoidance behaviours and 
reduced cod catch rates by returning to fishermen some of their deducted effort. The scheme has 
two components, a compulsory element involving all vessels in a requirement to avoid Real Time 
Closures (RTCs) and an optional component comprising a schedule of alternative selective gears 
which attract varying degrees of effort buyback depending on the estimated reduction in cod 
catch (these options are discussed in the technical measures part of this section of the report).  
Annex 14 provides a fuller description of the scheme with a presentation of results so far. 
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RTCs were first employed in 2008 and the scheme was expanded rapidly in 2009 to 144 
closures each 7.5nm x 7.5nm and lasting for 21 days. During 2010 165 closures were put in place 
and from July these were increased in size by 4 times based on emerging science on cod 
movements arising from tagging. The number of closures in each year is guided by the required 
adjustment in Scottish cod catch (in order to meet the requirements of the cod plan as assessed by 
ICES), the estimate of RTC performance (cod catch reduction) in previous years and the extent to 
which the stakeholders and managers wish to use RTC s to contribute to cod avoidance in the last 
couple of years the aim has been to use RTCs to achieve the first 20% reduction in fishing 
mortality.  The position of closures is determined using landings data linked to VMS data with 
high LPUE areas subject to closure. Additional RTC closures arise from on board inspections and 
cod catch rates in excess of a pre-determined trigger level. A number of longer term seasonal 
closures, mainly focussed on expected spawning areas, were proposed by industry and have been 













Figure 7.2.8 Distibution of RTCs (red polygons)  in 2010 under the Scottish Conservation Credits Scheme. 
Other closures directed at protecting cod are shown in blue. 
Without the establishment of (impractically) large scale experiments, reliable evaluation of the 
contribution of RTCs is difficult principally because it is not possible to ascertain what would the 
fishing activity in an area have been in the absence of the closure. Nevertheless alternative 
indicators have been developed in Scotland to help determine whether RTCS are having an effect. 
The first of these relies on analysis of individual vessel movement data (for every vessel equipped 
with VMS) and the second computes aggregate landings of vessels operating in the vicinity of 
RTCS prior to closure and then compares this with their landings in the subsequent period while 
the closure is in place. Results from the first two years have been encouraging with significant 
movements away from cod abundant areas and also marked reductions in landings. These 
approaches so far only address the question of what happens to vessels directly impacted by 
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RTCs, whereas other vessels may choose to avoid areas of higher cod abundance altogether. A 
new approach examining the patterns of behaviour of all vessels over time is being developed and 
results are expected shortly. 
Important in the evaluation process has been the recognition that numerous measures may 
operate in tandem such that ascribing any benefits to individual measures is not straightforward. 
To this end several ‘net effect’ approaches are being employed. Scotland has long recorded quite 
high discard rates, inconsistent with meeting targets for fishing mortality as expected in forecasts. 
In view of the improved quality of landings data, it is to be expected that meeting the targets of 
reduced catch will depend quite heavily on reducing discard rates significantly.  During the 
period covered by Conservation Credits, discard rates in the TR1 gear (the main cod catching 
gear) have dropped from around 60% to 40% and then to about 24% in 2010.  These data can be 
used alongside the monitored landings and results suggest that in the last couple of years, North 
Sea cod catches made by Scotland have broadly been in line with the ‘notional Scottish’ 
allocation of catch. Attempts have also been made to examine the partial Fs associated with the 
Scottish fleet. Analysis presented to the 2010 STECF Plenary demonstrated a 25% reduction in 
partial F associated with discards at a time when overall F apparently increased. STECF 
concluded that although the targets of the cod plan for 2009 had not strictly been met, there had 
been good progress and the measures should be strengthened and continue. Results of the 2010 
RTCs and other measures will be examined by the Summer STECF plenary 2011. 
English Real-time Closures 
As part of measures implemented by the UK Government to reduce fishing mortality on North 
Sea cod, the Marine Management Organisation (MMO) operates a Real Time Closure (RTC) 
scheme for all vessels under its administration, utilising article 13c to allocate additional days at 
sea.  The scheme is designed to incentivise cod avoidance behaviour, with closures placed to 
compliment the closures introduced by Marine Scotland in the northern North Sea, but covering 
areas of the North Sea cod distribution south of 56oN in ICES areas IVb, IVc and VIId. Closed 
areas are identified based on report of high cod abundance by fishers; sampling by fisheries 
enforcement vessels which demonstrate catches of greater than 80 cod per hours tow; or, on the 
basis of historic Landings Per Unit Effort (LPUE) data, for areas where catch rates were shown to 
be high in corresponding periods during previous years. 
During 2010 there were 5 seasonal closures (Figure 7.2.9), 3 of one month and 2 of four 
months in duration covering spawning locations for north sea cod; 105 real time closures (Figures 
7.2.10 & 11), with 82 in offshore areas of 7.5 x 8.5 miles closed for 1 month, and 20 in inshore 
areas of 6.5 x 3.5 miles closed for 14 days, based on landing-per-unit-effort records; as well as 3 
areas of 7.5 x 8.5 miles closed for 21 days for the protection of juvenile cod, identified on the 








Figures 7.2.10 & 11.  Real Time Closures implemented by UK Government south of 56⁰N in 2010. 
All English administered vessels using regulated gear as defined by the long-term 
management plan for cod are required to comply with all closures, as well as the closures 
introduced by other UK Fisheries Administrations, in order to receive an additional allocation of 
days at sea.  The  effectiveness of the scheme is currently being evaluated by the Centre for 
Environment, Fisheries and Aquaculture Science (CEFAS) under a DEFRA-funded R&D project 
MF1220 (“Improving the scientific basis for using real-time closures as a fishery management 
measure”) which is utilising data from satellite-based Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) to build 
up a fine-scale picture of where vessels are fishing, and the amount of fish they are catching, as 
well as using biological information from extensive cod tagging studies undertaken by CEFAS to 
validate closure size and temporal extent given information on cod movements. 
8. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE PLAN 
This section provides an overview of key changes in the characteristics, catch composition and 
financial performance of the major fleet segments prosecuting the North Sea Cod Fishery in the 
period 2006-2009. Detailed tables are provided in Annex 15. It has not been possible to examine 
the actual performance of the fishery against an estimated counterfactual and hence it is not 
possible with any certainty to attribute any of the observed changes to the North Sea Cod Plan. 
 Due to shortages of expertise no economic and social evaluations have been carried out for 
the other areas.  
8.1. Data and fleet segment selection 
The data for this analysis has been taken from the 2011 AER data call and covers the years 
2006-2009. The initial data extraction included all fleet segments landing cod caught in the 
following FAO areas: 27.3a, 27.4, and 27.7d, which were taken as a proxy for the area covered by 
the North Sea Cod Plan. A proportion of the cod landings from area 27.3a is actually covered by 
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other management plans and hence this approach overestimates to some extent North Sea activity. 
As there was no further spatial disaggregation possible and the impact on the overall results likely 
to be small, this approach is considered to be a reasonable second best. 
A number of amendments were made to the dataset to provide a consistent and usable record 
across the required time period. The key change was to remove the Swedish data as changes in 
the definition of fleet segments from 2008 meant that a consistent time series could not be 
produced in the available time.  
The remaining data contained details of 114 fleet segments, defined by Member State, fishing 
method and vessel length. There was a certain amount of missing data and a variety of 
approaches to reporting some aspects, for example effort, although there was greater consistency 
from 2008.  
Of the 114 fleet segments, a subset was selected in order to enable more manageable and 
meaningful analysis. The most significant fleet segments in terms of North Sea cod were selected. 
Each of the selected fleet segments landed, on average, half a percent or more, by value, of the 
total North Sea cod landings (see table in Annex 15). Using this criteria, 19 fleet segments were 
selected from six Member States and using six fishing methods, including demersal and beam 
trawls and passive gears. 
These 19 fleet segments caught between them, on average from 2006-2009, 90 per cent by 
value of all North Sea cod.  
An alternative approach to fleet selection (e.g. as taken in the 2010 evaluation of the Baltic 
Cod Plan) would be to base it on cod dependency. This approach was tested and, using a 
dependency ratio of ten per cent as a threshold (i.e. taking all fleet segments for which North Sea 
cod represented 10 per cent or more of their total fishing revenues) narrowed the field to 21 fleet 
segments. The combined scale of these 21 segments only summed to 74 per cent of all North Sea 
cod landings by value and it was decided that using this approach was too restrictive compared to 
the alternative. 
A brief comparison of the selected data (19 fleet segments) against the total population (114 
fleet segments) shows, on average, that they comprised only a minority of the total vessels and 
total employment engaged in the North Sea cod fishery, but a significant majority of the total cod 
catch. The table in Annex 15 provides an indicative view of the selected fleet segments. Caution 
is required when considering the results of the full dataset (i.e. covering all 114 fleet segments) as 
there are a number of missing entries and inconsistencies which mean that those results are 
indicative and not completely robust. The data for the 19 selected segments, on the other hand, is 
largely complete and consistent with only a few exceptions, discussed below. 
8.2.  Missing variables 
The data for the selected fleet segments was, in general, complete and consistent. There were a 
few exceptions and, where feasible, estimates were put in place to replace missing values. For 
example, some cost values were missing for some years for one of the UK and two of the Danish 
fleets and these were estimated using effort, landings and cost data for other years. 
The two French fleet segments did not have a full set of associated data and were missing, in 
particular, effort data 2006-7 and landings data for 2008. It was not possible to estimate the 
missing variables in these cases. 
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8.3. North Sea Cod Dependence 
As discussed above, the fleet segments selected for analysis were not the most cod dependent 
and, for many of them, North Sea cod provides only a small minority of their total fishing 
revenues. For almost all fleets, the importance of cod in total fishing revenues has declined over 
the period, sometimes significantly. The UK fleets are an exception to this with revenue from 
North Sea cod remaining relatively steady as a proportion of total income. For one of the UK fleet 
segments in particular, the 12-24m DFN, North Sea cod still provided the great majority of 
fishing revenues up to 2009 (see Annex 15 for details). 
8.4. Capacity, Effort and Employment 
Over the evaluation period 2006-9, fleet capacity has fallen by around a quarter, employment 
by just under a fifth and vessel numbers by over a third (see Table 8.1 below). The implied 
increase in average crew per vessel from three to four and the less than proportionate fall in fuel 
consumption both point to the unsurprising conclusion that the consolidation has been in favour 
of larger, more powerful vessels. The aggregate trends are clear, but there is considerable 
variation at the level of fleet segments. For example, some of the UK and Netherlands fleet 
segments experienced steady or even increasing vessel numbers and employment whereas many 
of the Danish fleet segments showed declines substantially greater than the average. 
 
Alongside the fall off in vessel capacity, effort has also declined, by around a third and 
slightly more in the North Sea than elsewhere. But effort per vessel has increased implying that 
the fleet consolidation may have had some benefits for the remaining vessels. 
79 
 
Table: 8.1 Selected fleets, total: capacity and employment 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 










(FTE)  9524 8821 8144 7764 -18% 3 4 
 Fleet GT  281,827 262,592 258,520 221,921 -21% 78 114 
Fleet KW  954,454 877,757 821,563 697,729 -27% 263 359 
Fleet(number)  3659 3409 2534 2381 -35%   
Fuel Cons 
(litres)  657,049,645 675,702,936 589,283,562 558,807,903 -15% 180,806 287,453 
Implied fuel 
price 
(euro/litre)  0.45 0.44 0.56 0.38    
 
8.5. Financial performance 
In line with falling fleet capacity and effort, all non-fixed costs have declined since 2006 (NB 
all financial data is in current prices. Costs are provided as totals for each fleet segment and do 
not differentiate where they were incurred i.e. it is not possible to isolate costs related specifically 
to North Sea activity). Crew costs, variable costs and fuel costs have all declined markedly. Total 
costs are reported as falling by over a third. Over the same period total fishing revenues have also 
fallen, but proportionately less than costs, with a decline of 12 per cent, implying that aggregate 
fishing profitability has increased. Landings and associated revenues from North Sea cod have 
fallen significantly (36 per cent) while prices have remained largely unchanged (not counting for 
inflation). Again, the aggregate view masks considerable variation at the level of fleet segment. 
While costs and revenues are falling at an aggregate level, the data suggests that both are 
increasing at a vessel level, a view supported by the increase in per vessel effort levels. Overall, 
costs per unit of effort have declined and revenues per unit of effort have increased. This 
suggests, plausibly, that it has been the most cost-inefficient participants which have exited the 
fleet while relatively more efficient vessels have remained engaged and have, up to 2009, been 
able to increase their activity. 
 
While the data on costs may be indicative, it is not definitively robust and analysis at a fleet 
segment level is enough to raise suspicions about the quality of the results being reported. For 
example, for a number of fleet segments, the reported operating costs (i.e. sum of fuel, crew, 
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repairs and other variable costs) vastly exceed the fishing revenues for each year implying 
unfeasibly large and sustained negative operating profits. Further detail is in Annex 15. 
8.6. Evaluating the Plan 
The data analysis reviewed above and Annex 15 provides some indications of trends in the 
composition and performance of the various fleets engaged in the North Sea Cod Fishery and 
affected by the Long Term Management Plan for Cod. What has not been possible is to attribute 
any of the observed changes directly to the Cod Plan – in that sense this is very much an 
evaluation of the fleet in recent years – and economic data has only been available for the first 
year of the revised Plan, 2009 - rather than an economic evaluation of the Plan itself. 
Some of the steps to allow a meaningful evaluation of the Cod Plan have now been 
undertaken. In particular, a counterfactual baseline has been estimated, illustrating the likely 
TACs and effort had no Plan been put in place from 2009. This is discussed in further detail in 
Section 9.1 below. The baseline estimates show that cod TAC with the Plan in 2009 is slightly 
higher than ‘no plan’ and around ten per cent higher with the Plan in place in 2010 and 2011. In 
all years 2009-11 effort is lower with the Plan than without.  
Deriving the revenue effect of the additional cod TAC is straightforward if it is assumed that 
the changes are insufficiently large to induce significant effects on price and that all of the TAC is 
used  – the suggested difference in TAC for 2009 implies an additional EUR1.3m in North Sea 
cod revenues. From a financial performance perspective profit is a more useful metric, but, as 
noted above, the existing cost data may not be reliable and hence estimates of the impact on 
profitability will prove more difficult. 
The more complex task in evaluating the Plan against its baseline, and one which requires a 
separate effort, is to estimate the impact of effort restrictions. The extent to which effort 
restrictions are binding, for which fleet segments and in respect of which stocks is not altogether 
clear. Undoubtedly effort in the North Sea would be higher without the Plan, the more so as the 
incremental impacts of effort restrictions take effect with each successive year. The resources to 
conduct this sort of analysis have not been available and it would yield more useful results if a 
longer period of analysis was possible i.e. when data for 2010/11 is available. 
In addition to understanding the economic impacts of the headline TAC and effort changes, a 
more thorough evaluation will also be required to unpick the particular consequences of the 
various approaches undertaken under Article 13 and which, at the level of individual fleet 
segments, may have had significant effects. 
9. THE ADDED VALUE OF THE MULTI-ANNUAL PLAN 
9.1. Generation of a Baseline 
The consequences of not having the 2008 agreed plan for four cod stocks in Kattegat, North 
Sea, West of Scotland and Irish Sea was evaluated by comparing the TACs and effort from 2008 
onwards assuming that the management would follow the approach laid out in the annual policy 
documents from the Commission, the detain is given in Annex 16. In general the North Sea stock 
is expected to follow the clause based on a ‘know state of the stock’ and the stock being evaluated 
as ‘outside safe biological limits’. For the three other stocks no assessment was available for most 
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years so it is assumed that STECF would follow the general ICES advice for ‘zero catch’, and 
that the state of the stock would be defined as ‘unknown’. 
9.2. Outcome TACs and Effort: 
The TACs set under the plan regulation, the new TACs set under the policy document if there 
was no plan are given in Table 9.1.  The tonnages of legal landings under the plan and under ‘no 
plan’ are give in columns 3 and 7 respectively. Column 10 gives the change in landings expressed 
at a ±% of the TAC originally set under the plan. For Effort the no plan option is likely to have 
been less restrictive.  Column 8 gives an indication of the Commission policy in the absence of 
the plan. For West of Scotland, TAC in 2009 appears to have been set in error as the reduction is 
almost twice that expected and in the subsequent year there was no reduction. Thus the no plan 
option may or may not have suffered from the same issue. If not the TAC in 2009 would have 
been higher. For subsequent years it is lower. For NS cod no effort restrictions would have 
applied, this might have had a number of consequences. 
• Vessel costs might have changed as vessels fished for longer but might have used 
slower steaming speeds, or reacted in a variety of ways to use the greater effort 
allowed 
• If  there were fishing opportunities on other species (untaken TACs) these might have 
been taken. 
For the other cod stocks there would have been a requirement to reduce effort but the amount 
was not specified.  
 
9.3. Outcome catches and stock:  
It is more difficult to estimate what might have happened to catch; there are several 
considerations (see Annex 16). Firstly it is concluded there is no measurable influence of the 
TACs set under  plan/no plan on catches. It is considered that in this context 2011 may be 
different, particularly for the Kattegat with a more dramatic change in TAC.  
• For effects of effort these may be different by area. 
• For Kattegat we have no estimate of removals so it is not possible to estimate catch or 
change in catch between no plan / plan 
• For West of Scotland and Irish Sea we have no basis to determine what the effort 
change would be under ‘no plan’ and even if there was a change what this change 
would have done to altered the catch.  
• For NS the situation is complex. For 2008 and 2009 under the plan the ratio of 
removals to TAC decreases slightly as headline effort declines under the plan (Table 
Under ‘no plan’ there could have been no effort reduction. Its unknown what would 
have happened to catch but as removals were at 2.6 times the TAC it does not seem to 
be convincing that the headline effort rate is strongly controlling removals. For 2010 
the ratio of removals to TAC is not know yet.  For NS it is possible that ‘no plan’ 
would have resulted in higher F in 2009/2010 but not in a direction to change the state 
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of the stock from ‘below Blim’ and probably not enough to change average catch over 
the two years by much. Thus the state of the stock might have been worse but is 
unlikely to be better even though TACs would have been smaller.  
9.4.   Economic and other potential impacts of no plan 
Detailed work to bring the findings of the ‘no plan’ analysis into the economic evaluation has 
not as yet been conducted. For Irish Sea there was no difference. For West of Scotland the 
situation is confused with apparently over reduction TAC in 2009 and subsequent correction in 
2010 with a small change for 2011. Given the complete lack of a link between TAC and catch in 
West of Scotland the differences are difficult to disentangle. For Kattegat the most recent larger 
reduction in TAC in 2011 would expect to result in decrease profit opportunities. For the North 
Sea the situation is also complex.  The direction of financial impacts arising from the TAC and 
the effort changes is straightforward – positive TAC changes increase profit opportunities, 
reduced effort changes reduce them. The balance of change, however, cannot be prejudged in 
advance of a proper analysis. The indications from the analysis of effort imply that effort 
restrictions have become steadily more effective in practice as initial headroom has been eroded. 
The effort restrictions have tended to become binding on non-cod stocks first and hence the gains 
in cod TAC have been available in full. The balance of short run costs and benefits for affected 
fleet segments depends, then, on the relative scale of the two offsetting impacts, the increased cod 
TAC and the reduced effort available for non-cod opportunities. The balance is as yet unknown 
and will be different on a fleet segment basis, depending, for example, on the relative importance 
of cod compared to the importance of other stocks where effort restrictions are binding. 
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Table 9.1 Comparison of  TAC and nominal effort changes under the 2008 plan and the TACs and changes in effort under ‘No plan’, see text for details of assumptions. The changes 
are summarized as the ratio of (no plan/plan) landings Also included is a column that indicates what we conclude might change in catch and a comment concerning the basis for the 
TACs set where this is not obvious. 
Stock Year Under Plan Under no plan Realized 
Fishery 
No Plan/ Plan 



























outcome  or basis 
of plan 
Kattegat 2008 673      Unknown    
 2009 505 -25% -25% -25% 505 reduction 
unknown 
Unknown No difference Unquantifiable  
 2010 379 -25% -25% -25% 379 reduction 
unknown 
Unknown No difference Unquantifiable  
 2011 190 -50% ?? -25% 284 reduction 
unknown 




2008 402      11.5    
 2009 240* -40% -25% -25% 302 reduction 
unknown 
14.9 +25% Unquantifiable  
 2010 240 0% -21% -25% 227 reduction 
unknown 
 6%  reduction Unquantifiable 25% plan reduced 
to 21% change 
 2011 182 -24% -24% -25% 170 reduction 
unknown 
 7% reduction  25% plan reduced 
to 24% change 
Irish Sea 2008 1199      1.5    
 2009 899 -25% -25% -25% 899 reduction 
unknown 
1.2 No difference Unquantifiable  
 2010 674 -25% -25% -25% 674 reduction 
unknown 
 No difference Unquantifiable  
 2011 506 -25% -25% -25% 506 reduction 
unknown 
 No difference   
North Sea 2008 25290      3.3    
 2009 34590 +37%# -25% +35% 34015 No effort 
change 
2.6 No difference Unquantifiable 30% reduction in F 
 2010 40300 +17% -10% +5% 36320 No effort 
change 
 10% reduction Unquantifiable 30% reduction in F 
 2011 32241 -20% -10% -20% 29056 No effort 
change 
 10% reduction  20% reduction in 
TAC 
#TAC uncertain due to unknown way of allocation of VIId part of NS stock TAC from combined TAC IIVb-k TAC , # effort reduction is headline effort not taking into account any 
exemptions under Articles. * Possible error in setting and then subsetting larger area TAC to West of Scotland   
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10. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF THE PLAN 
Based on the above analyses the Workshop came to the following conclusions and observations 
10.1. Effectiveness 
• What have been the immediate results and medium term impacts for the stock addressed by the multi-
annual plan? Have the objectives of the plan been achieved? 
Given that the plan is only into place for 3 years, it is premature to conclude on the medium term impact 
• A full analytical assessment is available only for North Sea cod. Objectives have not been met in 
terms of F. F has declined and SSB has increased prior to introduction of plan. There have been 
continued but minor reductions in F and increases in SSB since the introduction of the plan. Progress 
towards target is hindered due to TAC and effort regime failing to constrain removals. 
• Of the other stocks, there are assessments but these are only indicative of trends in F and biomass. 
For the West of Scotland and Irish Sea fishing mortality is very uncertain but total mortality remains 
very high. In the Kattegat, there is a high degree of uncertainty in F. Biomass levels are estimated to 
be well below Blim 
• Objectives in terms of F reductions do not appear to have been met in WoS, Kattegat and the Irish 
Sea, but, while mortality is considered to be well above the target objectives in line with the current 
plan, the exact level of F is unknown due to uncertainties in mortality estimates arising from inter 
alia unallocated removals, catches in excess of TAC and other sources of mortality. ,  
• Medium term simulations based on the current rate of change per year in F suggest that for North 
Sea, Irish Sea and West of Scotland cod stocks it is unlikely that following the current regime F will 
reduce sufficiently to reach F=Fmsy by 2015. Currently it is not possible to evaluate the likely 
success in terms of F by 2015 for Kattegat cod.  
• What have been the immediate results and medium term impacts of the multi-annual plan on the 
environment and the ecosystem, for example by-catch, discards, non-target species? 
• Reductions on discards, on commercial and non-commercial species, associated with Article 11 and 
Article 13 (technical measures) have been significant when used in some areas (e.g. North Sea). 
• Some technical measures have significantly reduced commercial by-catch (e.g. Nephrops fisheries 
with grids have become single-species fisheries).   
• Reported landings in most areas are in line with the plan, but due to high discards in some areas, 
catches are well in excess of TAC e.g. West of Scotland 
• Effort displacement may have had a negative impact. 
• Have there been any side effects resulting from the plan? (for example, changes in behaviour that 
affect other fisheries, or environmental consequences, changes in the market). 
• Various fleets have committed themselves to use more selective gear (Article 11 or Article 13) or to 
real time closures (Article 13) or to fish outside the distribution area of cod (Article 11). 
85 
• Has the implementation been affected by external factors such as global change, ecosystems effects, 
or other fisheries? 
• Positive responses in biomass may have been hindered by external factors (e.g. seal predation on the 
West of Scotland, Pope and Holmes 2008). 
10.2. Utility 
• What trends in fleet capacity (kW or GT) would have been expected from the implementation of the 
plan? What trends were actually observed? 
• Substantial decline in effort, although much of this occurred before introduction of the current cod 
plan, and continued decline at a lower rate or in some cases leveling out. 
• Otter trawl gears contribute the highest effort amounts, with the importance of TR1 and TR2 gears 
varying between areas. Beam trawl (BT2) effort is also very significant in the North Sea  
• The extent of unregulated effort varies between areas. However, this is associated with minimal cod 
catches  
• Effort associated with Article 11 is relatively low in all areas,  
• Effort associated with Article 13 ranges from 25% to 75%  between areas  
 
• Are the fleets affected by the multi-annual plan in a situation of overcapacity? 
• Currently we are unable to estimate the appropriate capacity for these fleets due to the complexity 
of the species mixtures and the shortage of economic data.  
• Did the multi-annual plan contribute to adapting the fleet capacity to the fishing possibilities 
resulting from the multi-annual plan? 
• It was not possible from the evaluations available to indicate to what extent the plan alone was 
responsible for changes in fleet capacity (fuel prices and fish prices have recently been volatile). 
10.3. Efficiency (cost-effectiveness) 
The costs of this plan in terms of for example employment, gross revenue of the fleet 
• At a fleet and vessel level, reductions in effort may not necessarily result in commensurate 
reduction in revenue as business will be incentivized to maximize revenue from available effort. 
• Costs at a fleet level have fallen in line with effort, but have increased at an individual vessel level. 
• Meta analysis can mask significant changes at an individual business level. Therefore, to 
understand the implications at an individual business level more detailed analysis would be 
required. 
• According to a sociological study, based on a small sample of interviewed fishers, employment has 
gone down. Additionally results from economic studies show that employment has fallen.   
Effects on the broader industry (processing, transporting, auxiliary) 
• Implicit in the reduction in capacity, there are likely to have been negative consequences for the 
broader industry, although there are no specific documented cases which can be attributed to the 
Plan. 
Economic benefit/loss during the period of implementation 
•  Analysis of changes in profitability at the level of fleet and vessel has not been possible due to 
concerns over the quality of the cost data. There are indications that revenue per vessel may have 
86 
increased while falling at the fleet level, but it is not possible to attribute these changes to the Cod 
Plan. 
Indicators 
•  The economic indicators were only sufficient to describe changes over the period of analysis. It 
has not been possible to attribute any of those observed changes in the indicators to the multi-
annual plan and hence they are not sufficient, on their own, to enable a robust evaluation. 
Sustainability 
Sustainability of the plan relative to the initial impact assessment? 
• From a biological perspective all the cod stocks covered by the plan are currently likely to have an 
SSB below Blim. However, for North Sea and West of Scotland cod SSB has increased in recent 
years.  
• Fishing mortality has not declined as envisaged by the plan 
• The long run (i.e. taking account of stock effects) economic sustainability of the plan cannot be 
judged at this stage. 
11. CONCLUSIONS 
Based on the answers to previous questions, the Workshop draws the following global judgement on the plan 
With regards to the utility and sustainability of the multi-annual plan and its contribution to the objectives of the 
Common Fisheries Policy. 
• The plan has not controlled fishing mortality as envisaged. 
• Mortality of some other species such as haddock and whiting may have declined to levels 
consistent with CFP objective in some areas, and maybe partly due to cod plan.  
• The short run economic impacts of the multi-annual plan are not clear and will depend on the 
balance of benefits resulting from increased cod TAC and costs resulting from reduced effort. The 
impact on long run economic sustainability will also depend on the stock effects of the plan which 
at this stage are unknown. 
Success in achieving its stated objectives  
• The plan has not achieved its stated objectives. 
• In all of the stock areas the total recorded effort by the gears for which cuts applied decline slightly, 
but did not decline, in 2009 and 2010, in line with the reductions according to the plan.    
• There have been positive contributions under Article 13c which appears to provide benefits 
towards achieving the cod plan targets. Article 13 allows a flexible, locally tailored response which 
should provide better governance with measures based directly on landings and discards. Notable 
effects are: redistribution of effort away from higher abundance in Kattagat; discard reductions in 
the northern North Sea by TR1 vessels; the use of more selective gears, and cod avoidance through 
real time closures.  However, the verification aspects of Article 13 are too complex. 
Specific indicators that would be useful for a future evaluation of this multi-annual plan 
• Fully documented catch of cod by vessel 
Additional data that should be collected in the future to help in evaluating the multi-annual plan 
• Economic data linked to vessels operating specifically under the cod plan by Article along with 
documented catch of cod by vessel 
Other plans this plan should be linked to 
• The plan would benefit from linking to plans for Nephrops and haddock, whiting, saithe sole and 
plaice in the North Sea. 
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Any future revision should consider the following: 
• Substitute alternative metrics for TAC (as Total Allowed Landings) or the current effort regime to 
regulate catches. These have been unable to adequately control cod removals. Reliance on these control 
instruments is a core weakness in the plan. 
• The HCR in the plan is overly reliant on annual estimates of F which are either absent, inaccurate or 
imprecise. Consideration should be given to multiannual metrics for informing decisions.   
• The lack of analytical assessments in WoS, Irish Sea and Kattegat preclude the application of the HCR. 
Therefore different metrics are needed for the application of the HCR. 
• Short term forecast has been available for North Sea cod and has not been available for other cod stocks. 
• Short term forecasts show bias in estimating SSB and F; specifically, SSB is overestimated and F is 
underestimated; by comparison removals were estimated less biased  
• Single-stock LTMPs were designed without consideration of the fishing opportunities for other species. 
Mixed fisheries simulations give an indication of the potential implementation error in North Sea cod 
advice, with actual F being higher than stipulated in the LTMP if there is continued fishing for other 
species with higher TACs as well as of the potential overcatch or underutilization of TACs. 
• It is concluded that we should not necessarily expect fishing mortality to follow trends in fishing effort.  
• Exemptions through Article 11 require low cod catches. These exemptions should only be approved 
when the fishing activity is deployed outside the distribution area of cod, or if deployed within the cod 
distribution area, when the used fishing gear is designed and confirmed to minimize cod catches.  
• Cod catches lower than a certain % (as in Articles 11 and 13.2b) can still contribute significantly to 
overall cod mortality if overall catch or effort is high or when abundance is low. This is a fundamental 
flaw in the design of the plan. A system based on proportion of total expected cod outtake from the 
whole fishery would be more appropriate.  
• Basing monitoring on percentage composition (as in Articles 11 and 13) provides a disincentive to 
improve selectivity for other species as reducing overall catch can increase the percentage of cod even if 
cod catches are constant. 
• The starting baseline used in Article 12 of the plan is derived from the average of either 2004-2006 or 
2005-2007 depending on MS choices. For the North Sea this means that allowed effort in the first year 
of the plan (Effort 2009 = 75% of the baseline) could be higher than 75% of effort in the preceding year 
(2008). Because the stipulated F reductions of 25% are relative to 2008, this resulted in effort reductions 
not being in line with F reductions. For the other stocks the percentages may have been different, but for 
the same reason the effort reductions were not in line with the F reductions. 
• Differences have occurred in the respective methodologies used to calculate effort from the reference 
years and those in the reported consumption of effort within the plan. This will have resulted in higher 
then intended effort. 
• Clear and unambiguous phrasing of the elements of regulations will make compliance more transparent 
and potentially more reliable. 
12. PREPARATION FOR SCOPING IA  
In preparation for the Impact Assessment of a revised plan, a scoping meeting will be required. In 
order for scientific advice to be given, Commission and MSs need to indicate in that meeting a range 
of aspects 
• The regulatory measures they might be prepared to implement, and specifically those they are 
not willing to consider, to focus available expertise in the most productive areas.  
• Specific objectives with timescales and if there are multiple objectives some idea of the 
tradeoffs. 
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• If catch quotas are to be considered for some fleets, those with expertise in compliance should 
be requested to attend to discuss compliance for catch quotas, likely errors and uncertainties. 
 
Observers: The following discussion is not intended as a criticism rather as observation to improve for 
the process for the future. There was considerable difficulty in managing numbers of participants to 
the meeting, in particular observers. Part of the problem is the ad hoc approach to organising the 
meeting. While the overall numbers were supposed to be limited to 40, due to the room size, with 28 
invited experts this would have implied 12 Commissions staff and observers. While some observers 
were very careful to register early, others seemed to feel that registering was not their responsibility, 
and even some Commission staff registered very late. In the end around 47 people were invited to 
come, though many observers were part time. These increased numbers were the result of imbalance 
in participation/notification occurring over time. One MS wished to send an observer notifying just 
two days before the meeting. It would be very helpful if STECF had a clear policy on who should be 
notified of meetings and this was formally communicated to all those involved. However, such a 
policy requires clear and early preparation of ToR and attendance lists. The need to define ToR 
implies the Commission having a clear idea of its policy and priorities significantly earlier than has 
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are met. Following  the adoption of EC  regulation 1342/2008, STECF were  requested  to 
evaluate each individual request to assess whether sufficient data had been presented so 


















and Germany. Of  the only 6 submissions  from UK  (Scotland), Sweden,  Ireland, France, 
Poland  and  Spain have  been  approved. The French  exemption was  revoked  as  it was 
considered that the application no longer constituted an administrative burden (EC regu‐
lation 57/2011).  
















3. Taking  into account time period, spatial coverage and  fishing pattern, are the observed catches of 
cod (landings and discards) considered representative of the catches of cod for the groups of vessels 
identified in the Member States’ submission? 




is  less than or equal to 1.5% of the total catch  for the vessel groups  identified  in the submission, 
STECF is requested to specify the data that are required in order to permit such an assessment.  
At  the start of  the evaluation process undertaken by STECF,  the  Information presented 
by the individual member states varied considerably, and this remained an issue for sub‐
sequent  applications.    It  should be noted  that  the  implementation  regulation  that  lays 
down the detailed rules for the application of 1342/2009 only came into effect in 2010 (EC 
regulation  237/2010).  This  legislative  vacuum  resulted  in  STECF  having  to  develop 
evaluation criteria and data requirements to answer the specific details (1‐5) highlighted 
above. This  led to an adaptive process over several plenary meetings whereby the data 




cases where observer data was presented, there was  insufficient  information to  link the 
observed  trips  to  the vessels seeking exemption or a  lack of spatial data precluded any 


















































resentative  observer  data  from  discard  sampling  programme  plus  detailed 
spatial analysis  
• High ‐ list of landings data associated with a list of vessels plus representative 
observer  data  from  discard  sampling  programme  plus  analysis  that  shows 
technical separation  
An  important  consideration  is  that while  fleets may  technically meet  the provisions of 





onstrated and/or proposed, and evidence  is presented  that demonstrates points  (i) and 
(ii)  are  the  primary  reason  why  cod  catches  are  below  the  threshold  levels,  caution 
should  be  applied when  evaluating  submissions  that  are  based  solely  on  recent  catch 
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and/or  landings data.    In  respect  of  the distinction  between points  ii)  and  iii)  there  is 
clearly a need for longer term information on stock distribution and metier behaviour to 






























species. High catches of other species  in a mixed  fishery will  lead  to  larger amounts of 



















fore a  thorough evaluation can be made. STECF  (2009) called  for  the development of a 
structured  approach  involving  stable  criteria  is  considered  essential  for  the  ongoing 
evaluation of Member State submissions, which will increase with the implementation of 
Article 13 of  the Council Regulation. During  the  summer plenary  in  2009, STECF was 
asked by Commission services to “Provide recommendations for the detailed rules concerning 
format and  content  for  the annual  reports which Member States have  to provide  in accordance 













identified  as belonging  to  the group of vessels  together with  the  fishing  effort 
(kW days) deployed  to obtain  those catches. Sampling precision should at  least 
correspond to the levels in the DCF. 
• Spatial and temporal coverage: sampling levels (such as sampled effort versus to‐
tal  effort)  should  be  given  for  onboard  observer  schemes  for  the  exempted 
group(s) of vessels. 
• Those groups of vessels exempted under spatial decoupling criteria due to fish‐
ing activity  taking place  in depths greater  than  those  inhabited by  cod  should 
provide data  to  show  that  all  fishing  activity has  taken place  at depths below 
300m. 




ing  the Winter Plenary  (2009), STECF was asked again  to reassess  the submissions pre‐
















1.5% with no  reference  to detailed  elements  requested previously  (see page  ?). STECF 
(2009) reiterated its previous concerns relating to the problems of being unable to disen‐
tangle the likelihood of spatial from depletion decoupling from any given case and noted 
“STECF do not consider  the  third criteria as a condition  for effort exemptions. Providing effort 
exceptions  to groups of vessels  that meet  the  third  criterion has  the potential  to negate any at‐

















aimed  at  reducing discards  of  other  species  as  for  a  given  catch  of  cod,  reducing un‐
wanted catches will increase the percentage of cod in the catch. 
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• Unable  to  common‐
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Position Paper on the Review of the EU Long-term Management Plan for Cod 
 
June 17th 2011 
1. Introduction  
1.1  The  ICES/STECF  Joint Scoping Meeting  in Copenhagen  in February/March 2011 set out 
terms  for  the  review  of  a  number  of  long‐term management  plans,  including  the  EU 
Long–term Management Plan for Cod. (EC 1342/2008). Evaluation of the cod plan would 
be backward  looking,  in  that  it would examine how  the plan had performed  to date  in 




























   Other  vessels  are  still  largely  dependent  on  catching  cod,  haddock  and  other 








figure  the  reputation  of  the  fishing  industry  and  the Common  Fisheries  Policy.  







cluding  catch  composition  rules and  inappropriate minimum  landing  sizes.   We 
are hoping that reforms to the CFP will sweep away these perverse effects. 














information  is  intended  to  complement  information  on  the  economic  and  social 
impacts of the plan being provided by Member States, and to inform the analysis 
of impact being carried out by the ICES/STECF WG. 









2. Design of the plan 
2.1  The  basis  of  the Commission’s  original Cod Recovery  Plan  (2003‐2007) was  the 
view  that  restrictive TACs had  failed  to prevent an  increase  in  fishing mortality 
and halt  the decline  in  cod  stocks. Blame  for  this  failure was mainly  levelled  at 











plan was  intended  to set TACs and effort  limits according  to predefined rules  in 
response to the latest scientific advice. 
2.3  Despite its name, the second phase of the Cod Management Plan was not designed 
as a coherent plan.   There had been  inadequate consultation with  ICES scientists 
and  stakeholders before  the plan was  introduced. Specifically  there had been no 
formal  impact  assessment. This  lack  of planning  led  to  a number  of unforeseen 





was especially disappointing  to  the NSRAC.   The  joint NSRAC/NWWRAC Sym‐
posium on Cod Recovery had raised important issues, and had pointed to the pit‐
falls of introducing unproven measures.  It had emphasised the need for incentives 
to achieve cod avoidance.   However,  the  first Plan was based on setting a  target 
biomass – despite advice from the NSRAC that this was inappropriate.  The second 
























other  fishing activities.  It  is also difficult  for  fishers  to accept  that  this highly  re‐
strictive plan applies only to European vessels.   The plan does not apply to Nor‐














its contribution but also partly because of  rigidities  in  the provisions of  the Cod 
Management Plan that have obstructed the full implementation of this approach. 




biomass  that scientists consider  to be a safe  level  to avoid stock depletion. How‐
ever,  the  resulting TAC was constrained  to be within 15% of  the previous year’s 
TAC, provided that the stock biomass was above the level that gave a high risk of 












towards  smaller mesh gears where  cod was  taken as a by‐catch. Because of  this 
transfer, the resultant reduction in fishing mortality was insignificant. 
3.3  The new cod recovery plan, put forward in April 2008, placed more emphasis on 






















cies,  including  saithe,  and  has  resulted  in unfair  competition.   Moreover,  it has 
proved difficult to award additional days at sea under Article 13 to those engaging 
in  cod avoidance. Management has  turned  into a  confusing numbers game gov‐
erned by arcane and incomprehensible rules that have little or nothing to do with 
constraining fishing mortality.  




siderable discarding on  top of  that.   For every cod  landed an additional cod has 
been discarded. Poor recruitment of cod has persisted since 2005. Recovery will be 
maintained if F0.4 can be met, but this has not been the case so far.  Year on year re‐
ductions  in  fishing  effort have  failed  to maintain  the  initial downward  trend  in 
fishing mortality on North Sea cod. 
3.6  With  low  spawning  stock biomass  and poor  recruitment  the NSRAC  recognises 










4. TAC setting and discards 
4.1  The Cod Recovery Plan has created discards through the way it has been designed 
and implemented.  The link between the plan, TAC setting, and the Technical Con‐
servation Measures Regulation  (which  imposes catch composition  rules) has cre‐







mesh size.   However, an  increase  is not possible because  the Cod Recovery Plan 
uses mesh size as a means of defining different fleet sectors.  Smaller mesh vessels 
cannot increase their mesh size to promote cod avoidance. 
4.3  Unreported  landings,  formerly a problem  in  the North Sea, may now have been 
marginalised but  there  is still a major problem with  the discarding of cod. Total 












4.4  Fishers and  fishery managers originally welcomed  the provisions  for  cod avoid‐
ance and discard reduction offered by plan. However, although some of these pro‐
visions have been well utilised, others have not.   Article 13 ostensibly provides a 








Article  11  allows  for  vessels  to  achieve  exemptions  from  the  plan  where  cod 
catches make up less than 1.5% of the total catch of the group of vessels concerned. 











4.6  Effort control  is now a complex and elaborate encumbrance that contributes  little 
or nothing to further reductions in fishing mortality. Effort levels are linked to one 




• The  automatic year‐on‐year  reductions  in permitted  effort  that  increases 
the costs of fishing without delivering a reduction in fishing mortality  
• The barriers  that have prevented  the  flexibilities present  in  the plan  that 
would allow wider cod avoidance from being implemented. 
4.8  There is strong support within the NSRAC for a “land more and discard less” pol‐
icy, and  for  fishers being provided with  the  incentives  to enable  them  to achieve 
that aim. The NSRAC also believes that it is important to control removals rather 
than  landings. Landing  the  quantities  of  fish now  being discarded would make 
many fisheries more viable.  The plan must be changed to encourage the landing of 
valuable  fish.   We are advocating a  fishery‐ by‐fishery,  incentive‐driven,  results‐
based approach as part of a more participative system of management under  the 
CFP.  





•  Insisting  that  all  the  marketable  sized  cod  that  are  caught  should  be 
landed.  





• Providing a more  straightforward means  to achieve  exemption  from  the 






5.2  The NSRAC has compiled a  list of examples of  initiatives  taken by  fishers across 




any  reason  to adopt measures over and above a  legally observed TAC.    Indeed, 
further effort restrictions could be taken off the agenda now if fishers were made 















5.6  The NSRAC accepts  that  there must be a robust system  for confirming  that  total 






5.7  Provision  for such changes could be  included  in an additional Article within  the 
cod recovery plan encouraging vessels to move in the right direction. It would be 
for individual vessels to decide whether to take on the additional task of catch ac‐
countability  in  return  for  relief  from  the  effort  regime.    Such  changes,  if  imple‐
mented, would reflect some of the aspirations for reform of the CFP. It would be a 










on  what  has  happened  within  the  different  fisheries,  and  considers  what  also 
might also take place in those fisheries  if the Cod Recovery Plan is extended  into 
the  future  in  its present  form. The  response of  individual  fishing companies has 
clearly differed. Some have moved into fisheries where the catch of cod is minimal. 





7. The way forward 




7.2  The NSRAC  is  firmly opposed  to any  further effort  reductions  in  the North Sea. 
Such  reductions would  further discourage  fishers  from  entering  into  innovative 






















place  in Hamburg  (2024  June 2011). The NWWRAC would  like  to  request  that 
ICES/STECF takes the paper into account during its deliberation and that it is in‐
cluded as an Annex to the meeting report.  



















be adopted  for  the management of  the cod stocks  in a context of mixed  fisheries  in  the 
north western waters rather than a “one‐size‐fits‐all” area. As a result, a new governance 















The NWWRAC  is of  the view  that both  from a  theoretical and a practical perspective, 
maximum sustainable yield is most usefully understood as a range of values rather than 
as a particular point value on the fishing mortality scale.  




There  is a need  to  set on a mechanism  to  incorporate  the  forthcoming benchmark  that 





The North Western Waters RAC  participated  in  the  ICES/SECF  joint meeting  held  in  





on  some  of  these  questions  using  a  separate  questionnaire  and  independent  expert 
funded by STECF.  





The evidence suggests  that current cod management plan  is based on  two assump‐
tions. The  first  is  that  there  is a  significant and direct  causal  correlation between  a 
reduction in fishing effort and a reduction in fishing mortality. The second is that that 


































tremely difficult  to partition  fishing  and natural mortality  for  fish  stocks  and ulti‐
mately only the fishing component of the mortality can be directly controlled.  
The assumption of a constant natural mortality of 0.2 seems questionable in relation 
to  the cod  fisheries  in  the West of Scotland and  Irish Sea. Whilst  it  is unlikely  that 
seals “caused” the decline of cod  in  these regional seas, ICES makes the valid point 
that  there  is  compelling  evidence  to  suggest  that predation by  the  rising grey  seal 














ty at 0.4 on cod on appropriate age groups”. The NWWRAC  is of  the view  that  the 
management plan  is not achieving  its objective and  is very unlikely  to do so  in  the 
future particularly for West of Scotland and the Irish Sea cod stocks.  
The NWWRAC concurs with  ICES  that  the plan as adopted  is “non‐precautionary” 
and the objectives stated there cannot be met under the present conditions and provi‐
sions of  the plan. For  this  reason,  ICES does not provide advice on  the basis of  the 




(VIa)  use  Research  Vessel  survey  data  to  estimate  total  removals  from  the  stock. 
These  estimates of  total  removals  are  typically multiples  of  reported  landings  and 
estimated discards, despite more accurate landings reporting and better discard esti‐
mates for cod in recent years. This ‘missmatch’ has led to concerns among ICES scien‐
tists  that natural mortality may well be higher  that  is assumed  in  the assessment  (a 
fixed instantaneous rate of 0.2 is assumed for each age and year). That in itself has an 















biomass  based  target  to  a  fishing mortality‐based  target…”  This  contrasts  sharply 
with  the  statement made on  the  same page of  the plan, under paragraph  (9): “The 
establishment and allocation of catch  limits,  the  fixing of  the minimum and precau‐













Whilst  precautionary  approach  should  be  implemented  in  the  absence  of  sound 
scientific data, the NWWRAC considers that the proposed 25% reduction is arbitrary 
and does not have a scientific basis. It has severe economic consequences for the fleet 










dustry and unless  it  is amended  it will ultimately  lead  to zero  fishing effort as  the 





ditions  set down  for  exemptions and allocation of  extra  effort  is very onerous and 
applies to groups of vessels and to effort groups.  


















The  funding provided under article 33 relates  to  the European fisheries  fund which 









The geographical definition of Article 3  for  the West of Scotland  is not appropriate 
and covers areas where cod are not present now or  indeed  in the past. It should be 





the  last  ten years, as  it might be  seen  in  the graph below. However  there has been 



























area VIa  as again a 25%  reduction  in both TAC  and  effort  is mandatory when  the 
scientific advice is to reduce catches to the lowest possible level.  
The  ICES  scientific  advice  for  2011  clearly  identifies  this  poor  data  condition  and 
states:  “Quantities  of  landings  and  discards  are  not  included  in  the  model  (only 
weights  at  age  information) because of  concerns over unreliability  in  the historical 
commercial data. Mortality estimates arising from  this assessment  ‐based on survey 
data ‐are poorly estimated. Because of uncertainties in the level and trend of natural 




















is  not  only  extremely  confusing  but more  importantly  has  ruled  out  fisheries  that 
have no affect on cod stocks and has stopped a directed haddock fishery which has 
been a key fishery for area VIa.  
Further,  the  imposition of catch composition rules aimed at  limiting catches of cod, 
haddock and whiting are resulting simply in increased discarding. STECF has stated 
(STECF 35Plenary Meeting Report  (PLEN‐10‐03) page 66  )  : “In practice, catch com‐
position as prescribed  in current EC regulations relate to the retained catch selected 
onboard following capture and is not related to the composition of catch selected by 




The NWWRAC  is of  the opinion  that  this will be greatly  exacerbated by  spike  re‐
cruitments, one of which (haddock, from 2009) is expected to present itself in the eco‐
system now. Anecdotal evidence suggests that it is already evident. 
5. COD RECOVERY PLAN: MAIN ISSUES RELATING TO IRISH SEA 
(VIIA)  
5.1. General Remarks  
The  cod management plan  (EC Reg.  1342/2008),  its predecessor,  the Cod Recovery 
Plan  and various  ad hoc measures put  in place  to  encourage  rebuilding of  the  cod 









ment plan. Before  reviewing  some of  the  individual articles  the  following  is  consi‐
dered as the new approach that should be adopted in the context of the Irish Sea.  
Rebuilding the cod stock in the Irish Sea should be achieved by:  
Achieving  fishing  mortality  rates  consistent  with  the  recovery  of  cod  may  be 
achieved  through effective  cod avoidance measures obtained with  the  full  involve‐

































ment measures  in  the  Irish Sea as a result of  the weakness of  the stock assessment. 




Currently  it  is not possible  to determine  the spawning biomass  in  this  fishery with 
any degree of certainty; likewise there are major uncertainties over the levels of fish‐
ing mortality;  








































Sea  but  it  requires  a  genuinely  participative  approach,  appropriate  incentives  and 
appropriate methods  of  catch  verification. An EU  funded  pilot project  to  improve 









The main  issue  for  the  fleets  in  the area VIId  is  the effort regime. The effort regime 
constrains all the fisheries in the area even if those for which cod is not present in the 







there  is a  link between  fishing mortality and effort), and  the hypothesis of an auto‐
matic rebuilding of the stock with a decrease of effort;  
The lack of flexibility between the groups of effort.  
The different  levels of  implementation  (European or Member State with or without 
STECF advice) of  these measures  compound  the  lack of  coherence  in  the  effort  re‐
gime.  
The main consequences of these provisions of the plan have for some fleets is to limit 









in  an  overlapping  of  the  following  sets  of  rules  (Technical  Measures,  effort  re‐
gime,TAC..)  




A  solution has  to be  found  to unlocking  the year‐on‐year  reductions  in  effort  that 
have an  important economic  impact on  the  fleets without delivering a  reduction  in 
fishing mortality. The evaluation process should provide some ideas for introducing 







Annex AA  Questions that the North Western Waters RAC considers 
should be included in the Review of the EU Cod management 



















































































Annex 4  Working Document on Rules-based management and 




A particular  issue  in  the  implementation of  the LTMP  for  the cod  stocks  is  the ab‐





thermore, even  in  the case of  stocks with accepted assessment, uncertainty  is often 
largest for the estimate of the current year (at  least  for VPA‐based assessment), and 




In  this WD, we describe alternative  rules  that  could be used  for  stocks without an 




or  “Policy  Papers”  from  the  EC. We  discuss  the  evolution  from  these  EC  Policy 
Statements  until  2010  to  the  2011  one,  and  conclude  about  the potential  for using 
these for the cod stocks under evaluation. 
The Alaska tier system 
This description comes from the analyses performed during the CEVIS project (Wolff 
and Hauge, 20081).     
Basic principles and concepts 
The system in place in Alaska is an innovative Overfishing Level (OFL) tier system, a 









agement outside  the European Union: The cases of Alaska  (USA), Canada,  Iceland and New 


































the ABC  is not expected  to be  taken because of bycatch problems and  the strict by‐
catch regulations. 





million metric  tons. For precautionary  reasons,  the OY was  set  at  85% of  the TAC 
range or 1.4 – 2.0 million metric tons. The OY for GOA groundfish is set to 116 to 800 








Description of the Tier system 
The Tier system is a 6‐tier set of harvest control rules that applies to all the Alaskan 










mation  (a  stock‐recruitment  relationship), while Tier 6  to  those with very  low data 







thus  to keep  the biomass  level above an MSY  level, or,  if necessary,  to  rebuild  the 
stock to this level.  
Tiers 4 to 6 are a one‐part rule. The requirement for Tier 5 is a minimum of biological 
information and  for Tier 6  that  there  is a  reliable catch history  for a certain period. 
Tier 6  is  thus constructed  in such a way  that  if  there  is no data,  it  is not possible to 
develop fisheries on new species.  
The management plans  list all  the  targeted species, so for a new fishery to develop, 
















Comments on the Alaska Tier System (from Wolff and Hauge, 2008) 
Compared to other fisheries around the world, the tier system provides precautious 
management. Stock abundances are historically high for several stocks. Most ground‐
fish  stocks are  considered  to be above  the BMSY  level and  few below. The  fishing 
mortality  rate  is very  low  compared  to European  stocks. The FMSY  level  is  lower 
than 0.4 for all stocks in the BSAI and GoA, but for most stocks it is lower than 0.1. 
The  history  of  harvest  rates  indicate  that  the  stocks  have  been  harvested  at  about 
these levels the last 10 –20 years. 
As a general comparison with the European situation, the Tier system provides cau‐
tious harvest  rates,  is more cautious with  long‐lived species,  is generally more cau‐





sarily more precautious down  the  tiers,  tier 2 has never been used and  the process 







EC Policy Statements 





Fishing Opportunities for 2007, COM(2006) 499 final 
This Policy Statement was the first of the series and set up the basis of the categoriz‐






into proposals  for regulations,  for  two reasons. Firstly, scientific  forecasts are at  times quite 




it  is acceptable to take a relatively high biological risk by allowing more  fishing than  is sus‐
tainable  in  the short  term,  in order  to maintain a certain continuity of  fishing activity. Re‐
medial  measures  to  redress  overfishing  should  be  implemented  gradually,  provided  that 
fishing mortality is steadily and gradually reduced.” 
“As  a  general  rule,  the Commission  attempts  to  stabilise  fishing  opportunities  by  limiting 
changes in TACs to no more than 15% from one year to the next.” 





Fishing possibility for 2007 : a TAC set : 
‐ to the  forecast catch established by STECF as corresponding  to an Fmsy proxy, but 
not more than 15% higher or lower than the TAC in 2006 
Stocks overexploited with respect to maximum sustainable yield but inside safe 
biological limits 










contradiction  to both  the  Johannesburg  Implementation Plan and  the precautionary 
approach. 




Stocks outside safe biological limits 
Description: this  category  covers  stocks  that are at  risk of depletion due  to  recruit‐
ment failure in either the short or the long term: either fishing mortality is above Fpa 
or the stock size is below Bpa., or both. This category also includes species for which 
few data are  available but where  there  are  strong  indications based on  life history 
parameters and fishery characteristics that current levels of fishing are unsustainable. 
Fishing possibility for 2007 : TAC set : 






Stocks whose status is unknown but which are not at high biological risk 
Description: for many stocks deterioration  in  the accuracy of commercial catch data 





Fishing possibility for 2007: Consistent with the precautionary approach, the Commis‐
sion will propose measures to prevent the expansion of fisheries in situations of high 
uncertainty. Where  recent catch  levels by all Member States are substantially  lower 
than  corresponding  quotas  (and  there  is  no  evidence  that  expansion  of  a  fishery 













the data and of  the results of modelling exercises even  though  these may not have been pre‐
sented. Such advice should be taken as seriously as advice given where the results of a mathe‐

























posed  reduction  will  be  no  less  than  the  reduction  implied  by  general 
principles outlined above. 





are no  scientific data  showing  that  such an  expansion  could be  sustainable. Where 
current  TACs  are  substantially  higher  than  the  real  recent  catches,  they would  be 
adapted towards the real catches at a rate of 15% per year. 















tage of  increases  in available catches  from stocks  that have recovered. Stocks may be able  to 
recover  faster than 15% per year, but the rules  limit TAC  increases to this  figure. Stocks of 
herring, for example, have recovered from low levels at much faster rates than 15% annually.” 














Fishing Opportunities for 2010, COM(2009) 224 final 
“Where long‐term plans are not yet in place, TAC decisions are taken on the basis of annual 













and  effort data. This  problem  seems  to  be getting worse:  poor data  leads  to  poor decisions, 








Fishing Opportunities for 2011, COM(2010)241 final 
“By 2011,  time  is running out  for reaching Maximum Sustainable Yield  (MSY)  targets by 
2015. Many important stocks are now under long‐term plans that have Fmsy objectives. These 
plans should be implemented, and for both new plans and for existing plans that need revision 


























and/or  in  the  fishing effort  levels should be proposed, unless scientific advice  indi‐
cates that a bigger reduction is necessary because of short‐term risks to the stock. 















ful.  A  25%  reduction  in  TAC  should  be  applied  and Member  States  should  take 
urgent steps to identify the appropriate fishing rate. 
Some points of discussion 
The Alaska Tier  system  is  an  interesting  system, because  it  shows  that  it has been 
possible to develop a generic rule based system with mechanisms allowing to i) cover 
all  types of  species  caught  in  the  region,  regardless of  the  level of  scientific know‐
ledge,  ii) avoid unregulated development of  fisheries without proper monitoring of 
the resources, iii) account for some sort of mixed‐fisheries and multi‐species consid‐
erations  in a simple and  transparent manner,    iv) consider both  targets    (MSY) and 
limits (OFL) reference points, v) insure stability, consistency and transparency in the 
management  process,  and  from  there,  gain  support  from  stakeholders. While  it  is 




an  interesting evolving process, where  the EC has established  clear principles, and 
from there, recognizing the diversity of situations in terms of level of scientific know‐
ledge and the unavoidable and often  irreducible uncertainties in the state of nature, 
has  suggested  up  to  11  categories with  corresponding  rules  for  setting  the  TACs. 
Over  time,  these  rules have evolved due  to  feed‐back  interactions and communica‐
tions with  scientific  agencies  and  stakeholders.  It  is however  clear  that  these  rules 






minimum basis of  scientific knowledge, and acts  therefore as a major  incentive  for 
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contributing  to  scientific knowledge.  Illustrations of  this  are  to be  found  in  the  in‐
creasing development of numerous  collaborative  scientific programs  and  joint  sur‐
veys with scientists and  fishermen. While  this was  initially mostly dealt with at  the 
local/national  level, a higher  level has been  reached  recently during  the  Joint  ICES‐
RACs  initiative on data deficiencies  (WKDDRAC), which was kicked‐off  in  January 
2011 in order to establish workplans for improving the most acute data deficiencies in 
the North Sea and North‐Western areas,  and  from  there hopefully  lift  some  stocks 
away  from Category 11 and  its decreasing TAC  rule.   This  initiative  represented  a 
real break‐through in the history of data collection and collaboration between scien‐
tists and the fishing industry. Outcomes from the two meetings held in 2011 around 
this  joint  initiative  clearly  showed  that  the  focus was not  on  challenging  the prin‐
ciples behind the rules of the 2010 Policy Statement, but on making the best out of it 
by contributing to better knowledge in order to get higher TACs.   
The 2011 Consultation  represents however an abrupt change  in  the  relatively short 
history of the EC Policy Statements. The 11 rules have been replaced by 3, of which 
the  two  first  deal with  stocks with  analytical  assessments  and  established  fishing 
mortality levels, while the third, which then covers the majority of EC stocks, suggest 
to reduce TAC by 25% for all stocks, regardless of the actual levels of scientific know‐
ledge. There  is no distinction between  stocks with  some knowledge on  abundance 
levels, and stocks with much less information. Neither does this acknowledge, as in 
2008,  that  qualitative  advice  is  often  the  result  of  in‐depth  scientific work which 
then“should be taken as seriously as advice given from a mathematical model”.  
However,  the Policy Statement  suggest  that  “Indicators  from  commercial  fisheries  and 
from the scientific surveys should be developed to provide some robust rules to guide fisheries 
towards  sustainable  exploitation  of  resources  even  in  data‐poor  situations”, which  seems 
though not very  far  in essence  from  the  idea behind  the previous categories 6  to 9. 
These previous categories 6 and 9 had actually already embedded some suggestion 
for  formulating  quantitative  rules  on  e.g.  survey  trends,  such  as  “If  the  average 




agement  is  to provide  transparency,  fairness and predictability  in  the management 
decision process. This  in  turn  should  insure  stability  and  commitment  from  stake‐
holders  as  seen  in Alaska  and  now  increasingly  in Europe. All  recent  research  on 
good governance practices and paths  towards sustainable  fishing underline  the  im‐
portance of clarity of management objectives and long‐term visions, and the increas‐
ing  sustainability  observed  for  stocks  subject  to  long‐term  management  plans 
illustrates this clearly. It is therefore of major importance to be able to establish simi‐












principles were gaining  increasing acceptance both  in  the scientific community and 
among the fishing industry. These rules could have in the near future set the basis for 
establishing  long‐term management plans  for most stocks without analytical assess‐
ment  falling within  the categories 6  to 9, while providing  incentives  for developing 
scientific knowledge for the stocks falling into category 11.  
I  consider  though,  that  these positive mechanisms have been  largely broken  in  the 











term management plan  for  these stocks. However, given  that  the uncertainties  that 
currently  hinder  stock  assessments will  likely  not  disappear  in  the  near  future,  a 
management plan could be based on other objectives and criteria than the current F‐
based design. That would  likely make  the LTMP more pragmatic  and operational, 
which  in  turn would  likely  facilitate  the  implementation and ultimately beneficiate 
the sustainability of these stocks. More creative rules could be implemented based on 
existing  examples  as  those  reviewed here,  involving  survey‐trends  and  life history 
traits, as well as on the improved ICES MSY framework.  
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Annex 5 Effort-based management in mixed-fisheries : Experience 
from the Faroese Islands 
Working Document to STECF‐ICES WKROUNDMP 2011 
Clara Ulrich, version 15 June 2011 
During  the 2011 February meeting of WKROUNDMP,  it was  suggested  to provide 
additional general reviews on the effectiveness of recovery plans and effort manage‐
ment. In particular, the case of the fisheries management in the Faroese Islands pro‐
vide  some  interesting  insights, as  this  is practical example where pure effort‐based 
management  is  implemented  in  a mixed  demersal  fishery  context, without  single‐
stocks TAC.  





there has been major changes  in  the system  in  the most recent years so  the conclu‐
sions below may still hold.  

















estimated  that  sustainability  of  the  fisheries  could  be  achieved  by  a  target  fishing 
mortality  (F) of 0.45  for  each  stock,  corresponding  to an average annual harvest of 
approximately one‐third of the spawning stock (ICES, 2006; Jákupsstovu et al., 2007). 

















precautionary Approach;  ICES bases  its advice on  the precautionary approach  that 
corresponds  to a value of F of 0.35. Since  the  introduction of  the effort  system,  the 
total number of  fishing days allocated has been  reduced by some 15 %  in  total,  i.e. 
less  than 2% per year since  implementation, significantly  less  than advised by ICES 
for the same period (ICES, 2008). 




One of  the main assumptions behind  implementing effort management,  that  fishers 
would  switch  their  target automatically according  to  the  relative availability of  the 
stocks, has not been verified (Jákupsstovu et al., 2007). Most fishers opportunistically 






catchability  is  likely  to  increase  over  time  because  of  so‐called  technological  creep 
and increased knowledge of best fishing practice. However, it has proven difficult to 
demonstrate that changes in catchability were associated with the introduction of the 
effort  system  (Jákupsstovu  et  al.,  2007),  because  of  the  influence  of  environmental 
conditions. There is considerable interannual variation in exchange rates between the 
warm, saline upper water  layer and cold,  less saline deeper water,  leading  to great 
variability  in productivity between areas and years where primary production may 
vary by up  to a  factor of  five. Environmental variability has a significant  impact on 
fish stock dynamics and trends and may be considered as one of the main drivers of 
fluctuations  in  the stocks, with respect  to both recruitment and growth  (Steingrund 
and Gaard, 2005; ICES, 2006). Primary productivity seems to be negatively correlated 
with  the  catchability of  longlines,  suggesting  that  cod approach  longline bait more 
often when natural food abundance is low (ICES, 2008). Consequently, natural factors 
may impact catchability to a greater extent than technological ones.  
2.  Main results of MSE analyses 
A Management Strategy Evaluation  (MSE) model was developed by Baudron et al. 
(2010) to compare an effort‐management system (TAE) based on the Faroese example 
with a TAC  system as  currently applied  in EU  fisheries, both  in a  single‐stock ap‐
proach  for  the  three main demersal stocks  (cod, haddock, saithe)  in  isolation and a 
mixed‐fisheries and fleet‐based context considering the three stocks together. 
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2.1 Single stock approach 
We could not ascertain whether TAEs  led  systematically  to more biological  robust‐
ness  than TACs.  In a single‐species approach over a  ten‐year projected period,  this 
was only true for the most depleted stock, where mean biomass was higher and un‐
certainty  lower  than with  the TAC scenarios. For  the other  two stocks, and without 
accounting  for  mixed‐fishery  interactions,  single‐species  TACs  performed  equally 
well or sometimes better than a TAE system. 
Effort‐based HCRs were  expected  to  be more  biologically  robust  than  catch‐based 
HCRs, because  they are  less dependent on uncertainty  in growth,  recruitment, and 
the results of stock assessments. There were a number of simulations where the TAC 
system  induced  large  fluctuations  in F, along with poor performance of  the assess‐
ment method. However, it was not clear from the results that the TAE was more bio‐
logically  robust when  looking  at  each  stock  in  isolation. One  key  issue  in  a  TAE 
system is the great uncertainty in catchability estimates, which blurs the relationship 
between E and F. The uncertainty in this parameter is comparatively higher than the 







2.2 Mixed fisheries approach 
In a mixed‐fisheries context,  the TAE system would often be more sustainable  than 
the TACs  if  it was  flexible enough  in  following  the year‐to‐year variability  in scien‐
tific  recommendations. Buisman  et  al.  (2010) observed  that an effort  control  system 
does not seem to improve the economic performance of the Faroese fleet. Setting the 
effort  level at an  intermediate  level, but with additional measures to protect  the de‐
pleted  stock, would appear  to be an acceptable  compromise between  sustainability 





3.  Discussion and conclusion 
The  case  of management  of  the  Faroese  fisheries  is  particularly  interesting.  These 




management  bodies  have made  it  possible  to  establish  new  governance  rules  and 
new innovative management systems.  
However,  even  under  these  favourable  conditions,  ten  years  of  experience  have 
proved that the system has not achieved all its conservation objectives (Jákupsstovu 






the effort  increasing but did not actually  lower  it. Since  then,  there has been  resis‐
tance  from  industry  to decreasing  the amount of  effort authorized, but  the  current 
decrease in the cod stock has led to recent proposals for drastic reductions which are 
impacting  the whole  Faroese  society. This  underlines  the  importance  of  the  initial 
design of a management system. 
Our results suggest  that effort management seems  to be appropriate, but  that some 
interannual  flexibility  in  the  system would  appear  to  be  the  best  compromise  be‐




rather  its  inability  to  adjust  to  scientific  recommendations  and  to  variability  and 
trends in catchability. This in turn is linked to the fact that the initial effort was set by 
Faroese authorities too high, and it could not be reduced easily thereafter. A sustain‐
able TAE  system  is accommodated  if  the  initial effort  level  is  set  sustainably. Only 
then, and allowing for adequate year‐on‐year flexibility, the TAE would appear to be 
a more  sustainable and economically  robust management  strategy  than TAC‐based 
management, considering  the  fluctuations  in  the single‐species HCR and  the exten‐
sive discarding this could create.  
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Some  factors  influencing  the validity of  this assumption and deteriorating  the pro‐
portional  relation  have  been  identified  –  and  quantified  in  the  case  of  the Dutch 
North Sea beam trawl fishery for flatfish – by Rijnsdorp et al. (2006). In their study, 
the partial F exerted per unit effort (Fpue) by a vessel depended on skipper skills, auxil‐




cumulative effort, after  sorting  the weeks  in descending order of Fpue  (or  revenue 
per unit of effort). The authors assumed that fishers can restrict their effort predomi‐
nantly  in  those weeks and areas  for which  they  expect a  low  catch  rate. The more 
convex  this  relation  is,  the better a  fisher can select an  inefficient week/area  to skip 
fishing when they face effort reductions. A similar approach was taken by Kraak et al. 
(2008) and Van Oostenbrugge et al. (2008) studying the same fishery and quantifying 
the non‐proportional,  convex,  relation between F  and  effort. Kraak  et  al.  (2008)  re‐
ported predictable effects of vessel, gear, and month on  the efficiency  in  terms of net 














effect  is  that  spatial distribution of a  stock may  contract with declining population 
biomass, without affecting the fish densities in the core habitat of the species. When 
fishers are mainly  fishing  these core habitats, contraction of  the spatial distribution 
will result in a ‘hyper stability’ of the catch rate (Harley et al., 2001). Thus, if fishers 
faced with effort reductions  ‘contract’  their activity  to  these core habitats,  they may 
still achieve high catches despite the reduced effort. All in all, it is likely that fishers 

















thing close  to proportional  reductions  in F; under effort  reductions  it  is most  likely 
that the non‐proportional relation is convex, implying that F decreases to a lesser ex‐
tent than effort. In that case greater effort reductions than those stipulated in the plan 
are needed to achieve  the reductions  in F prescribed  in  the plan’s HCR. Various at‐
tempts to quantify and predict the relation in the case of the North Sea flatfish fishery 




bounds of expected %  reduction  in F under a given %  reduction  in effort. We ana‐
lyzed logbook data from three groups of trips: all Irish 2010 trips with OTB 70‐99 mm 
mesh  in VIIa; all Irish 2010  trips with OTB 100 mm mesh  in VIIa; and all Irish 2010 
trips with OTB 100+ mm mesh in VIa. In each case, separately, we ordered the trips 
by descending efficiency, i.e. by descending revenue‐per‐unit‐effort. Then, under the 
extreme  assumptions  that  fishers  (i) maximize  fleet  revenues  and  (ii)  have  perfect 
knowledge, and (iii) are not restricted by quota, we simulated what would have hap‐
pened  if  the 25%  least  efficient  trips would not have  taken place  (disregarding  the 
identity of  individual vessels/skippers  involved). The graphs  show  that  in all  three 
cases revenues would have been maintained at 97%‐98% of the actual revenues, but 
that cod catches would have been reduced to 77%, 95%, and 93% of the actual catches 
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Annex 7 Summary of Provisional Effort and Catch Information for cod 
stocks covered by Annex IIa - data compiled by STECF EWG -06 





























REG GEAR COD 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
GN1 305380 310351 361457 218651 143629 166703 157684 127651 130529 139371 118772
GT1 43320 43989 42682 41481 26045 41054 44100 46289 41024 40727 40837
LL1 1460 27477 60062 8923 4456 10684 27698 37856 25234 406
TR1 1042121 963870 643361 247080 209190 235705 204041 211900 218424 111081 82663
TR2 5269301 5379334 4493063 4860676 4134540 3601254 3492836 3336687 3414865 3085533 3183319
TR3 349804 511806 507228 654355 481725 485616 358274 307710 152411 97045 36383
REG Total 7011386 7236827 6107853 6031166 4999585 4541016 4284633 4068093 3982487 3474163 3461974
UN REG GEAR 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
DEM_SEINE 813 354
DREDGE 3782 11218 7881 7526 6461 33713 39802 50977 55259 36768 36517
none 12544 10384 28958 10309 15212 8924 17261 15766 24584 47342 41620
OTTER 283517 289388 284275 290906 205883 189643 258570 200213 157752 232709 75844
PEL_SEINE 2880 5240 22361 31059 20680 25640 52976 32560 16157 11000 19876
PEL_TRAWL 124187 312184 287663 395285 391770 448473 374703 349489 192363 378195 300799
POTS 53049 58700 52602 54894 85806 65450 75311 86516 75233 64289 29897
UNREG Total 479959 687114 683740 790792 725812 772197 818623 735521 521348 770303 504553
TOTAL Effort 7491345 7923941 6791593 6821958 5725397 5313213 5103256 4803614 4503835 4244466 3966527





AREA REG. GEA MEMBER SCPART 11 Total effort % Cpart 11CPART 11 Total effort % Cpart 11
3a TR2 SWE 415194 851549 49% 482432 767026 63%
3a TR2 DEN 0 2214066 0 0 2385563 0
3a TR2 GER 0 19918 0 0 30730 0
3a TR2 ALL 415194 3085533 13% 482432 3183319 15%
3a All regulateALL 415194 3474163 12% 482432 3461974 14%
3a Total effort ALL 415194 4244466 10% 482432 3966527 12%  
Article 13 – cod avoidance – effort 
2009 2010
AREA REG. GEA MEMBER SCPART 13 Total effort % Cpart 11CPART 13 Total effort % Cpart 11
3a TR2 DEN 0 2214066 0% 2385563 2385563 100%
3a TR2 GER 0 19918 0 20020 10710 0
3a TR2 other 0 851549 0 0 767026 0
3a TR2 ALL 0 3085533 0% 2405583 3163299 76%
3a All regulateALL 0 3474163 0% 2405583 3461974 69%











REG_GEAR 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
GN1 87 36 26 25 28 45 13 10
GT1 21 14 7 3 4 3 1 1
LL1 20 2 1 3 0 14 0 0
TR1 257 188 174 58 130 36 29 4
TR2 2347 2026 1103 1293 853 466 210 201
TR3 79 26 14 36 7 7 0 0
Total REG 2811 2292 1325 1418 1022 571 253 216
REG_GEAR 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
DEM_SEINE 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
none 8 5 6 10 1 0 0 0
OTTER 17 8 12 18 5 4 9 3
PEL_TRAWL 2 3 5 15 4 0 0 0
POTS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total UNREG 28 16 23 43 10 4 9 3
Total 2839 2308 1348 1461 1032 575 262 219





AREA REG. GEA MEMBER SCPART 11 Total catch % Cpart 11CPART 11 Total catch % Cpart 11
3a TR2 SWE 13 69 19% 10 47 21%
3a TR2 DEN 0 140 0 0 153 0
3a TR2 GER 0 0 0 0 0 0
3a TR2 ALL 13 209 6% 10 200 5%
3a All regulateALL 13 253 5% 10 216 5%
3a Total catch ALL 13 262 5% 10 219 5%  
Article 13 – cod avoidance – catch 
2009 2010
AREA REG. GEA MEMBER SCPART 13 Total Catch% Cpart 11CPART 13 Total Catch% Cpart 11
3a TR2 DEN 0 140 0% 153 153 100%
3a TR2 GER 0 0 0 0 0 0
3a TR2 other 0 70 0 0 48 0
3a TR2 ALL 0 210 0% 153 201 76%
3a All regulateALL 0 253 0% 153 216 71%









3b – North sea, Skagerrak, Eastern Channel 
Effort trends Regulated gears 



























REG GEAR COD 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
BT1 2812567 2691963 7506993 6101145 5561566 5071363 5699183 3691347 2144592 1747555 1748302
BT2 85075503 82401292 73803155 65659202 64487791 62943209 55359743 53652799 40346242 40653344 39099642
GN1 6229125 6101511 7508773 4600849 4348091 4037958 4000344 3048211 3075301 3174941 3189811
GT1 1094135 2198014 12557141 3553602 3699369 4404484 5727823 5506524 3868425 3924777 1812028
LL1 835138 756416 2145689 510329 412305 367492 386193 400832 621740 922169 545530
TR1 59600841 55206803 62494992 33136244 26488076 26511364 26927258 23822624 26026854 25883223 21479681
TR2 19592842 25181885 70715739 39204264 39646161 35558023 35637126 34518968 32366844 30313249 25177764
TR3 5570514 4008588 4220105 3421117 3370449 2743483 1966597 1020724 1016904 707469 1266010
REG Total 180810665 178546472 240952587 156186752 148013808 141637376 135704267 125662029 109466902 107326727 94318768
UNREG GEAR COD 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
BEAM 12990183 13415705 13364169 13801328 13521284 13230382 12938958 13782031 13336844 14047370 12669242
DEM_SEINE 33037 18696 13393 26422 9718 23138 2585 13017 5214 14305 43871
DREDGE 2997329 2633554 3328222 4010953 4459314 5986424 3218067 3803033 3139961 3776311 4509999
none 126972 149974 172370 407572 385857 251012 308412 720239 773769 926110 200002
OTTER 15065463 16768090 14283394 14729542 14271608 9751513 9155423 6077251 8409456 9496032 9720585
PEL_SEINE 3041306 2388865 2239266 2531044 2721915 2720802 1998040 1417010 1153077 1432037 1134323
PEL_TRAWL 17845500 19292051 28531537 25213339 25336800 21606936 18926549 17389951 11399213 12252507 11134477
POTS 2745311 2868982 3492219 3160919 3127845 3242037 3523180 3610120 3500987 3589291 3536352
UNREG Total 54845101 57535917 65424570 63881119 63834341 56812244 50071214 46812652 41718521 45533963 42948851
TOTAL Effort 235655766 236082389 306377157 220067871 211848149 198449620 185775481 172474681 151185423 152860690 137267619
% UNREG 23.27339659 24.37111775 21.35425847 29.02791703 30.13212119 28.62804373 26.95254171 27.14175306 27.59427475 29.78788268 31.28840677  
155 
Article 11 –  <1.5% cod catch ‐ effort 
REG AREAREG GEARCOUNTRY Art 11 total effort % Art 11 total effort %
3b TR2 SCO 0 8344074 0.0 97359 8302801 1.2
3b TR2 SWE 766754 1547861 49.5 699160 1360491 51.4
3b TR2 Other 0 20421314 0.0 0 15514472 0.0
3b TR2 ALL 766754 30313249 2.5 796519 25177764 3.2
3b All reg gearAll 766754 1.07E+08 0.71 796519 94318768 0.84




REG AREAREG GEARCOUNTRY Art 13 total effort % Art 13 total effort %
3b TR1 ENG 2145727 2145727 100.0 1685226 1685226 100.0
3b TR1 GER 927872 1819825 51.0 918707 1831265 50.2
3b TR1 NIR 56140 56140 100.0 29360 29360 100.0
3b TR1 SCO 12245575 12245575 100.0 10444829 10444829 100.0
3b TR1 other 0 9615956 0.0 0 7489001 0.0
3b TR1 ALL 15375314 25883223 59.4 13078122 21479681 60.9
3b All reg gearAll 15375314 1.07E+08 14.33 13078122 94318768 13.87
3b reg. + unre All 15375314 1.53E+08 10.06 13078122 1.37E+08 9.5
3b TR2 ENG 1917712 1917712 100.0 1720026 1720026 100.0
3b TR2 GER 2420 473834 0.5 39820 464345 8.6
3b TR2 NIR 385631 385631 100.0 398498 398498 100.0
3b TR2 SCO 8344074 8344074 100.0 8205442 8302801 98.8
3b TR2 Other 0 19191998 0.0 0 14389453 0.0
3b TR2 ALL 10649837 30313249 35.1 10363786 25275123 41.0
3b All reg gearAll 10649837 1.07E+08 9.92 10363786 94318768 10.99






ANNEX REG AREAREG GEARSPECON COUNTRYVESSEL_LENGTH
FDFIIA 3b DREDGE FDFIIA ENG o10t15m 9847
FDFIIA 3b GN1 FDFIIA ENG o15m 22101
FDFIIA 3b none FDFIIA DEN o15m 3170
FDFIIA 3b PEL_TRAWFDFIIA DEN o15m 2420
FDFIIA 3b POTS FDFIIA DEN o15m 983
FDFIIA 3b POTS FDFIIA ENG o10t15m 597
FDFIIA 3b TR1 FDFIIA DEN o15m 1038901
FDFIIA 3b TR1 FDFIIA ENG o10t15m 29840
FDFIIA 3b TR1 FDFIIA ENG o15m 395493
FDFIIA 3b TR1 FDFIIA SCO O15M 1531775
FDFIIA 3b TR2 FDFIIA DEN o15m 10290





REG_GEAR 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
BT1 677 1183 1122 1336 688 549 230 323
BT2 3395 3842 2946 2691 2303 3560 2754 2128
GN1 3418 4040 3751 3228 2421 2519 2872 3385
GT1 499 340 343 344 346 373 470 472
LL1 211 127 133 228 183 207 127 288
TR1 13313 12471 14173 14792 17843 30461 25799 23780
TR2 7021 7339 6736 7832 11294 7510 8159 7599
TR3 51 28 31 30 4 57 2 17
Total REG 28585 29370 29235 30481 35082 45236 40413 37992
REG_GEAR 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
BEAM 39 24 20 14 24 32 113 51
DEM_SEINE 1 0 3 3 1 0 2 10
DREDGE 0 1 0 1 4 1 0 3
none 30 30 12 23 10 44 63 27
OTTER 391 328 3006 253 324 3974 207 282
PEL_SEINE 0 0 12 1 0 0 0 3
PEL_TRAWL 35 7 11 11 6 7 41 31
POTS 14 16 17 15 11 7 7 12
Total UNREG 510 406 3081 321 380 4065 433 419
Total 29095 29776 32316 30802 35462 49301 40846 38411
% UNREG 1.752879 1.363514 9.533977 1.04214 1.07157 8.245269 1.060079 1.090833  
Article 11 ‐ <1.5 cod catches – catch 
REG AREAREG GEARCOUNTRYArt 11 total catch % Art 11 total catch %
3b TR2 SCO 0 1261 0.0 69 1465 4.7
3b TR2 SWE 4 539 0.7 14 349 4.0
3b TR2 Other 0 6358 0.0 0 5795 0.0
3b TR2 ALL 4 8158 0.0 83 7609 1.1
3b All reg gearAll 4 40413 0.01 83 37992 0.22




REG AREAREG GEARCOUNTRYArt 13 total Catch % Art 13 total Catch %
3b TR1 ENG 1250 1250 100.0 1211 1211 100.0
3b TR1 GER 147 2468 6.0 156 2787 5.6
3b TR1 NIR 6 6 100.0 2 2 100.0
3b TR1 SCO 14622 14622 100.0 14065 14065 100.0
3b TR1 other 0 7453 0.0 0 5715 0.0
3b TR1 ALL 16025 25799 62.1 15434 23780 64.9
3b All reg gearAll 16025 40413 39.65 15434 37992 40.62
3b reg. + unre All 16025 40846 39.23 15434 38411 40.2
3b TR2 ENG 464 464 100.0 375 464 80.8
3b TR2 GER 1 187 0.5 23 199 11.6
3b TR2 NIR 123 123 100.0 59 59 100.0
3b TR2 SCO 1261 1261 100.0 1396 1465 95.3
3b TR2 Other 0 6124 0.0 0 5412 0.0
3b TR2 ALL 1849 8159 22.7 1853 7599 24.4
3b All reg gearAll 1849 40413 4.58 1853 37922 4.89








FDFIIA COD 3b DREDGE FDFIIA ENG 0 0
FDFIIA COD 3b GN1 FDFIIA ENG 132 0
FDFIIA COD 3b POTS FDFIIA ENG 5 0
FDFIIA COD 3b TR1 FDFIIA DEN 969 15
FDFIIA COD 3b TR1 FDFIIA ENG 286 47
FDFIIA COD 3b TR1 FDFIIA SCO 2330 0
FDFIIA COD 3b TR2 FDFIIA SCO 16 0  
  
158 
3c Irish Sea 
Effort trends Regulated gears 





























REG GEAR COD 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
BT2 1617383 2007800 2219020 2881456 2005022 2377308 1694550 1539672 948062 804724 896069
GN1 35104 43564 74239 91485 73097 38416 38070 49011 45254 25036 34948
GT1 523 475 656 2393 4025 1852
LL1 180243 185365 87888 47385 59214 93773 59656 12238 989 924 2588
TR1 1846600 2393214 3643561 3178548 1693343 1238516 1051113 565610 610126 486769 478044
TR2 4438444 4273573 3216575 4836818 4921676 5045026 4705062 5076416 4979739 4205977 4211499
TR3 2026 90 3305 960 436
REG Total 8118297 8903516 9241283 11037718 8752442 8796344 7549886 7243603 6586999 5527455 5625000
UN REG GEAR COD 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
BEAM 805950 669403 780129 31213 160981 25324 8221 8992 29989 9494 1788
DEM_SEINE 23180 27798 26993 759 142
DREDGE 1461545 1632052 1491559 1630092 1406478 1260910 1143714 1504464 1939512 1845719 1748553
none 709 2130 906 96
OTTER 1992397 1775119 1772299 31726 100937 5704 8488 820 1025 8708
PEL_SEINE 20940 22729 29223 47712 27914 61552 34310 1131
PEL_TRAWL 166450 245782 112977 148994 220213 211827 151959 165394 118398 97653 206296
POTS 280985 300102 412446 582307 531491 531084 590775 643381 640229 751292 982215
UNREG Total 4751447 4673694 4625626 2472044 2448773 2098531 1937609 2323957 2729355 2705183 2947560
TOTAL Effort 12869744 13577210 13866909 13509762 11201215 10894875 9487495 9567560 9316354 8232638 8572560
% UNREG 36.91951448 34.42308103 33.35729686 18.2982054 21.86167304 19.26163448 20.42276702 24.28996526 29.29638569 32.85924876 34.38366136  
159 
Article 11 –  <1.5% cod catch ‐ effort 
2009 2009 2009 2010 2010 2010
AREA GEAR COUNTRYCPART11 ALL-SPEC % CPART1CPART11 ALL-SPEC % CPART1
3c TR1 ENG 0 21860 0% 0 25111 0%
3c TR1 FRA 0 15241 0% 0 5418 0%
3c TR1 IOM 0 0 0 0
3c TR1 IRL 0 60348 0% 0 95243 0%
3c TR1 NED 0 0 0 0
3c TR1 NIR 0 384860 0% 0 350609 0%
3c TR1 SCO 0 0 0 1663 0%
3c TR1 all nat ALL 0 482309 0% 0 478044 0%
3c All regulateALL 0 5522995 0% 0 5625000 0%
3c Total effort ALL 0 8228178 0% 0 8572560 0%
3c TR2 BEL 0 29980 0% 0 14283 0%
3c TR2 ENG 0 171656 0% 0 180844 0%
3c TR2 FRA 0 0 0 803 0%
3c TR2 GBJ 0 0 0 0
3c TR2 IOM 0 23022 0% 0 23928 0%
3c TR2 IRL 0 853159 0% 156988 1187022 13%
3c TR2 NIR 0 3097345 0% 0 2777583 0%
3c TR2 SCO 0 30815 0% 9055 27036 33%
3c TR2 all nat ALL 0 4205977 0% 166043 4211499 4%
3c All regulateALL 0 5522995 0% 166043 5625000 3%
3c Total effort ALL 0 8228178 0% 166043 8572560 2%  
Article 13 – cod avoidance – effort 
2009 2009 2009 2010 2010 2010
AREA GEAR COUNTRYCPART13 ALL-SPEC % CPART1CPART13 ALL-SPEC % CPART1
3c TR1 ENG 21860 21860 100% 25111 25111 100%
3c TR1 NIR 384860 384860 100% 350609 350609 100%
3c TR1 SCO 0 0 1663 1663 100%
3c TR1 other 0 80049 0% 0 100661 0%
3c TR1 all nat ALL 406720 486769 84% 377383 478044 79%
3c All regulateALL 406720 5522995 7% 377383 5625000 7%
3c Total effort ALL 406720 8228178 5% 377383 8572560 4%
3c TR2 ENG 194678 194678 100% 204772 204772 100%
3c TR2 IRL 35827 853159 4% 163894 1187022 14%
3c TR2 NIR 3097345 3097345 100% 2777583 2777583 100%
3c TR2 SCO 30815 30815 100% 17981 17981 100%
3c TR2 other 0 29980 0% 0 24141 0%
3c TR2 all nat ALL 3358665 4205977 80% 3164230 4211499 75%
3c All regulateALL 3358665 5522995 61% 3164230 5625000 56%





3c Irish Sea Catches 
 
REG_GEAR 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
BT2 248 125 156 78 127 32 29 70
GN1 93 117 55 131 329 392 78 78
GT1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 2
LL1 1 1 2 3 1 12 0 0
TR1 567 445 374 415 339 468 363 241
TR2 416 686 553 376 551 351 184 478
REG Total 1325 1374 1140 1003 1348 1256 655 869
REG_GEAR 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
BEAM 1 8 0 0 0 0 0 0
DREDGE 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
OTTER 5 13 0 0 0 0 0 0
PEL_SEINE 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
PEL_TRAWL 4 5 0 1 3 0 1 1
POTS 1 24 0 0 0 0 0 0
UNREG To 12 52 0 1 3 0 1 1
Total 1337 1426 1140 1004 1351 1256 656 870
% 0.897532 3.646564 0 0.099602 0.222058 0 0.152439 0.114943  
Article 11 ‐ <1.5 cod catches – catch 
2009 2009 2009 2010 2010 2010
AREA GEAR COUNTRYCPART11 ALL-SPEC % CPART1CPART11 ALL-SPEC % CPART1
3c TR2 SCO 0 1 0% 0 1 0%
3c TR2 other 0 183 0 477
3c TR2 all nat ALL 0 184 0% 0 478 0%
3c All regulateALL 0 655 0% 0 869 0%
3c Total catch ALL 0 656 0% 0 870 0%  
Article 13 – cod avoidance – catch 
2009 2009 2009 2010 2010 2010
AREA GEAR COUNTRYCPART13 ALL-SPEC % CPART1CPART13 ALL-SPEC % CPART1
3c TR1 ENG 4 4 100% 9 9 100%
3c TR1 NIR 286 286 100% 190 190 100%
3c TR1 SCO 0 0 0% 0 0 #DIV/0!
3c TR1 other 0 73 0% 0 42 0%
3c TR1 all nat ALL 290 363 80% 199 241 83%
3c All regulateALL 290 655 44% 199 869 23%
3c Total CatchALL 290 656 44% 199 870 23%
3c TR2 ENG 1 1 100% 6 6 100%
3c TR2 IRL 0 81 0% 0 136 0%
3c TR2 NIR 94 94 100% 327 327 100%
3c TR2 SCO 1 1 100% 1 1 100%
3c TR2 other 0 7 0% 0 8 0%
3c TR2 all nat ALL 96 184 52% 334 478 70%
3c All regulateALL 96 655 15% 334 869 38%
3c Total CatchALL 96 656 15% 334 870 38%  
161 
3d West Scotland 
Effort trends Regulated gears 































REG GEAR COD 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
BT1 4894 61815 166807 119958 81195 1803
BT2 129252 98005 110353 46106 93215 15444 10750 2356
GN1 516683 633621 1190156 782170 646402 412405 156970 280344 629427 618620 332492
GT1 2829 157448 636 435 5410 448
LL1 806642 804192 741513 502828 626671 628949 819031 1299306 684589 981146 897903
TR1 16036535 17437389 36489544 12906880 10947581 9190944 7723086 7641364 6970660 7335020 6571087
TR2 5432593 5280734 5254005 7230404 6735807 5761558 5613455 5895213 6011367 5356787 4688657
TR3 61109 51340 132184 188903 98285 41544 11680 573 11321 1323
REG Total 22990537 24462729 43917755 21719742 19315203 16176212 14416615 15120959 14307364 14292896 12490139
UNREG GEAR COD 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
BEAM 10523 12528 10136
DEM_SEINE 75298 24711 31916 644
DREDGE 1981727 2037696 2245875 1956374 1684266 1510557 1161672 911530 1075527 1071327 1002770
none 50876 57096 59694 52102 26858 42249 50920 63504 68847 99379 100269
OTTER 2016559 1818225 1492506 188543 514781 654988 290705 41340 151384 171586 98570
PEL_SEINE 609134 492967 358793 249004 266254 157776 186486 113645 53255
PEL_TRAWL 9624812 10610905 12429002 11623490 17006375 13187476 11060133 9890496 8636882 7488991 5721420
POTS 2188417 2546277 2497117 2637737 2664107 2762361 2725839 3429787 2906422 2884610 3482270
UNREG Total 16557346 17600405 19114903 16707894 22172777 18315407 15475755 14450302 12839062 11715893 10458554
TOTAL Effort 39547883 42063134 63032658 38427636 41487980 34491619 29892370 29571261 27146426 26008789 22948693




2009 2009 2009 2010 2010 2010
AREA GEAR COUNTRYCPART11 ALL-SPEC % CPART1CPART11 ALL-SPEC % CPART1
3d TR1 ENG 0 24446 0% 0 14062 0%
3d TR1 FRA 0 4147092 0% 0 3352214 0%
3d TR1 GER 0 4854 0% 0 6957 0%
3d TR1 IOM 0 0 0 0
3d TR1 IRL 0 549300 0% 0 813886 0%
3d TR1 NIR 0 45378 0% 0 23860 0%
3d TR1 SCO 0 2228713 0% 44284 2360108 2%
3d TR1 all nat ALL 0 6999783 0% 44284 6571087 1%
3d All regulateALL 0 13957659 0% 44284 12490139 0%
3d Total effort ALL 0 25673552 0% 44284 22948693 0%
3d TR2 BEL 0 0 0 1176 0%
3d TR2 ENG 0 15721 0% 0 14802 0%
3d TR2 FRA 0 274203 0% 0 0
3d TR2 IOM 0 0 0 0
3d TR2 IRL 0 17989 0% 0 11876 0%
3d TR2 NIR 0 523976 0% 0 874396 0%
3d TR2 SCO 0 4524898 0% 1054957 3786407 28%
3d TR2 all nat ALL 0 5356787 0% 1054957 4688657 23%
3d All regulateALL 0 13957659 0% 1054957 12490139 8%
3d Total effort ALL 0 25673552 0% 1054957 22948693 5%  
 
Article 13 – cod avoidance – effort 
2009 2009 2009 2010 2010 2010
AREA GEAR COUNTRYCPART13 ALL-SPEC % CPART1CPART13 ALL-SPEC % CPART1
3d TR1 GER 4854 0% 4530 6957 65%
3d TR1 IRL 549300 549300 100% 813886 813886 100%
3d TR1 SCO 2228713 2228713 100% 2315824 2315824 100%
3d TR1 other 0 4552153 0% 0 3434420 0%
3d TR1 all nat ALL 2778013 7335020 38% 3134240 6571087 48%
3d All regulateALL 2778013 13957659 20% 3134240 12490139 25%
3d Total effort ALL 2778013 25673552 11% 3134240 22948693 14%
3d TR2 SCO 4524898 4524898 100% 2731450 3786407 72%
3d TR2 other 0 831889 0% 0 902250 0%
3d TR2 all nat ALL 4524898 5356787 84% 2731450 4688657 58%
3d All regulateALL 4524898 13957659 32% 2731450 12490139 22%
3d Total effort ALL 4524898 25673552 18% 2731450 22948693 12%  
Fully Documented fisheries (REM/CCTV) effort 
3d
ANNEX REG AREAREG GEARSPECON COUNTRYVESSEL_LENGTH 2010
FDFIIA 3d TR1 FDFIIA SCO O15M 126775  
 
163 
3d West Scotland Catches 
REG_GEAR 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
BT1 2 6 1 0 0 0 0 0
BT2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
GN1 6 1 6 9 14 10 6 2
LL1 8 5 5 14 8 0 0 0
TR1 995 493 451 764 1191 1400 923 1226
TR2 337 176 86 264 508 58 58 23
REG Total 1348 681 549 1051 1721 1468 987 1251
REG_GEAR 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
DEM_SEINE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DREDGE 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
none 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OTTER 1 1 0 10 0 0 0 0
PEL_SEINE 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PEL_TRAWL 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1
POTS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
UNREG Total 6 2 1 10 1 1 0 1
Total 1354 683 550 1061 1722 1469 987 1252
% 0.443131 0.292826 0.181818 0.942507 0.058072 0.068074 0 0.079872  
Article 11 ‐ <1.5 cod catches – catch 
2009 2009 2009 2010 2010 2010
AREA GEAR COUNTRYCPART11 ALL-SPEC % CPART1CPART11 ALL-SPEC % CPART1
3d TR2 SCO 0 54 0% 17 22 77%
3d TR2 other 0 3 0% 0 1 0%
3d TR2 all nat ALL 0 57 0% 17 23 74%
3d All regulateALL 0 987 0% 17 1251 1%
3d Total catch ALL 0 987 0% 17 1252 1%  
Article 13 – cod avoidance – catch 
2009 2009 2009 2010 2010 2010
AREA GEAR COUNTRYCPART13 ALL-SPEC % CPART1CPART13 ALL-SPEC % CPART1
3d TR1 GER 0 0 0% 0 0 0%
3d TR1 IRL 121 122 99% 201 201 100%
3d TR1 SCO 706 706 100% 573 573 100%
3d TR1 other 0 95 0% 0 452 0%
3d TR1 all nat ALL 827 923 90% 774 1226 63%
3d All regulateALL 827 987 84% 774 1251 62%
3d Total CatchALL 827 987 84% 774 1252 62%
3d TR2 SCO 54 54 100% 5 22 23%
3d TR2 other 0 4 0% 0 1 0%
3d TR2 all nat ALL 54 58 93% 5 23 22%
3d All regulateALL 54 987 5% 5 1251 0%










Annex 8 Fishing mortality of cod in the Kattegat 2007-2010, esti-
mated from spatial and temporal overlap of stock distribution 
















son.    Older  cod  is mainly  found  in  the  deeper  part  of  the  eastern  and  southern 
Kattegat, while the distribution of younger cod is more disperse, but with the highest 
concentrations in the north western Kattegat.  
For quarter 1,  the predicted stock distribution  is a  rather dispersed  for  the 1 group 
cod with  the highest  concentration  in  the North‐western Kattegat. Age 2  is mainly 
concentrated in the deeper eastern Kattegat while age 3 plus, which includes the most 
of the spawning stock at spawning time, is concentrated in the area closed for all fish‐

































The  closure of  the northern Sound  (“Kilen”) has almost entirely  removed effort by 
segment TR1 and TR2 in that area. 
Based on VMS data and predicted  stock distribution,  the  fishing  impact  (proxy  for 
Fishing mortality) on cod in Kattegat from the TR2 segment has decreased in the pe‐
riod 2007‐2010 for all ages.  The fishing impact in 2010 is estimated to be around 63% 
of  the  impact  in  2007, which  is  equivalent  to  an  annual  decrease  of  around  14%. 
Nominal effort measured as kW‐days has remained at  the same  level since 2007, so 
the decrease is due to a combination of closed areas which exclude the fishery from 
areas of high cod densities, and  the application of selective gears. The  reduction  in 





The very  low cod TAC and even  lower  reported  landings  in  the most  recent years 






Nephrops  and  sole. The most  important measures  are probably  the  introduction  of 
closed areas and application of trawl with sorting grid or SELTRA 300: 




area  1  the Northern  Sound  is  closed  1st  February  ‐31th March,  except  for 
fishery with selective gears. This area is named “Kilen” (the Triangle) ; 














mentioned  here.  In  Danish  fisheries,  the  usage  of  the  exit‐window  with  square‐
meshes at a minimum 120 mm has been mandatory  since 1st February 2008. How‐
ever, according to STECF (REFERENCE to the most recent STECF Plenary) the effect 














a. Use surveys  to model cod density by quarter as a  function of catch 
position (longitude, latitude), depth, year and survey 
b. Predict  the distribution of  the  cod  stock  in Kattegat  from  the  fitted 
model and a bathymetric map of Kattegat. 
2. Map the distribution of fishing pressure.  
a. Use VMS  recordings assigned  to  fishing  (recordings with speed 2‐4 
knots) to map the distribution of effort (hours fished) for Danish and 
Swedish fishing fleet in 2007‐2010. 
b. Estimate relative catchability  from  the  individual fleet segments de‐
fined from the actual use of the gear types (Standard trawl, Swedish 
grid and SELTRA 300)  and their selection pattern. 
c. Assume  that  fishing pressure  is proportional  to   vessel  engine  size 
(kW) 
d. Estimate  local  fishing  pressure  from  the  sum  of  product  of  effort, 
catchability and engine size for the individual fleet segments. 
3. Estimate the change in fishing impact (proxy for fishing mortality) on cod 
a. Overlay  the  spatial distribution  (0.05o  longitude  x  0.05o  latitude) of 
fishing pressure and temporal distribution (quarter of the year) of the 
cod stock and fishing pressure.  








1. Distribution of cod in Kattegat 
Available data 
Survey coverage in Kattegat is relatively good, however most often covered by multi‐
purposed  surveys. CPUE data  for analysis of  cod distribution were  taken  from  the 
Kattegat area and a very limited area adjacent to Kattegat (Figure 2). By including the 
areas bordering Kattegat,  the density of cod  in  the border areas of Kattegat  can be 
estimated with  less statistical uncertainty and minimise  the edge effect  in the abun‐
dance estimate. 
For the first quarter of the year, data from two surveys are available. The ICES coor‐









For  the  third  quarter  the  IBTS  Quarter  3  data,  1991‐2010  are  available  including 
around 20 stations per year in Kattegat. 











using  penalized  regression  splines with  the  number  of  smoothing  parameters  se‐
lected as part of the model fitting. See Wood (2006) and Wood (2008) for more infor‐
mation. The R‐package  “mgcv” were used  for analysis. For quarter  four with only 
three  years  data,  the  year  effect was modelled  as  a  factor.  For  all  analyses,  non‐
significant model terms were removed from the final model.   
The negative binomial distribution and  log‐link  function was used  to model CPUE. 
For some combinations of quarter and age group the quasi‐Poisson distribution and a 















ries  for analysing  the  cod distribution was  shorten,  such  that  the  assumption on  a 
constant stock distribution was not violated.  
Results 

























riod, quarter 1 and 4, do not show a consistent change  in stock distribution  for  the 
last 20 years. The situation seems however different for the summer period, where a 










fect”  (stock  abundance) has  increased  significantly  since  2009. The predicted  stock 
distribution (Figure ANA‐4) is a rather dispersed for the 1 group cod with the highest 









centrated  in  the  north‐eastern  Kattegat,  with  part  of  the  high  concentration  area 
within the “orange” closed area, where selective gears are mandatory. (Figure ANA‐









2. Distribution of fishing effort from VMS    












(“the  red  area”)  area  in Kattegat  and  in  the  Sound  (“Kilen”)  before  the  closure  in 
2009.  
Effort  from  the TR1 segment  (Figure VMS‐4) has been  relatively modest since 2007 













decrease  is quarter 4  is probably due  to  the mandatory use of grid or SELTRA 300, 
which has a very low catchability of sole that is mainly caught in the late autumn.  





“black”  area which  is  also  reflected  in  the  effort distribution. Fisheries  in  the  “Or‐
ange” area  is  allowed  in  the period    1st April  –  31th December with  selective gears 
(Swedish  grid  or  SELTRA  300). Application  of  the  Swedish  grid  (Figure VMS‐8c) 
shows a relative high concentration of effort within the orange area, especially in the 







peace  campaign  the  22. August  2010,  that  showed  clear  evidence  of  fishery  in  the 
“red” area by Danish fishermen from Gilleleje (a harbour in the Southern Kattegat). 
Based on  the  calculated  centre of gravity of  the  fishing  effort by year  and quarter 













effort  (VMS  record)  seems however  to  have  been  stable  (2009)  or  increased  (2010) 
since  the closure. For both years, quarter 1 effort was reallocated outside the closed 












year of closure was however not  that pronounced as  for  the second quarter, which 
indicates fast adaptation to the closures.  Total effort (VMS records) in quarter 4 has 
decreased substantially since 2007. 
The  closure of  the northern Sound  (“Kilen”) has almost entirely  removed effort by 
segment TR1 and TR2 in the area. 










effort  is  the  fishing activity given by  the number of VMS “fishing”  records 
times  engine power (kW) 









“density”  is derived from  the predicted cod distribution within Kattegat, e.g.  figure 
ANA‐4 and “effort” is from the national VMS data. Both data sources are used on a 
0.01 x 0.01 degree grid. In cases of no  information on use of selective gears,  it  is as‐
sumed that vessels fishing in the “orange” closed areas in the period 1st April to 31th 




sis.  Experiments  conducted  by  DTU  Aqua  with  SELTRA  codends  (300‐400  mm 
square‐ mesh  panels)  have documented  that  about  90%  of  the  cod  that  enters  the 
trawl will escape through the large meshes of the square‐mesh panel (see Annex 1 for 









Fishing  impact on Kattegat cod  from  the TR2 segment has decreased  in  the period 
2007‐2010 for all ages (Table 5).  Relative to fishing impact in 2007 the impact in 2010 
is around 63% for all age groups (Table 6), which is equivalent to an annual decrease 
of around 14%  (Table 7). The sensitivity  to  the applied catchability reduction  factor 
(Table 8) show that the F reduction in 2009 is rather insensitive to the assumption on 
catchability   as  the  t F  reduction  is   mainly due  to  the  relocation of effort  from  the 
closed (high cod density) areas  to areas with lower cod density. For 2010 the decrease 
in F is however more closely linked to the assumed catchability changes as nominal 
effort has  increased  significantly  in  the areas where cod selective gears are manda‐
tory.  
Discussion 
The uncertainty of  the estimated  fishing  impact cannot be  ignored. Around 40% of 
the  effort  in  Kattegat  is  from  small  vessels without  VMS.  It  is  assumed  that  the 




fishery  in  the  closed  areas where  such gears  are mandatory. We have  information 
from the Danish fishery that SELTRA 300 is used, both inside and outside the closed 
areas, but statistics from enforcement  is not available.    In  the analysis  it  is assumed 
that SELTRA 300 is only used in the closed areas.   Application SELTRA 300 outside 







most  important  in  reducing  F.  Total  effort  (kW‐days)  has  not  been  reduced  since 
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Table 1.   Overview of effort  (mega Watt days) by segment and year  for  the Kattegat  fishery as 
used in the analysis. 
DENMARK 
Gear Segment  2007  2008  2009  2010 
TR1  190  159  102  70 
TR2  2,027  2,153  2,214  2,382 
TR3  306  152  93  36 
GN  73  66  82  67 
GT  12  12  23  14 
LL        <1   
SWEDEN 
Gear Segement  2007  2008  2009  2010 
TR1  20  58  7  14 
TR2 (%SPECON)  1275 (18)   1228 (25)  852 (49)  767 (63) 
TR3  1  0  1  0 
GN  15  33  33  33 
GT  34  29  18  27 
LL  38  25  0  0 
Table 2.  Landings (tonnes) of Kattegat cod by gear segment.   
DENMARK 
Kattegat               
Gear segment  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
GN  42  36  37  35  39  15   
GT  9  2  4  3  1  1   
LL  2  0  2  1  0  0   
TR1  68  83  39  52  26  17   
TR2  536  344  349  255  181  86   
SWEDEN 
Gear segment  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
GN  1  2  4  2  11  2  0 
GT  6  5  1  2  3  1  0 
LL  0  1  3  0  14  0  0 
TR1  35  25  8  31  7  1  1 
TR2  398  284  282  198  117  35  27 
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Table ANA‐1. Regression  results  of GAM  analysis  of CPUE  at  age  as  function  of  trawl  posi‐
tion(x,y), depth and survey, Quarter 1. 
Age 1 
Family: Negative Binomial(0.728) Link function: log  
Formula: Age_1 ~ s(x, y) + s(Depth) + s(Year) + Survey 
 
Parametric coefficients: 
            Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)     
(Intercept)  3.45488    0.06819  50.667  < 2e-16 *** 
SurveyIBTS  -0.87537    0.10977  -7.975 1.53e-15 *** 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
Approximate significance of smooth terms: 
            edf Ref.df Chi.sq  p-value     
s(x,y)   25.479 28.208 116.47 1.09e-12 *** 
s(Depth)  6.812  7.930  52.08 1.51e-08 *** 
s(Year)   8.256  8.848 221.39  < 2e-16 *** 
--- 
R-sq.(adj) =  0.209   Deviance explained = 43.1% 
UBRE score = 0.28425  Scale est. = 1         n = 714 
 
Age 2 
Family: Negative Binomial(0.79) Link function: log  
Formula: Age_2 ~ s(x, y) + s(Depth) + s(Year) 
Parametric coefficients: 
            Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)     
(Intercept)  2.39315    0.06231   38.41   <2e-16 *** 
 
Approximate significance of smooth terms: 
            edf Ref.df Chi.sq  p-value     
s(x,y)   24.644 27.648 274.71  < 2e-16 *** 
s(Depth)  8.580  8.911  48.11 2.25e-07 *** 
s(Year)   8.896  8.997 503.41  < 2e-16 *** 
 
R-sq.(adj) =   0.16   Deviance explained = 55.8% 
UBRE score = 0.21468  Scale est. = 1         n = 714 
 
Age 3+ 
Family: Negative Binomial(0.999) Link function: log  
Formula: Age_3Plus ~ s(x, y) + s(Depth) + s(Year) + Survey 
Parametric coefficients: 
            Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)     
(Intercept)  0.91500    0.08269  11.066  < 2e-16 *** 
SurveyIBTS   0.54686    0.10334   5.292 1.21e-07 *** 
 
Approximate significance of smooth terms: 
            edf Ref.df Chi.sq p-value     
s(x,y)   24.358 27.240 412.38 < 2e-16 *** 
s(Depth)  3.669  4.659  45.83 6.4e-09 *** 
s(Year)   8.799  8.988 358.55 < 2e-16 *** 
 
R-sq.(adj) =   0.22   Deviance explained = 63.1% 
UBRE score = 0.13759  Scale est. = 1         n = 714 
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Table ANA‐2. Regression  results  of GAM  analysis  of CPUE  at  age  as  function  of  trawl  posi‐
tion(x,y) year and depth, Quarter 3. 
Age 1 
Family: Negative Binomial(1.308) Link function: log  
 
Formula:Age_1 ~ s(x, y) + s(Year) 
Parametric coefficients: 
            Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)     
(Intercept)  1.12514    0.08245   13.65   <2e-16 *** 
 
Approximate significance of smooth terms: 
           edf Ref.df Chi.sq p-value     
s(x,y)  24.400 26.989  164.0  <2e-16 *** 
s(Year)  8.943  8.999  216.9  <2e-16 *** 
--- 
R-sq.(adj) =  0.501   Deviance explained = 69.7% 




Family: Negative Binomial(1.998) Link function: log  
Formula:Age_2 ~ s(x, y) + s(Year) 
 
Parametric coefficients: 
            Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)     
(Intercept)  -1.0953     0.2123  -5.159 2.48e-07 *** 
--- 
Approximate significance of smooth terms: 
           edf Ref.df Chi.sq  p-value     
s(x,y)  15.862 19.176  159.4  < 2e-16 *** 
s(Year)  8.042  8.732   68.8 1.95e-11 *** 
--- 
R-sq.(adj) =  0.564   Deviance explained = 76.2% 
UBRE score = -0.12441  Scale est. = 1         n = 223 
 
Age 2+ 
Family: Negative Binomial(2.048) Link function: log  
Formula:Age_2Plus ~ s(x, y) + s(Year) 
 
Parametric coefficients: 
            Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)     
(Intercept)  -0.7523     0.1565  -4.806 1.54e-06 *** 
--- 
Approximate significance of smooth terms: 
           edf Ref.df Chi.sq  p-value     
s(x,y)  18.179 21.156 205.36  < 2e-16 *** 
s(Year)  7.384  8.357  87.81 2.02e-15 *** 
--- 
R-sq.(adj) =  0.506   Deviance explained = 77.2% 




Family: Negative Binomial(1.434) Link function: log  
Formula: Age_3Plus ~ s(x, y) + s(Year) + s(Depth) 
 
Parametric coefficients: 
            Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)     
(Intercept)  -2.6318     0.3695  -7.122 1.07e-12 *** 
--- 
Approximate significance of smooth terms: 
           edf Ref.df Chi.sq  p-value     
s(x,y)   9.334 12.159  28.53  0.00503 **  
s(Year)  8.116  8.773  52.98 2.37e-08 *** 
s(Depth) 2.833  3.389  13.37  0.00566 **  
--- 
R-sq.(adj) =  0.399   Deviance explained = 71.7% 
UBRE score = -0.36198  Scale est. = 1         n = 223
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Table ANA‐3. Regression  results  of GAM  analysis  of CPUE  at  age  as  function  of  trawl  posi‐
tion(x,y), depth and year, Quarter 4. 
Age 0 
Family: Negative Binomial(0.892) Link function: log  
Formula:Age_0 ~ s(x, y) + factor(Year) + s(Depth) + Survey 
 
Parametric coefficients: 
                 Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)     
(Intercept)        1.3806     0.1263  10.928  < 2e-16 *** 
factor(Year)2009  -1.2741     0.1818  -7.010 2.39e-12 *** 
factor(Year)2010  -0.8886     0.1725  -5.152 2.57e-07 *** 
SurveyHavF         1.9648     0.1812  10.841  < 2e-16 *** 
--- 
Approximate significance of smooth terms: 
           edf Ref.df Chi.sq p-value     
s(x,y)   13.23 17.728 119.25  <2e-16 *** 
s(Depth)  3.75  4.625  11.99  0.0273 *   
--- 
R-sq.(adj) =  0.543   Deviance explained =   64% 
UBRE score = 0.23099  Scale est. = 1         n = 307 
 
Age 1 
Family: Negative Binomial(1.998) Link function: log 
Formula: Age_1 ~ s(x, y) + factor(Year) + s(Depth) + Survey 
Parametric coefficients: 
                 Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)     
(Intercept)        1.4871     0.0934  15.922  < 2e-16 *** 
factor(Year)2009   1.2627     0.1187  10.640  < 2e-16 *** 
factor(Year)2010   0.8615     0.1177   7.321 2.45e-13 *** 
SurveyHavF        -0.6128     0.1346  -4.552 5.33e-06 *** 
--- 
Approximate significance of smooth terms: 
            edf Ref.df Chi.sq  p-value     
s(x,y)   21.002 25.566 83.385 4.77e-08 *** 
s(Depth)  1.007  1.012  3.641   0.0574 .   
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
 
R-sq.(adj) =  0.315   Deviance explained = 50.6% 
UBRE score = 0.063617  Scale est. = 1         n = 307 
 
Age 2 
Family: Negative Binomial(3.263) Link function: log  
 
Formula: Age_2 ~ s(x, y) + s(Depth) + factor(Year) + Survey 
 
Parametric coefficients: 
                  Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)     
(Intercept)       0.523050   0.108672   4.813 1.49e-06 *** 
factor(Year)2009  0.001898   0.137577   0.014    0.989     
factor(Year)2010  0.621721   0.124313   5.001 5.70e-07 *** 
SurveyHavF       -0.705379   0.164903  -4.278 1.89e-05 *** 
--- 
Approximate significance of smooth terms: 
            edf Ref.df Chi.sq  p-value     
s(x,y)   20.463 24.686  57.11 0.000223 *** 
s(Depth)  2.325  2.956  16.33 0.000925 *** 
--- 
R-sq.(adj) =  0.305   Deviance explained = 49.9% 
UBRE score = 0.1736  Scale est. = 1         n = 307 
177 
Table ANA‐3  (continued). Regression  results  of GAM  analysis  of CPUE  at  age  as  function  of 
trawl position(x,y), depth and year, Quarter 4. 
Age 2+ 
Family: Negative Binomial(2.401) Link function: log  
 
Formula:Age_2Plus ~ s(x, y) + s(Depth) + factor(Year) + Survey 
 
Parametric coefficients: 
                 Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)     
(Intercept)       1.17471    0.10294  11.411  < 2e-16 *** 
factor(Year)2009 -0.34778    0.13257  -2.623   0.0087 **  
factor(Year)2010  0.08562    0.12411   0.690   0.4903     
SurveyHavF       -0.83717    0.16699  -5.013 5.35e-07 *** 
--- 
Approximate significance of smooth terms: 
            edf Ref.df Chi.sq  p-value     
s(x,y)   19.238 23.694  74.64 3.53e-07 *** 
s(Depth)  3.115  3.923  16.13  0.00266 **  
--- 
R-sq.(adj) =  0.289   Deviance explained = 51.1% 




Family: Negative Binomial(3.475) Link function: log  
 
Formula: Age_3Plus ~ s(x, y) + s(Depth) + factor(Year) + Survey 
 
Parametric coefficients: 
                 Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)     
(Intercept)        0.2899     0.1473   1.968    0.049 *   
factor(Year)2009  -1.0499     0.1692  -6.205 5.47e-10 *** 
factor(Year)2010  -2.1402     0.2304  -9.290  < 2e-16 *** 
SurveyHavF        -1.7790     0.4218  -4.218 2.46e-05 *** 
--- 
Approximate significance of smooth terms: 
           edf Ref.df Chi.sq p-value     
s(x,y)   11.21  15.04 119.28 < 2e-16 *** 
s(Depth)  1.00   1.00  10.41 0.00125 **  
--- 
R-sq.(adj) =  0.405   Deviance explained = 70.2% 





year     Unknown GN   GT   LL  TR1  TR2  TR3 
2007      12.7  2.4  0.4   NA  6.2 68.1 10.2 
2008      10.3  2.3  0.4   NA  5.5 76.2  5.2 
2009      11.8  2.9  0.8  0.0  3.6 77.7  3.3 
2010      11.3  2.3  0.5   NA  2.4 82.2  1.3 
Table 4.  Proportion (%) of annual nominal TR2 effort from vessels equipped with VMS.   
          Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
DNK 2007  66 53 61 62 
    2008  76 55 57 62 
    2009  61 56 56 57 
    2010  70 59 62 60 
 
SWE 2007  58 64 67 58 
    2008  54 50 60 48 
    2009  68 70 72 62 
    2010  72 74 78 68 
Table 5.  Fishing impact (arbitrary unit) for the TR2 segment. 
        age Age 1 Age 2 Age 2+ Age 3+ 
year                                  
2007 Q1       325   353    359    395 
     Q2       284   292    292    297 
     Q3       682   688    678    940 
     Q4       343   451    460    503 
2008 Q1       224   264    267    284 
     Q2       279   268    277    285 
     Q3       620   692    690    881 
     Q4       347   460    459    483 
2009 Q1       194   225    221    223 
     Q2       263   259    259    252 
     Q3       477   503    501    682 
     Q4       240   295    309    355 
2010 Q1       237   248    241    237 
     Q2       208   249    264    280 
     Q3       347   345    343    474 
     Q4       210   282    290    330 
             Age 1 Age 2 Age 2+ Age 3+ 
year                               
2007   1634   1784   1789   2134 
2008   1469   1684   1693   1932 
2009   1174   1282   1289   1511 
2010   1003   1125   1139   1321 
179 
Table 6.  Relative Fishing impact for the TR2 segment. 
         
     age Age 1 Age 2 Age 2+ Age 3+ 
year                               
2007      1.00  1.00   1.00   1.00 
2008      0.90  0.94   0.95   0.91 
2009      0.72  0.72   0.72   0.71 
2010      0.61  0.63   0.64   0.62 
 
Table 7.  Change in Fishing impact (%) from one year to the next for the TR2 segment. 
     age Age 1 Age 2 Age 2+ Age 3+ 
year                               
2008       -10    -6     -5     -9 
2009       -20   -24    -24    -22 




Catchability of cod in “cod selective gears” is assumed 5% of the catchability 
for reference gears.  
         Age 1 Age 2 Age 2+ Age 3+ 
year                               
2008       -11    -6     -6    -10 
2009       -20   -24    -24    -21 
2010       -16   -14    -14    -16 
 
Catchability of cod in “cod selective gears” is assumed 25% of the catchability 
for reference gears.  
         Age 1 Age 2 Age 2+ Age 3+ 
year                               
2008        -8    -3     -3     -7 
2009       -20   -24    -24    -23 













• Area 1: The “black” area  is closed during  the period 1st  January‐31th March, 
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resolution. With pooled gear groups  (TR1, TR2, BT2)  (and using only  the  first  three 
quarters because  last quarter data  for 2010 are not yet available)  the graphs below 
show the amount of effort deployed in grid cells with zero, low (0‐5 kg/h), medium 






number  of  hours. While  in  all  years  only  a  few %  of  effort  is  deployed  in  zero‐
abundance and high‐abundance cells, and most of the effort is deployed in cells with 
low cod abundance, the data show that the effort deployed in cells with medium cod 
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tendency over  the years  to  fish  relatively  less  in grid  cell‐week  combinations with 
high cpue? 
The graphs below are a  little bit more difficult  to  interpret because  the discards are 
not  accounted  for; many of  the  zero‐cpue  records must have had  cod  catches  that 
were discarded. Again,  and unfortunately,  2010  saw  increased  effort  (both  relative 
and  absolute)  in  medium‐  and  high‐abundance  cell‐week  combinations,  which 
counters the objective of the plan. 
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Integrated  ecosystem  assessment  of Kattegat  has  been  conducted  by  the Working 
Group of Integrated Assessment of the Baltic Sea in ICES (2010). In total, 67 variables 
were  considered,  covering hydrographic  conditions, nutrients, phytoplankton,  zoo‐
plankton,  benthos,  fish,  birds  and  seals.  The  data  series  covered  the  period  from 
1982–2008. 
The analyses used Principal Component Analyses (PCA) methods. To  illustrate sys‐
tematic  patterns  in  single  time‐series,  the  “traffic‐light”  framework was  used. An 
overview of the temporal changes in all time‐series compiled for the Kattegat is pre‐
sented in Figure 1. Variables were sorted according to their PC1 loadings of the sub‐
sequently  performed  PCA,  generating  a  pattern  with  variables  at  the  top  that 
revealed an increasing trend over time (from green to red),  to variables at the bottom 
demonstrating  the opposite  trend  (red‒green) with  the highest values  in  the period 
1982 – 1989.  
Chronological  clustering  analyses  identified  an  ecosystem  shift  in  1988  –  1989.  In 
general, the system was more variable at the beginning of the investigated period and 
started  to  stabilize after  the major  shift  from  the mid‐1990s onwards. The group of 
variables with increasing trends included e.g. spring and summer temperature, secchi 




high  values  at  the  be‐ginning  of  the  time‐series,  but  also  comparatively  high  esti‐
mates  in  the period  from 1990  to  early 2000. This  includes biomass of polychaetes, 
crustaceans and CPUE of sprat. 
Concerning cod, which  is a cold‐water species, the  increasing  temperature  indicates 
deteriorated  conditions.  In addition, declining zooplankton abundances may  imply 
lower food recourse for early life stages.  
Due  to  increased water  temperature  in  summer,  northward migration  of  cod may 
take place. This pattern has for example been found for North Sea cod (Rindorf and 
Lewy  2006). The  IBTS  survey data  from  the  3rd quarter  indicates  that  the  centre of 
gravity of cod stock in the Kattegat during summer period has indeed shifted north‐
wards in recent years (Annex X), which could be associated with the increasing water 
temperature during  summer  in  recent period  (Fig. 1). No significant  change  in cod 
distribution was detected during other periods of a year. 
Potential  effects  of  changes  in  zooplankton  abundance  on  cod  recruitment  are  ad‐
dressed in the section below. 
221 
Figure  1. Traffic‐light  plot  of  the  temporal development  of Kattegat  time‐series. Variables  are 
transformed to quintiles, colour coded (green = low values; red = high values), and sorted in nu‐
merically descending order  according  to  their  loadings on  the  first principal  component  (ICES 
2010). 
Potential environmental/ecological effects on Kattegat cod recruitment 




























of effort  for 1 year‐old cod as and  index  for  recruitment. SSB was  from  the assess‐
ment, where  the  estimates  for  2008‐2010 were  similar  to  the  fisheries‐independent 




low  level of recruitment  is mainly due  to  low spawning stock. However,  this result 
may be due  to  the effect of continued  transportation of  recruits  from spawning ag‐
gregations  in adjacent areas  such as  the North Sea  (Cardinale and Svedaeng 2004), 









Figure  3.   Atmospheric‐  and hydrographic  conditions  illustrated  by  the Baltic Sea  Index  (BSI, 
black) and winter bottom oxygen conditions  (white), respectively  (upper panel).   Potential prey 
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Annex 11 Recent changes in fisheries regulations and fisheries for 








1. Fisheries regulations  
TAC 
TAC for cod in the Kattegat has continuously been reduced since 2004 (Table 1). The 























mum 120 mm.   Since 1st February 2008,  the usage of  the exit‐window  in  trawls has 
been made mandatory in Denmark. In 2008, in order to restrict the targeted Kattegat 










regime. Firstly, according  to Article 11, paragraph 2,  the Council may decide  to ex‐
clude certain groups of vessels from the effort regime provided that the percentage of 





ing effort  for certain effort groups,  if certain other measures are  taken  that  reduces 
fishing mortality  for  cod. This  increase  in effort  shall be no more  than  the amount 
needed to compensate the effort adjustments made annually. Denmark introduced a 
cod avoidance plan in 2010 which includes initiatives in relation to article 13 (effort) 
of  the  long‐term plan  for cod. These  include, amongst other,  introduction of a new 
selective trawl SELTRA 180.  
1.1.1 Protected areas 
In 2009, as a part of the attempts  to rebuild the cod stock  in  the Kattegat, Denmark 
and Sweden introduced protected areas on historically important spawning grounds. 



















































3. Cod landings 
Commercial landings 
Agreed TACs and  reported  landings have been  significantly  reduced  since 2000  to 





tegat have been below TAC  (Fig.  5). The  reported  landings  in  2010 were  155  tons, 
while the TAC was 379 tons. Along with declining catches, the importance of cod for 
the fisheries in the Kattegat has become negligible. In 2010, the value of Danish total 
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Figure 6. The relative contributions of Nephrops, sole and cod  to  the Danish catch value  in  the 
Kattegat. 
Kattegat - OTB_CRU



































on  collecting  information  through mail,  telephone or  internet  interviews where  re‐











4. Cod discards 
Estimates of discards are available from Swedish and Danish onboard sampling pro‐
grams. The Swedish discard data  indicate  that although  the cod  landings have sub‐
stantially declined  since  the  1990s,  the  amount  of discards  has until  recently  been 




the proportion of discards  in catch  is estimated  to have been  the highest and coin‐
cides with the years of largest discrepancy between landings and estimated removals 
(Fig. 14b). The level of discards in the Danish fisheries in 2008‐2010 is indicated to be 
somewhat  higher  compared  to  the  Swedish  (Fig.  10).  In  total,  about  a  half  of  the 
amount of cod caught in the Kattegat (in tonnes) is currently discarded (Fig. 11). 
Even  though  the quota has not been utilized since 2007,  there  is some  indication of 
high‐grading in Kattegat and that high‐grading has been an increasing problem since 
2007 when the new Danish regulation system was initiated with Vessels quota shares. 
Comparison  of  the  relative  distribution  of  the  different  size  categories  over  time 
shows a large decrease in the smallest size group of cod (size group 5) in landings in 






































































5. Fisheries removals compared to the estimated total removals 





ings  in recent years  indicate a drastic decline  in F and current F at a very  low  level 
(0.1), whereas  the  survey data  indicates  the  current F  to be at a much higher  level 
(around  1.0), without  showing  any major  change  in  recent years. Accordingly,  the 
survey data  indicates  that  total  removals  from  the  stock  in  2003‐2010 were  signifi‐
cantly higher than represented by landings (Fig. 14b). There could be several reasons 
for  this  discrepancy,  e.g.  discards, migration,  or  higher  natural mortality  than  as‐
sumed. The assessment is at present run without the discards. To obtain an estimate 
of  total  fisheries removals,  the available  information on  the amount of discards and 
also landings from recreational fishery were added to the reported commercial land‐
ings. This resulted in total catch about 3 times higher than reported landings in 2010 

















portion of  fish originating  from other  stocks due  to  the decline of  the Kattegat cod 
could thus seriously affect estimations of population parameters and bias the fishing 
mortality estimates.  






the  runs with  (black  line) and without  (red  line) estimating unallocated  removals. Shaded area 












































































































































































































































































































trigger  levels  as  specified  in  the  regulation.  In  addition  to  the  biomass  proxies, 




















Brief History of Cod Management Measures 
Prior to 2004 emergency recovery measures had been implemented on an individual 
basis. 

















 exception of purse  seining and  trawling  for  sandeels and pelagics. This  temporary 
closed area was designed to cover the main spawning period of cod in the North Sea, 
and was  in  force  throughout  the period  14 February  to  30 April  2001.  In addition, 
TAC reductions in 2001 and 2002 were aimed at reducing fishing mortality by more 
than 50 per cent. Fishing effort restrictions were also  implemented  from 1 February 
2003  for  vessels  of  overall  length  greater  than  or  equal  to  10m. This  restricted  the 
number of days per month different types of vessels (i.e., using different gear types) 
could  employ  in different parts  of  ICES  areas  IV  and  IIIa  (EC.671/2003,  amending 
EC.2341/2002). 
Council regulation EC.423/2004 established a raft of measures for the recovery of cod 
stocks. These  included mulit‐annual process  for  the selection of TACs, restriction of 
fishing effort, technical measures, control and enforcement and accompanying struc‐
tural and market measures.  
Available Data and Methods 
Data have been obtained  from  a number of different  sources. The  agreed TACs  in 











2. Kattegat cod  
Achievement of objectives 
In the Kattegat, the assessment used for advice in ICES suffers from uncertainty in the 
fishing mortality. This uncertainty  is  caused  by uncertain  estimates  of unallocated 
removals  (UR). The benchmark  assessment workgroup  in  2009  (WKROUND  2009) 




because  the  proportion  of  the  fisheries  and  biology  driven  factors  (migration  pat‐
terns)  in estimated unallocated  removals can at present not be specified.  In  the ab‐





in both assessments  to be below Blim  (6000  tons). The SSB  in  the beginning of 2011 
(2045 t with UR; 1815 t without UR) is estimated to be above the SSB in the beginning 





ning of 2011 and  to a decrease by 21%  since 2008. Recruitment  in  recent years has 
been  among  the  lowest  in  the  time  series without  any  sign  of  improvement  since 
2000. Current level of fishing mortality is likely in between the two very different es‐
timates  from  the  two  runs. Under  the assumption of no unallocated  removals F  in 
2010 (0.1) is estimated to be well below the target of the plan (0.4) and F decreased by 






clusions on  the achievement of objectives  related  to  reductions  in  fishing mortality 
can be drawn given the uncertainty introduced by UR.  










notes  that under article 12 of  the management plan  fishing effort  is adjusted by  the 
same percentage as  the TAC.  In  the years between 2004 and  the  implementation of 




Total  removals  (landings  *  scaling  factor)  estimated  by  the  stock  assessment  de‐
creased over time but increased slightly between 2009 and 2010 (Figure 2). The pro‐










cannot  be  answered  due  to  the  uncertainties  introduced  by  unallocated  removals. 
However, SSB  is  in any case still well below Blim and the slight  increase  in SSB be‐
tween 2010 and 2011 has to be approved in the next assessment as estimates for the 





creased  slightly  between  2009  and  2010  and  the  proportion  of  landings  in  total 
removals  further declined since 2008. However,  it  is also unknown whether unallo‐
cated removals are associated with fisheries or biological factors.  
3. North Sea cod 






declined  since 2000, but  it  is estimated  to be well above  the  level  that achieves  the 
long‐term objective of maximum yield  (0.19) and  the  target of  the current manage‐
ment plan (0.4; Figure 4).  The fishing mortality in 2010 (0.68) is estimated to be above 
Fpa  (0.6) and  to be 20%  lower  than F  in 2004 but only 3%  lower  than F  in 2008. Al‐
though the estimate of F 2010 might be biased as the SAM assessment model reacts 
slow  to  changes,  the  reduction  in F over  the  last years mainly occurred before  the 
new cod management plan was implemented. In addition, the reduction since 2008 is 




Recruitment since 2000  is poor and without obvious  trend  (Figure 4). The 2005 and 
2009 year  classes are  slightly  stronger but  still well below historically observed  re‐
cruitments. 




did not  include  an  adaptive  element  implying  that  fisheries  for  cod  remain  closed 
until an initial recovery of the cod SSB has been proven. Therefore, the agreed TACs 








removals  are  the  same  as  the  average over  the  last  three  available data  years,  the 
TACs would imply strong reductions in F and substantially increased SSB (Table 1). 
However, ICES states in those years that future proportions could be predicted. 
For  2009  ICES  and  STECF  advice was  outdated  since  the management  plan was 
agreed in December of 2008 after the advice was published. However, it was stated in 








For  the years 2010 and 2011  the TAC was set  in a way  that F was predicted  to de‐
crease at least as intended by the management plan (25% in 2010 and 10% thereafter) 
and SSB was predicted to increase above Blim during the TAC year for 2009 to 2011 





that objectives were met for the  intermediate year  (i.e. reduction  in F during  the  in‐
termediate year) and  that  there are no unallocated  removals during  the TAC year. 




located  removals  in  total  removals  changed  considerably over  the  last 10 years ac‐
cording  to  the  latest assessment estimates  (ICES WGNSSK 2011; Figure 5; Table 3). 
The proportion of  landings  in  total  removals decreased  substantially between 2000 
and  2007.  In  2007  landings were  responsible  for  35%  of  total  removals.  In  the  last 




tion of  the management plan  in 2009. Unallocated removals comprise an  important 




Analysis of Short term forecasts 





cation of  the ability of  the short  term  forecasts  to adequately predict  the  future dy‐
namics  of  the  stock  in  response  to  the  actual  level  of  fishing  mortality  that  has 
occurred in the fishery.  







The forecast procedure 
The B‐Adapt  forecasts are based on 1000 bootstrap estimates of  terminal values  for 
fishing mortality and population number. Each bootstrap estimate  is  taken  forward 









required  for  this exercise needed  to be  run with alternative assumptions of  fishing 
mortality and  it was  therefore necessary  to  first  recreate  the original B‐Adapt  fore‐
casts before re‐running  them with  the alternative settings. Comparative plots of  the 
results of the WG forecasts and of the same forecasts conducted using an FLR imple‐
mentation  (Figures 6  to 9) show  that  the values are pretty close, although not quite 




show  a  cumulative under‐estimation of  about  1.5% per  year,  leading  to  an under‐
estimation of about 4.5%  in 2008. Comparison of  the 2008 forecast shows very close 







estimation of SSB  compared  to  the WG values  indicating  that  the differences were 
due  to a small, persistent bias rather  than random variation.  In all cases,  the differ‐






Alternative Forecast Results 
Estimates of total removals and SSB from the short term forecasts conducted in 2006 
to  2009  for  those  fishing  mortality  scenarios  in  accordance  with  the  manage‐
ment/recovery plans  (figure  10)  show  that  for  the  reduced F  levels,  total  removals 
from 2007 onwards would have been lower than those estimated by the 2011 assess‐
ment with corresponding SSB levels from 2008 onwards at a higher level. The level of 
bias  in  the  over‐estimation  of  future  SSB  is  approximately  equal  to  the  under‐



















The agreed TACs were set  in accordance  to advice based on  the management plan 
since its implementation. In all years since 2009 forecasts predicted positive changes 
in  F  and  SSB  as  intended  by  the management  plan  but  only  if  the  plan  is  imple‐
mented  and  enforced adequately and  that  reductions  in F are achieved during  the 
intermediate year. Both assumptions turned out to be inappropriate according to the 
latest assessment and  this  is considered  to have contributed  to  the objectives of  the 
plan not being met. 
By analysing the proportions in total removals, a first success is obvious in reducing 
discards  in  2009  and  2010. However, unallocated  removals  still play  an  important 
role although their proportion decreased since 2003. No further reduction in the pro‐
portion of unallocated  removals  is  estimated  since  the  implementation of  the plan. 
TACs alone are still not able to restrict total removals.      
 Replacing  the  fishing mortality  levels with  those estimated by  the 2011 assessment 






estimate  the  level of  fishing mortality  that  is  required  to achieve  the  removals  that 














be helpful  to understand what  caused  the differences between prediction and out‐
come.  
The most obvious cause of the difference between estimated and out‐turn F in recent 
years  is  that  recruitment  has  been  revised  downwards,  particularly  the  2005  year 
class which has been revised downwards to only 54% of it was first estimated value. 
A similar effect occurred with the 1996 year class, which has effectively been revised 
downwards by  about  58%  (though  the  assessment  and STF were not  the quite  the 
same as they have been recently). The downward revision of R from 2003 to the pre‐
sent has on average been to 70% of first observations. This revision compares to revi‐
sion  in SSB by much more modest amounts,  to 88% of  initial observations over  the 
same period. So revision is occurring most at younge ages and mostly for bigger year 
classes. Two possible explanations could be considered.  









ues  the STF may be suitable  for status quo  levels of recruitment but  is possibly  less 
suited  for  occasional  higher  values.  Overall  however,  there  must  be  some  doubt 
whether STF of  the  type provided by ICES are  the best basis to formulate catch ad‐
vice.  
If  the multi‐annual plan were  to be  revised  some  thought  should be given  to how 
catch  advice  should  be  given.  Intrinsically  STFs  increase measurement  error,  com‐
pared with assessment error, but  includes more uptodate  information, but  if  the  in‐





tives of  the plan are met  in  the  intermediate year and  that no unallocated removals 
occur during  the TAC year. Both  turned out  to be wrong and  this  is considered  to 




Mixed-fisheries considerations for North Sea cod 
Introduction and approach 







It  is  important  to underline  that  these assumptions of  the  forecast have  repeatedly 
been challenged by replacing them in a broader mixed‐fisheries and fleet‐based con‐
text,  and  that  this  context  could  explain  a  large part  of  the discrepancies  between 
forecast and reality.  
Implicitly, a TAC  assumes  that  the  level of  fishing activity will adapt  to  the quota 
available for a particular stock, and will lead to the targeted level of fishing mortality. 
The  simplest  link  is  to  assume  that vessels will  stop  catching a given  species once 
their quota  for  that  species  is  exhausted. This  assumption  is  though  little  likely  to 
hold true for complex, multispecies, multigear fisheries, where fleets are given a set 
of different fishing opportunities for the various stocks. Different catch limits for the 





cod, was at  its highest biomass  in 30 years  (ICES, 2009b).  In  these circumstances,  if 










ing catch potentials  for distinct  fleets (groups of vessels) and métiers  (type of activ‐
ity),  and  hence  quantifying  the  risks  of  over‐  and  underquota  utilization  for  the 
various stocks. This method, named Fcube (Fleet and Fisheries Forecast, Ulrich et al., 
2011), was applied  successfully  to  the  international demersal  fisheries  in  the North 
Sea and  incorporated  into  the advice  framework. This allowed  ICES  to provide  in‐
sights on the relevancy of the North Sea cod forecast and advice in both 2009 (ICES 
WKMIXFISH and AGMIXNS 2009) and 2010 (ICES WGMIXFISH 2010).   
Overall,  the  results were  obvious, pointing  out  that  the  expected  effort  reductions 
during the intermediate years of the forecast both in 2009 and 2010 were not likely to 
be achieved under current conditions of effort, and that the required effort reductions 


























cially  sole),  but  comparatively  stronger  impact  on  catch  potentials  for  haddock, 
whiting and Nephrops. Assuming again that there should be no overshoot of the cod 
TAC  in  2010  (cod  scenario)  or  that  the  effort  reductions  would  be  adhered  to 
(Ef_Mgt) would have  implied  strong  reductions  in effort,  leading  to potential TAC 
undershoot between  15  and  40%  for  the other  stocks  compared  to  the  single‐stock 
forecast.  
STECF estimates that between 2008 and 2009, the effort decreased by only 1% in TR1 
and 6%  in TR2,  implying a scenario closer  to  the sq_E scenario.  Indeed, F 2009 has 
hardly decreased compared to F 2008 according to the latest assessment. In the MIX‐
FISH projection,  this  sq_E  scenario  estimated  the potential  cod  “landings”  (i.e.  the 
non‐discarded part of the catches) to be 29% above the single‐stock cod forecast, im‐
plying a SSB at the start of 2010 22% lower than suggested. Accounting for this in the 









found  the  previous  year  indicating  greater  consistency  both  across  the  individual 
single‐stock  forecasts and advice and between  the  single  stock TACs and  the  sq_E 








this scenario  indicated a  larger  reduction  in F  in 2010 compared  to  the single‐stock 
cod forecast. For the TAC advice in 2011, strict implementation of the simulated effort 
reductions would bring  the  fisheries  to a  level  (estimated Fbar=0.45) almost equiva‐
lent  to  the expectation of  the cod management plan  (target F=0.44), but with poten‐
tially  large  catch  undershooting  for  all  other  stocks  compared  to  the  single‐stock 
advice  (around 40% undershoot  for haddock and plaice, 60%  for all Nephrops and 
20‐30% for sole and saithe). 
Conclusion for 2011 







known and expected changes  in  the effort of  the main  fishing  fleets  rather  than on 
simple average or  intended  reductions  stipulated by  the management Plan,  i.e.  the 
forecast should preferably not assume a 25% reduction in F in the intermediate year 
as was done  in 2009, even  if  the LTMP says so, unless  there  is evidence within  the 
Member States that significant measures are implemented to actually reduce fishing 
effort or catchability.       
Provisional effort  figures provided  to STECF suggest  that effort reductions between 
2009 and 2010 may have been more substantial than during the previous year (‐10 to 
15%), although not down  to  the expected  level of 25% of  the Ef_Mgt  scenario. The 
level  of  F  reduction  assumed  in  the  2010  single‐stock  cod  forecast was  13%.  This 
would mean  that  for  this year,  there  is potentially  a  chance  for  a better match be‐
tween forecast and realized F in 2010, and thus a more accurate prediction for 2011 F.  
4. Irish Sea Cod 









remain well  below  the  ICES  estimates  for  the  1970s‐1980s, when  catch‐based  esti‐




The  fishing mortality  estimates  (including  unallocated  removals!)  since  1988  have 




unallocated mortality  can  be  attributed  to  fishing mortality  only. Also unallocated 
sources of natural mortality may cause these removals what can change the percep‐
tion of fishing mortality trends completely.  
Recruitment has been below  average  for  the past  eighteen years. The  2002  to  2008 
year classes are amongst the smallest on record. Data show increased recruitment in 
2009 compared  the  recent period of poor  recruitment, but still below  the  long‐term 
average. Preliminary  indications suggest  the 2010 year class  is some way below  the 
2009 estimate. The increased recruitment in the last two years will lead to an increase 
in SSB in the next years from the historical low. 





tionary  approach  only  and  aimed  for  zero  catch.  ICES  states  that  the  plan  is  not 
precautionary for this stock. STECF agreed with ICES advice for 2009,  2010 and 2011, 
but additionally notes  that  the TACs based on  the management plan should be 674 
tons in 2010 and 506 tons in 2011 (Table 5). In the years between 2004 and the imple‐
mentation of  the plan,  ICES and STECF advice was always zero catch.   There were 




Total  removals  (landings  *  scaling  factor)  estimated  by  the  stock  assessment  de‐
creased since 2003 but increased slightly between 2009 and 2010 (Figure 14). The pro‐
portion of  landings  in  total  removals declined substantially between 2000 and 2003 
(26% in 2003; Figure 15). After 2003 the proportion of landings increased and are now 





Conclusions for Irish Sea cod 
Whether the objectives of the plan in terms of reductions in fishing mortality are met 
cannot be answered due  to  the uncertainties  in  the source of unallocated  removals. 
However, SSB  is  in  any  case  still well below Blim. There  are positive  signs  for  in‐
creased  recruitment  driven  by  environmental  factors  .  The  next  years will  decide 
whether  the management plan can avoid  that  the stronger year classes will be dis‐
carded. So far no positive effect is obvious in relation to total removals. The propor‐
tion  of  landings  in  total  removals  remained  stable  since  2008. However,  it  is  also 




5. West of Scotland Cod 
Achievement of objectives 
An analytical assessment was  carried out  in 2011  (ICES WGCSE 2011) but  this has 
been rejected as the basis for advice by ICES because it relied on data from a research 




gadoid  stock assessments WoS, and with  trend but  the actual  levels have not been 
quantified. As a consequence it is not considered possible to partition mortality into 
fishing,  discard  and  unaccounted mortality.  Instead  assessment  results  are  simply 





1995 onwards,  (concerns over under‐reporting)  the estimate  is very uncertain, how‐













Reasons for deviation 
The  current  cod management plan has not been  accepted  as precautionary  for  the 
WoS  cod  stock  for  the  reason  that  to date  it has not been possible  to  assess unac‐
counted mortality accurately. The previous cod recovery plan was also not accepted 
as precautionary because “ICES is not in a position to give quantitative forecasts and 







Using  the short  term  forecast of  the 2008 ICES assessment  (not presented  in  the ad‐
vice sheet) that assumed all mortality over M to be due to fishing, this level of remov‐
als would lead to a 92% increase in SSB for 2010, well in excess of the 30% required by 




































accommodated by  the  standard value of natural mortality used  for gadoid  species 
WoS. Estimates of increasing seal population also suggest there may be a trend in this 
predation mortality. 
Conclusions for WoS cod 
The situation is similar to Irish Sea cod in that it is not possible to answer whether the 
objectives of the plan  in  terms of reductions  in  fishing mortality are met because of 
uncertainties  introduced by unallocated  removals.  In  the  case of WoS  cod  the  con‐
cerns about unallocated removals revolve around a suspected high level and trend in 
natural  mortality  as  much  as  unallocated  removals  due  to  fishing.  However,  as 
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Year Landing s D is ca rds Catch
1963 112758 14118 126754 126754
1964 140787 13837 154662 154662
1965 183322 22181 205664 205664
1966 218819 33456 252458 252458
1967 266199 34648 301040 301040
1968 279568 21703 301342 301342
1969 229120 12585 241591 241591
1970 246965 25034 271848 271848
1971 291268 63070 353982 353982
1972 325462 34372 359691 359691
1973 234920 24810 259886 259886
1974 214915 25135 240145 240145
1975 205048 32177 237281 237281
1976 197205 36425 233748 233748
1977 179872 62380 242316 242316
1978 278452 38754 317109 317109
1979 270493 41940 312388 312388
1980 270763 66237 337055 337055
1981 322223 38216 360411 360411
1982 291851 39895 331705 331705
1983 253723 25160 278730 278730
1984 197798 45844 243531 243531
1985 201189 22248 223463 223463
1986 160492 44445 204843 204843
1987 215777 29437 245242 245242
1988 184795 12640 197402 197402
1989 134996 32338 167209 167209
1990 113664 21397 135131 135131
1991 104715 14464 119134 119134
1992 106831 27011 133786 133786
1993 126694 26148 152899 0.97 147561
1994 104349 35721 140154 1.08 150844
1995 122165 27423 149661 1.22 183139
1996 135372 21912 157280 1.03 161943
1997 133517 44090 177546 0.93 165049
1998 139145 41826 180822 0.77 139525
1999 101165 17499 118600 0.83 98322
2000 79549 21070 100622 1.00 101114
2001 47830 13156 60986 1.49 90853
2002 62941 7636 70541 1.26 88965
2003 27313 5221 32537 1.89 61574
2004 28852 7039 35916 1.36 49021
2005 29466 6005 35454 1.42 50262
2006 26001 7718 33721 1.37 46351
2007 22707 20982 43714 1.49 65186
2008 27155 22099 49233 1.25 61390
2009 32653 16798 49498 1.29 63831








Year by Year Advice
Set STF STF
WG Year Catch year F Target TAC Catches Removals Rem/TAC
2003 2004 31200
2004 2005 31200 ---- ----
2005 2006 26520 ---- ----
2006 2007 0.40 22851 27421 46700 2.04
2007 2008 0.27 25400 31404 45357 1.79
2008 2009 0.40 34590 54000 54000 1.56
2009 2010 0.51 40300 66400 66400 1.65
2010 2011 0.44 32241 49900
Outcome 2011 Assessment
F Landings Catches Removals Rem/Land Rem/Catch
2004 0.856 28852 35916 49021 1.70 1.36
2005 0.807 29466 35454 50262 1.71 1.42
2006 0.753 26001 33721 46351 1.78 1.37
2007 0.720 22707 43714 65186 2.87 1.49
2008 0.699 27155 49233 61390 2.26 1.25
2009 0.684 32653 49498 63831 1.95 1.29
2010 0.676 38963 53336 69286 1.78 1.30
Ratio of outcome to predicted




2007 180% 99% 159% 140%
2008 259% 107% 157% 135%
2009 171% 94% 92% 118%







































































































2004 0#1 Precautionary approach 814 (848)#4 0.37 1.01 ‐63% 3213 2170 48%
2005 0#2 Precautionary approach 692 (721)#4 ‐15%
2006 0#2 Precautionary approach 588 (613)#4 ‐15%
2007 0#1 Precautionary approach 490 (556)#4 ‐17%
2008 0#1 Precautionary approach 402 (447)#4 ‐18%
2009 0#1 Precautionary approach 240 (302)#4 ‐40%
2010 0#3 Precautionary approach 240 (80)#5 0%















































































































































sponding  to  the management plan.  Forecast  options  in  accordance with  the management  plan 
were not presented  in  the 2007 advice sheet. Values are  taken  instead from  the WG report. The 
































































































































































































































based estimates at  three ports; circles are  total  removals estimates  in excess of M=0.2 with 90% 



































































































































































Annex 13 Medium term simulations to answer the question: “Is the 





pact Assessment  of  the HCR  components  (Articles  7  and  8)  of Council Regulation 
(EC) 1342/2008 for West of Scotland and Irish Sea cod, and using a similar framework 
for North  Sea  cod. North  Sea  and West  of  Scotland  cod  have  a  high  probability 
(>95%) of recovery above Blim by 2015 for both recruitment models  (“standard” and 
“low”)  for  the  scenarios  that  correspond  to  the way  in which  these  stocks  are  cur‐
rently  assessed  (bias  in  catch).  This  drops  to  80%  for  “standard”  recruitment  and 
<60% for “low” recruitment for Irish Sea cod, because of the poor state of this stock. 










closer  to  the  target of 0.4, and higher yields  in  the  case of “standard”  recruitment, 
than when TAC constraints are imposed. This is also the case for “low” recruitment 
for North Sea and West of Scotland cod, but not for Irish Sea cod, where performance 
of  the management plan  in  terms of both  recovery  and yield  is poorer when TAC 
constraints are removed compared to when they are imposed. This implies that for a 
stock in poor condition, it may be beneficial to impose TAC constraints to prevent a 





Sea  and West  of  Scotland  cod,  the  same MSE  (Management  Strategy  Evaluation) 
simulation  framework  that has already been used  for  the  Impact Assessment of  the 
HCR components (Articles 7 and 8) of Council Regulation (EC) 1342/2008, is adopted. 
A  full description  of  the  approach used  is  given  in  the AGCREMP  report  of  2008 
(ICES 2009). 
The approach  for North Sea cod has had  to be modified  to reflect  the change  in as‐
sessment model  from B‐Adapt  to SAM. The simulation  framework described above 
was developed to work with the former, not the latter. The approach used for North 





  North Sea  West of Scotland  Irish Sea 
Bpa  150000  22000  10000 
Blim  70000  14000  6000 
Fmsylo  0.16  0.17  0.25 
Fmsy  0.19  0.19  0.40 





































Regulation  (EC) 1342/2008  (Appendix 2 and 3). Two scenarios  for  recruitment were 




























































1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
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Figure 1a. North Sea cod. Clockwise from  top  left, point‐wise estimates and 95% confidence  in‐
tervals of spawning stock biomass  (SSB),  total stock biomass  (TSB),  recruitment  (R(age 1)),  the 
catch multiplier, catch and Fbar (catch, ages 2‐4), from the SAM base run. The heavy lines repre‐
sent  the point‐wise estimate, and  the  light  lines point‐wise 95% confidence  intervals. The open 
diamonds given  in  the catch plot represent model estimates of  the  total catch excluding unallo‐







Figure 1b. North  Sea  cod. Stock‐recruit  relationship, with  circles  representing  the  stock‐recruit 
estimates  from  the 2011 SAM assessment, and  the  top curve  representing  the  fit of a Beverton‐




















SSB L D C FL FD FC 
1 cat 1 cat 20% 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 370 53.3 14.8 68.2 0.06 0.02 0.08 
2 cat 1 m 20% 1.00 1.00 0.98 1.00 1.00 357 56.8 15.7 72.9 0.06 0.02 0.09 
3 cat 1 wg 20% 1.00 1.00 0.82 0.94 1.00 330 70.9 20.6 92.0 0.09 0.03 0.12 
4 m 1 cat 20% 1.00 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 264 39.8 12.0 52.0 0.06 0.02 0.08 
5 m 1 m 20% 1.00 0.99 0.98 1.00 1.00 256 42.2 12.7 55.2 0.07 0.02 0.09 
6 m 1 wg 20% 1.00 0.95 0.80 0.93 1.00 239 53.0 16.6 69.8 0.09 0.03 0.12 
7 cat 0.5 cat 20% 1.00 0.98 0.65 0.84 1.00 241 52.2 11.6 64.1 0.11 0.04 0.14 
8 cat 0.5 m 20% 1.00 0.96 0.53 0.75 1.00 227 54.1 12.1 66.4 0.12 0.04 0.16 
9 cat 0.5 wg 20% 1.00 0.83 0.10 0.25 0.98 197 67.7 16.4 84.7 0.17 0.06 0.23 
10 m 0.5 cat 20% 1.00 0.69 0.56 0.79 1.00 170 38.7 9.5 48.3 0.11 0.04 0.15 
11 m 0.5 m 20% 1.00 0.64 0.48 0.73 1.00 162 39.1 9.8 49.5 0.12 0.04 0.16 
12 m 0.5 wg 20% 1.00 0.44 0.08 0.22 0.98 143 49.5 13.1 63.4 0.17 0.06 0.23 
13 cat 1 cat - 1.00 1.00 0.08 0.17 1.00 324 131.5 40.1 173.8 0.18 0.06 0.24 
14 cat 0.5 cat - 1.00 0.97 0.02 0.05 0.98 219 86.1 20.4 107.8 0.21 0.07 0.28 
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• Similarly, for the scenarios  that correspond  to  the way  the North Sea cod 
stock is currently assessed, the reduction of Fbar (catch) to Fmsy or below 
by 2015  is achieved with a more  than 95% probability  for  the “standard” 
recruitment model; however it is achieved with less 84% probability for the 
“low” recruitment model. 





• When TAC  constraints  are  removed  (scenarios 13  and  14), probability of 
recovery remains high, larger yields are obtained, and F values are closer 
to 0.4  than when TAC  constraints are kept. However,  the  target F  is not 
reached by  2015 because  the  short‐term  forecast  recruitment  assumption 
(average of last 10 years of recruitment) causes a bias when there is a rapid 
recovery in recruitment.  
• As  expected,  probability  of  recovery  by  2015  and  yield  is  lower  for  the 
“low” recruitment model than for the “standard” recruitment model. 
West of Scotland cod 
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Figure 2a. West of Scotland cod. A comparison of Fbar (catch, ages 2‐5) from TSA (red line) and B‐
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Figure 2b. West of Scotland cod. Estimates  from  the B‐Adapt model  fit with point estimates  in 



























tions underlying  the simulations, as explained  in Table ii. Values  for  the reference points used 
are given  in Table i, and  the summary statistics are described  in Table iii. Values for SSB, L, D 
and C are in thousand tons.  












SSB L D C FL FD FC 
1 cat 1 cat 20% 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 54.4 0.844 0.777 1.581 0.01 0.02 0.03 
2 cat 1 m 20% 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 54.5 0.618 0.627 1.263 0.01 0.02 0.02 
3 cat 1 wg 20% 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 54.5 0.774 0.714 1.486 0.01 0.02 0.03 
4 m 1 cat 20% 0.72 0.39 0.95 0.97 1.00 19.9 0.377 0.545 0.902 0.02 0.04 0.06 
5 m 1 m 20% 0.72 0.40 1.00 1.00 1.00 20.0 0.252 0.360 0.610 0.01 0.03 0.04 
6 m 1 wg 20% 0.72 0.40 0.98 0.99 1.00 19.9 0.330 0.481 0.796 0.02 0.03 0.05 
7 cat 0.5 cat 20% 0.99 0.89 0.98 0.99 1.00 32.6 0.788 0.533 1.307 0.01 0.03 0.04 
8 cat 0.5 m 20% 0.99 0.92 1.00 1.00 1.00 33.0 0.442 0.313 0.742 0.01 0.02 0.03 
9 cat 0.5 wg 20% 0.99 0.90 0.99 0.99 1.00 32.9 0.655 0.460 1.105 0.01 0.03 0.04 
10 m 0.5 cat 20% 0.32 0.10 0.86 0.90 0.98 10.5 0.377 0.364 0.712 0.03 0.06 0.09 
11 m 0.5 m 20% 0.33 0.10 1.00 1.00 1.00 10.8 0.143 0.181 0.329 0.01 0.03 0.04 
12 m 0.5 wg 20% 0.33 0.10 0.94 0.97 1.00 10.5 0.252 0.287 0.555 0.02 0.05 0.07 
13 cat 1 cat - 0.84 0.59 0.13 0.16 0.32 25.8 3.765 5.961 10.173 0.15 0.35 0.50 
14 cat 0.5 cat - 0.52 0.28 0.22 0.25 0.39 14.9 1.913 2.493 4.466 0.13 0.30 0.43 
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• For  the  scenarios  that  correspond  to  the way  the West  of  Scotland  cod 
stock is currently assessed (scenarios 1 and 7 in bold in Table 2), recovery 
of SSB to above Blim by 2015 is achieved with more than 95% probability for 
both  the  “standard”  and  “low”  recruitment  models.  Probabilities  are 











low  levels  the  increase  in  the  stock biomass  is  considerably greater  than 
that of the TAC and therefore the proportional removals remain very low. 
• If the change in TAC is not constrained, total fishing mortality is closer to 








for  Irish Sea  cod,  as applied by WGCSE during May  2011  (Figure 3a). The harvest 
control rules associated with the management plan are based on Article 7 of Council 

































































































SSB L D C FL FD FC 
1 cat 1 cat 20% 0.80 0.54 0.68 0.90 0.94 10.7 2.188 0.000 2.188 0.18 0.00 0.18 
2 cat 1 m 20% 0.90 0.62 0.95 0.98 0.99 11.9 1.300 0.000 1.300 0.10 0.00 0.10 
3 cat 1 wg 20% 0.80 0.56 0.71 0.90 0.94 11.0 2.097 0.000 2.097 0.17 0.00 0.17 
4 m 1 cat 20% 0.26 0.08 0.48 0.80 0.90 3.4 0.758 0.000 0.758 0.25 0.00 0.25 
5 m 1 m 20% 0.28 0.08 0.86 0.98 0.99 3.6 0.457 0.000 0.457 0.14 0.00 0.14 
6 m 1 wg 20% 0.26 0.08 0.54 0.81 0.90 3.4 0.699 0.000 0.699 0.23 0.00 0.23 
7 cat 0.5 cat 20% 0.57 0.24 0.52 0.76 0.84 6.6 1.685 0.000 1.685 0.25 0.00 0.25 
8 cat 0.5 m 20% 0.65 0.31 0.87 0.94 0.97 7.5 0.992 0.000 0.992 0.12 0.00 0.12 
9 cat 0.5 wg 20% 0.58 0.24 0.49 0.71 0.80 6.6 1.652 0.000 1.652 0.25 0.00 0.25 
10 m 0.5 cat 20% 0.04 0.00 0.18 0.47 0.66 1.6 0.519 0.000 0.519 0.41 0.00 0.41 
11 m 0.5 m 20% 0.04 0.00 0.53 0.76 0.89 1.8 0.330 0.000 0.330 0.24 0.00 0.24 
12 m 0.5 wg 20% 0.04 0.00 0.23 0.48 0.63 1.6 0.480 0.000 0.480 0.41 0.00 0.41 
13 cat 1 cat - 0.54 0.25 0.20 0.42 0.60 6.2 2.607 0.000 2.607 0.45 0.00 0.45 




rently assessed  (scenarios 1 and 7  in bold  in Table 3),  recovery of SSB  to 
above Blim by 2015 is achieved with 80% probability for the “standard” re‐
cruitment models,  but with  less  than  60%  probability  for  the  “low”  re‐




• Similarly,  for  the  scenarios  that  correspond  to  the way  the  Irish Sea  cod 
stock is currently assessed, the reduction of Fbar (catch) to Fmsy or below 
by 2015  is achieved with 90% probability  for  the “standard”  recruitment 
model, but with less than 80% for the low recruitment model. 





• When  TAC  constraints  are  removed,  there  is  ~20%  increase  in  median 
catches but this is associated with a ~40% reduction in SSB and substantial 
reduction in the probability of recovery to above Blim by 2015 (from 80% to 
54%)  for  the  “standard”  recruitment model.  In  the  case of  the  “low”  re‐
cruitment model,  removing  the TAC  constraint  leads  to poorer perform‐


















Approach used for North Sea cod 
The framework used for the MSE for North Sea cod was developed from the stochas‐
tic projection software used  to provide catch options advice  for North Sea cod  (see 
Annex 2  in  ICES 2011). This  is because  the MSE  framework used  for earlier  Impact 





































because  although  the  WG  assessment  assumes  that  there  is  random  variability 
around  the exponential equation, which would account  for demographic variability 






Interpretation of Articles 7 and 8 of Council Regulation (EC) 1342/2008 































































1. For  the cod stock  in  the North Sea,  the Skagerrak and  the eastern Channel,  the 


























(a) a quantity of  fish equivalent  to  the expected discards of cod  from  the stock 
concerned; 










(b) if  the size of the stock on 1 January of the year of application of the TAC  is 
predicted by STECF  to be below  the precautionary spawning biomass  level 




(c) if  the size of the stock on 1 January of the year of application of the TAC  is 








4. When giving  its advice  in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3, STECF shall as‐
sume  that  in  the  year prior  to  the  year  of  application  of  the TAC  the  stock  is 
fished with  an  adjustment  in  fishing mortality  equal  to  the  reduction  in maxi‐
mum allowable fishing effort that applies in that year. 








1. Each year,  the Council shall decide on  the TACs  for  the cod stock  in  the North 
Sea, the Skagerrak and the eastern Channel. The TACs shall be calculated by ap‐
plying the reduction rules set out in Article 7 paragraph 1(a) and (b). 
2. The TACs  shall  initially  be  calculated  in  accordance with paragraphs  3  and  5. 
From  the year where  the TACs  resulting  from  the  application of paragraphs  3 
and  5 would  be  lower  than  the  TACs  resulting  from  the  application  of  para‐
graphs 4 and 5, the TACs shall be calculated according to the paragraphs 4 and 5. 









(b) between  the  minimum  spawning  biomass  level  and  the  precautionary 
spawning biomass level, the TACs shall not exceed a level corresponding to a 
fishing mortality rate on appropriate age groups equal  to  the  following for‐
mula:  0,4  –  (0,2  *  (Precautionary  spawning  biomass  level  –  spawning  bio‐
mass)  /  (Precautionary  spawning  biomass  level  –  minimum  spawning 
biomass level)) 
(c) at or below  the  limit  spawning biomass  level,  the TACs  shall not  exceed a 





6. Where  the cod  stock  referred  to  in paragraph 1 has been exploited at a  fishing 
mortality  rate  close  to  0,4 during  three  successive years,  the Commission  shall 
evaluate the application of this Article and, where appropriate, propose relevant 

















This Appendix  considers  the possibility  that  the management plans  for North Sea, 
West of Scotland and  Irish Sea cod are  ignored, and either  the current  trend  in F  is 
continued  (year‐on‐year decline of 1.5% per year  for North Sea cod) or  the current 








Table A4.1. North Sea  cod. Summary  results  for 4 scenarios  for  the year 2015. The  columns  la‐
belled  “OM”  and  “SR”  refer  to  the different permutations  of  the  assumptions underlying  the 
simulations, as explained  in Table ii. Values  for  the  reference points used are given  in Table i, 
and the summary statistics are described in Table iii. Values for SSB, L, D and C are in thousand 
tons.  










SSB L D C FL FD FC 
1 cat 1 0.99 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 134 128.4 46.4 176.6 0.40 0.14 0.54 
4 m 1 0.98 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.50 126 93.0 34.1 128.4 0.31 0.11 0.42 
7 cat 0.5 0.85 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 94 74.6 21.9 96.7 0.40 0.14 0.54 
10 m 0.5 0.78 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.50 87 53.5 16.1 69.9 0.31 0.11 0.42 
 
Table A4.2. West of Scotland cod. Summary results for 4 scenarios for the year 2015. The columns 
labelled “OM” and “SR” refer  to  the different permutations of  the assumptions underlying  the 
simulations, as explained  in Table ii. Values  for  the  reference points used are given  in Table i, 
and the summary statistics are described in Table iii. Values for SSB, L, D and C are in thousand 
tons.  










SSB L D C FL FD FC 
1 cat 1 0.38 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.9 2.509 5.906 8.299 0.28 0.65 0.93 
4 m 1 0.43 0.15 0.00 0.01 0.61 12.6 1.027 1.925 2.970 0.09 0.22 0.31 
7 cat 0.5 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.0 1.398 2.479 3.957 0.28 0.65 0.93 




“OM” and “SR”  refer  to  the different permutations of  the assumptions underlying  the simula‐
tions, as explained in Table ii. Values for the reference points used are given in Table i, and the 
summary statistics are described in Table iii. Values for SSB, L, D and C are in thousand tons.  










SSB L D C FL FD FC 
1 cat 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.4 2.544 0.000 2.544 1.39 0.00 1.39 
4 m 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 2.6 0.908 0.000 0.908 0.46 0.00 0.46 
7 cat 0.5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.2 1.211 0.000 1.211 1.39 0.00 1.39 






Annex 14 Evaluation of measures employed in Scotland under the 






with  the provision  for Member States  to employ alternative measures under Article 
13 so long as they delivered equivalent fishing mortality reductions to those specified 
in the management plan for cod stocks. In Scotland the Conservation Credits Scheme, 








STECF  reviewed  the progress of  the scheme  in November 2008 concluding  that  the 
RTCs offered promise but there were too few in 2008 (15) and that the scheme would 
need  to be expanded considerably and  the gear measures actually adopted by  fish‐
ermen. In 2009 the scheme was expanded considerably and a report of outcomes was 











In addition  to making use of  the provision of Article 13c  (see below), Scotland has 
also utilised Article  13b  allowing  for  lesser  cuts  in  fishing  effort  for  vessels which 
catch  less  than  5%  cod.  In  2010,  174 vessels  (mostly TR2) were deemed  eligible  to 
make use of this provision. During the year, a number of these vessels were sampled 
by observers and records of  the cod catch and  total catch were made.   Table 1 pro‐
vides details of  the sampling occasions.  In 2009, 2 observations out of 14 suggested 
cod catches of higher than 5% and the average cod catch was 67kg. In 2010, 4 out of 













i) A compulsory part  involving  full observance by all vessels of RTCs.  In 
line with the STECF recommendations these were scaled up and during 
2010 it was estimated that 165 closures could deliver the first 20% of the 



















of RTCs had  relied on boardings of vessels by  fisheries  inspectors and estimates of 
the catch rate of cod. It was not possible in 2009 or 2010  to deploy resources sufficient 
to enable  the  large  increases  in RTC numbers to be    identified by inspections alone. 
Instead a method was devised utilising landings data  linked to VMS  information to 
give  estimates  of LPUE  (landings per  ‘ping’). The  approach  isbasically delivers  an 
ongoing routine for identifying RTCs so that at 12 are in place at any one time (each 
















the  landings by  the same vessels  in  the period  immediately  following  the establish‐
ment of the RTC when they have moved away. Assuming that if they had continued 
fishing  in the RTC  they would have continued  to catch similar quantities of fish (in 
the  short  term  at  least)  then  savings accrue  if  the vessel moves  to areas where  the 
catch rate is less. The greater the differential between the RTC catch rate and the new 
location  the greater  the  saving. Results  in Table  2  show quarterly  and annual  esti‐
mates of  catch ‘savings’ arising from vessels that move away from areas designated 
as RTCs.  Savings  are  greatest  in  the North  Sea where  the majority  of  closures  oc‐
curred. Overall  the  landings  saving  amounted  to  around  892  tonnes which, when 
raised to reflect the discard rate, amount to just over 1177tonnes.  
This quantity  is  less  than was predicted would be delivered but  it should be noted 








Another approach used  to analyse  the effect of RTCs  relies on spatial behaviour of 








dance could be  identified in most quarters and  for  the year as a whole (for boats in 
RTC areas prior  to closure).  In 2010  there was evidence of movement  towards RTC 





















results  are  shown  in  Figure  5.   Based  on  the  relative performance  of  the different 
gears  in avoiding  cod  capture,  ‘a  schedule’ of effort buy‐backs were developed  for 
vessels opting to use one of the options. At this stage, establishing a true ‘worth’ for 
each of the gears is not possible. 
The  text  table below provides a summary of  the gears being used  in 2009 and 2010 
and the numbers of vessels involved. Numbers are still low compared to the overall 
fleet size (160 TR1 Vessels and 300 TR2) but are increasing and represent a major im‐
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nities  (eg  the buying  in of  extra quota which  could  confound  comparison of  catch 
rates, even if the gear effectively reduced catch rates). Furthermore, the comparisons 





Although  it  is  almost  impossible  to  fully  estimate  the  individual  contributions  of 




numbers of observations  for Scottish vessels  in  the North Sea and West of Scotland 
(respectively) using TR1 gears and TR2 gears. Additional  sampling   between   2008 
and  2010  has  been  possible  through  additional  observers  employed  to  assist  the 
monitoring of Conservation Credits measures generally.  
Figures 8 and 9 show a time series of estimates of discard rates in the North Sea for 
TR1 gear and TR2 gear  respectively. Of  special note  is  the  rapid decline  in discard 






landing discard discard rate landing discard discard rate
% %
COD North Sea 11362 3861 25 436 1014 70
West Coast 108 507 82 5 161 97
Marine Scotland Science catch information
 
Catch tracking 
Ongoing monitoring  of  Scottish  landings  takes  place  routinely  in  accordance with 
management of the Scottish quota – the landings total available to Scotland. In order 
to  inform on progress  towards  cod  recovery  targets  it  is necessary  to monitor  and 




to  remain within  the amounts of catch  (ie  landings +  ICES estimate of  international 
discard rate) implied by the ICES forecast and which is allocated to the Scottish POs.  




















































remain  disappointingly  high  and  greater  overall  reductions  could  be 
achieved in this gear – possibly through the adoption of technical solutions. 
d) The reduction in discards translates to a marked reduction in the fishing mor‐





the  agreement  by  the Conservation Credits  Steering Group  to  increase  the 








an  ICES  assessment  providing  estimates  of  fishing  mortality  precludes  a 
more detailed analysis although  the assessment  indicative of  trends suggest 
















2009 Observer sampling of boats under Article 13b (<5% cod in catches)
cod cod live tails Disc prop disc Total Wt Total % cod
date Vessel mesh size hours days stat rec FU depth discarded landed fish catch fish landed discarded Nephrops Nephrops Nephrops Nephrops Nephrops Catch
(raised to L)
26/01/2009 1 80 34.08 4 46E8 7 110 56 124.3 9568 3200 6368 945 252 33.22 0.027 1230.216 10798.22 1.7
04/03/2009 2 70 21.33 2 40E5 13 65-120 10 36.2 248 80 168 504 90 55.18 0.085 649.1803 897.1803 5.1
27/03/2009 3 80 28.72 2 47E9 7 110-140 71 0 3530 692 2838 494 636 31.36 0.027 1161.357 4691.357 1.5
02/04/2009 5 80 21.17 2 41E7 8 45 32 0 435.2 0 435.2 250 951 195.51 0.14 1396.512 1831.712 1.7
22/04/2009 4 80 25.67 2 44E3 11 80-160 2 4.4 560 48 512 419.1 762 82.11 0.065 1263.209 1823.209 0.4
14/05/2009 6 80 20.17 2 40E5 13 55-85 0 5.3 104 16 88 55 156 19.60 0.085 230.6011 334.6011 1.6
15/05/2009 12 95 13.57 2 42F0 1 145 10 157 516 335 181 123.5 48 4.76 0.027 176.259 692.259 24.1
06/06/2009 7 80 85.18 7 45F1 7 110-140 88 34.1 3528 1576 1952 3832 1980 161.28 0.027 5973.279 9501.279 1.3
06/08/2009 11 80 26.0 4 40E4 13 45-85 0 0 33 0 33 483 0 44.87 0.085 527.8689 560.8689 0.0
28/08/2009 8 80 3.0 1 42E7 8 62 2 0 257.6 1.6 256 88 0 14.33 0.14 102.3256 359.9256 0.6
23/09/2009 9 80 34.22 4 44E7 9 80-200 86 0 2136 248 1888 591 414 31.08 0.03 1036.082 3172.082 2.7
30/09/2009 10 80 35 3 39E4 13 45-65 0 0 592 0 592 608 2565 294.76 0.085 3467.76 4059.76 0.0
09/12/2009 10 80 26.5 3 39E5 13 55-117 7 0 640 0 640 480 642 104.23 0.085 1226.23 1866.23 0.4
12/12/2009 8 80 15.75 3 42E7 8 55-85 181 36.9 744 40 704 305 57 58.93 0.14 420.9302 1164.93 18.7
2010 Observer sampling of boats under Article 13b (<5% cod in catches)
cod cod live tails Disc prop disc Total Wt Total % cod
date Vessel mesh size hours days stat rec FU depth discarded landed catch marketable discarded prawns prawns Prawns nephrops Prawns Catch
16/03/2010 17 100 58 3 50F1 7 120-150 217 0 5334.5 2999.1 2235.4 354.92 1117.5 40.86 0.027 1513.279 6847.779 3.2
24/03/2010 6 80 22.75 2 39E5 13 60-75 2 48.4 148.8 65.6 83.2 139 306 41.34 0.085 486.3388 635.1388 7.9
09/04/2010 10 80 21.58 3 39E5 13 50-100 0 0 560 0 560 373 606 90.95 0.085 1069.945 1629.945 0.0
10/04/2010 8 80 26.22 3 42E7 8 55-75 6 0 296 0 296 252 0 51.61 0.17 303.6145 599.6145 1.0
16/04/2010 15 80 135.08 9 45F1 7 115-140 642 75 14800 10000 4900 3348 3360 186.14 0.027 6894.142 21694.14 3.3
16/05/2010 13 80 121 7 44F0 7 115-145 133 90 3425.9 1824 1602 4380 2376 187.47 0.027 6943.474 10369.37 2.2
05/06/2010 9 80 41.95 3 45F0 7 120-135 191 24.8 1920 500.6 1418 289 4731 139.30 0.027 5159.301 7079.301 3.0
08/06/2010 14 80 141.54 9 46E9 7 100-130 413 20 5048 2040 3008 1785 2025 105.72 0.027 3915.725 8963.725 4.8
03/08/2010 18 80 27 2 41E4 12 55-100 2 0 329.9 0 329.9 308 1125 65.95 0.044 1498.954 1828.854 0.1
05/08/2010 10 80 32.33 2 39E5 13 45-80 1 0 440 0 440 448 1617 191.83 0.085 2256.831 2696.831 0.0
08/08/2010 19 80 32.94 4 45F0 7 130-150 527 0 5045.5 825.5 4220 3420 217.5 100.94 0.027 3738.438 8783.938 6.0
23/08/2010 16 80 74.5 8 46F0 7 130-135 951 0 3120 1541 1579 2254 2635 135.67 0.027 5024.666 8144.666 11.7
14/09/2010 5 80 28.78 3 41E7 8 40-50 6 0 291.2 0 291.2 137.5 1237.5 281.63 0.17 1656.627 1947.827 0.3
22/10/2010 5 80 26.17 2 41E7 8 40-50 181 0 707.2 0 707.2 237.5 487.5 148.49 0.17 873.494 1580.694 11.5












Pre-RTC During RTC Difference "Catch" difference
Annual 3917 3025 892 1177
Q1 636 504 132 174
Q2 810 719 91 120
Q3 1618 1142 476 629





Pre-RTC During RTC Difference "Catch" difference
Annual 425.8 405.39 20.41 39
Q1 101.96 97.04 4.92 9
Q2 148.99 145.01 3.98 8
Q3 81.46 95.26 -13.8 -26







Observed vessels using Conservation Credits gear options: Cod catch, effort and CPUE
Gear option Vessel No.** CATCH (KG) EFFORT (HRS) CPUE CATCH (KG) EFFORT (HRS) CPUE CATCH (KG) EFFORT (HRS) CPUE
TR1_level 1_130MM CODEND 1 7716 94 82.09
TR1_level 1_130MM CODEND 2 7028.1 62.92 111.70 2929.34 86.25 33.96
TR1_level 1_130MM CODEND 3 4387.2 65.67 66.81 23192.2 241.38 96.08
TR1_level 1_130MM CODEND 4 3897.25 75.58 51.56 8462.45 133.2 63.53 3324.55 46.25 71.88
TR1_level 1_130MM CODEND 5 3904.35 157.3 24.82 8130.16 254.42 31.96
TR1_Level 3_Orkney Trawl 1 9078.31 195.18 46.51 11306.16 154.75 73.06 21461.35 338.5 63.40
TR1_Level 3_Orkney Trawl 2 11640.1 123.98 93.89 680.12 110.75 6.14 10998 74.03 148.56
TR1_Level 3_Orkney Trawl 3 6466.23 122 53.00
TR1_Level 3_Orkney Trawl 4 93.97 18.22 5.16 3265.95 156.83 20.82 8152 108.83 74.91
TR1_Level 3_Orkney Trawl 5 0 116 0.00 6601.08 125.53 52.59 10368.43 75 138.25
TR1_Level 3_Orkney Trawl 6 3904.5 145 26.93 27964.5 280 99.87 22411.1 297.83 75.25
TR1_Level 3_Orkney Trawl 7 18128.9 77 235.44
TR1_Level 3_Orkney Trawl 8 554.65 129 4.30 6544.6 163.75 39.97
TR1_Level 3_Orkney Trawl 9 8910.31 121.17 73.54
TR1_Level 3_Orkney Trawl 10 6852.15 108.83 62.96
TR1_Level 3_Orkney Trawl 11 29253.15 162.65 179.85
TR1_Level 3_Orkney Trawl 12 7969 122.5 65.05 40193.79 172.17 233.45 18912.19 246.5 76.72
TR1_Level 3_Orkney Trawl 13 14010.87 155.67 90.00
TR1_Level 3_Orkney Trawl 14 234.56 14.25 16.46 2237.89 23.92 93.56
TR1_Level 3_Orkney Trawl 15 15626.68 152.83 102.25
TR1_Level 3_Orkney Trawl 16 14894.6 71.5 208.32 6450.9 48.42 133.23
TR1_Level 3_Orkney Trawl 17 15874.66 49 323.97
TR1_Level 3_Orkney Trawl 18 10981.44 48 228.78
TR2_Level 1_SMP 1 303 121.6 2.49 145.4 75.5 1.93
TR2_Level 1_SMP 2 3218.7 441.9 7.28 1363.1 141.75 9.62 2677.1 146.75 18.24
TR2_Level 1_SMP 3 543.1 67.58 8.04 2015.79 134.93 14.94
TR2_Level 1_SMP 4 4400.97 170.75 25.77
TR2_Level 1_SMP 5 1958.88 81.75 23.96
TR2_Level 1_SMP 6 4179.39 169.12 24.71
TR2_Level 1_SMP 7 2051.8 272.17 7.54 466.01 117.5 3.97
TR2_Level 1_SMP 8 550.61 126.28 4.36 581.86 136.67 4.26






























month %dis cum catch cum dis %cum dis
jan 33.0% 894 295 33.0%
feb 33.0% 1987 655 33.0%
mar 33.0% 3011 993 33.0%
apr 19.3% 3962 1176 29.7%
may 19.3% 5292 1433 27.1%
jun 19.3% 6746 1713 25.4%
jul 23.5% 8094 2030 25.1%
aug 23.5% 9278 2308 24.9%
sep 23.5% 10119 2506 24.8%
oct 41.3% 11258 2976 26.4%
nov 41.3% 12762 3596 28.2%
dec 41.3% 13757 4007 29.1%
month %dis cum catch cum dis %cum dis
jan 90.8% 275 250 90.8%
feb 90.8% 635 576 90.8%
mar 90.8% 823 747 90.8%
apr 65.6% 880 784 89.2%
may 65.6% 943 826 87.6%
jun 65.6% 1012 871 86.1%
jul 90.4% 1359 1185 87.2%
aug 90.4% 1834 1614 88.0%
sep 90.4% 2204 1949 88.4%
oct 17.5% 2250 1957 87.0%
nov 17.5% 2293 1964 85.7%
dec 17.5% 2320 1969 84.9%
 304 
Table  6  Partial Fs (preliminary) calculated by partitioning Fs (mean 2‐4) arising from 2011 ICES 
assessment  (shown  in  right hand  column)  according  to  countries  landings,  discards  and  catch 
(based on numbers of fish).  
2008 Denmark Scotland Germany E&W NetherlandsSweden Norway Belgium France Faroes Total F
Landings 0.0925 0.0911 0.0295 0.0247 0.0161 0.0119 0.0578 0.0110 0.0202 0.0002
Discards 0.0627 0.1564 0.0009 0.0033 0.0335 0.0031 0.0477 0.0135 0.0221 0.0006
Catch 0.1552 0.2475 0.0304 0.0280 0.0496 0.0150 0.1055 0.0245 0.0423 0.0008 0.6987
2009
Landings 0.0962 0.1204 0.0266 0.0366 0.0399 0.0123 0.0499 0.0139 0.0241 0.0006
Discards 0.0621 0.1094 0.0023 0.0079 0.0220 0.0038 0.0327 0.0083 0.0140 0.0004
Catch 0.1582 0.2299 0.0288 0.0445 0.0620 0.0161 0.0826 0.0222 0.0382 0.0010 0.6833
2010
Landings 0.1378 0.1694 0.0466 0.0271 0.0293 0.0128 0.0399 0.0091 0.0260 0.0004
Discards 0.0524 0.0771 0.0010 0.0024 0.0110 0.0019 0.0195 0.0030 0.0097 0.0001











































































































Figure  5 Selectivity  results  (top  figure)  for various  configurations of  large mesh  (placed  in  the 
forward section of  the net or as  large panels  in  the belly of  the net) all designed  to  reduce cod 











































































































































































































Total, all fleets   2006  2007  2008  2009 
Employment (FTE)   22471  22190  20607  17926 
Fleet number   13512 13747 12847  12362 
Value North Sea cod landings (euro, m)   98.41  95.99  58.23  61.93 
   
   
Total, selected fleets   2006  2007  2008  2009 
Employment (FTE)   9524  8821  8336  7476 
Fleet number   3659 3409 2534  2381 
Value North Sea cod landings (euro, m)   87.16  83.44  54.57  55.75 
   
Selected fleets % of total   2006 2007 2008  2009 
Employment (FTE)   42%  40%  40%  42% 
Fleet number   27%  25%  20%  19% 




method*  Vessel Length (m)  2006  2007  2008  2009 
Belgium   TBB   24‐40 13% 13% 6%  5% 
Germany   DTS   12‐24  15%  11%  7%  8% 
Germany   DTS   over 24 27% 24% 21%  25% 
Denmark   DTS   12‐24  30%  31%  11%  12% 
Denmark   PGP   00‐12 46% 43% 31%  22% 
Denmark    PGP   12‐24  29%  29%  26%  28% 
Denmark   PMP   00‐12  45%  43%  18%  15% 
Denmark   PMP   12‐24 27% 31% 21%  22% 
Denmark   PTS   24‐40  5%  9%  8%  8% 
France   DTS   12‐24 9% 8% na  7% 
France   DTS   24‐40  8%  10%  na  5% 
UK   DFN   12‐24 87% 75% 91%  87% 
UK   DTS   12‐24  6%  6%  5%  6% 
UK   DTS   24‐40  14%  14%  12%  14% 
UK   DTS   over 40 6% 6% 8%  7% 
Netherlands   DTS   24‐40  3%  4%  3%  5% 
Netherlands   TBB   12‐24 1% 1% 1%  1% 
Netherlands   TBB   24‐40  1%  1%  2%  2% 
Netherlands   TBB   over 40 1% 1% 2%  2% 




  2006  2007  2008  2009  % change 2006‐09  average per vessel 2006  average per vessel 2009 
 Effort days North Sea   252,318  209,781  180,464  160,935  ‐36%  69  83 
 Effort days Total   291,862  251,261  223,483  200,112  ‐31%  80  103 
 Effort GT days North Sea   29,849,071  26,956,635  22,733,166  21,831,002  ‐27%  8,214  11,230 
 Effort GT days Total   33,020,369  30,110,016  25,937,229  24,949,910  ‐24%  9,087  12,834 
 Effort KW days North Sea   95,413,826  84,973,086  67,903,522  64,212,319  ‐33%  26,256  33,031 
 Effort KW days Total   105,906,242  95,711,343  78,773,193  74,503,848  ‐30%  29,143  38,325 
NB: the effort data reported does not include details for the French fleet segments for which effort data is only available for 2009 
Table: Selected fleets, total: Income and Costs (EUR) 
  2006  2007  2008  2009  % change 2006‐09  average per vessel 2006  average per vessel 2009 
 Income   1,360,831,419  1,360,306,354  1,240,770,124  1,055,790,431  ‐22%  374,472  543,102 
Costs               
 Total Costs  1,320,206,465  1,290,252,228  1,059,724,258  845,808,185  ‐36%  363,293  435,087 
Capital  138,044,057  124,935,678  ‐  ‐  na   37,987   
 Crew   423,405,552  423,132,914  319,965,657  284,073,408  ‐33%  116,512  146,128 
 Fixed   104,672,919  103,750,210  167,034,091  109,709,077  5%  28,804  56,435 
 Fuel   295,644,568  298,383,118  331,053,925  211,573,095  ‐28%  81,355  108,834 
 Repairs  124,190,446  125,321,625  114,339,564  110,147,644  ‐11%  34,175  56,660 
 Variable   234,248,922  214,728,682  127,331,021  130,304,960  ‐44%  64,460  67,029 
Table  Selected fleets, totals: Landings, weight and value (EUR and tons) 
 315 
  2006  2007  2008  2009   % change 2006‐09    average per vessel 2006   average per vessel 2009 
                
                   
Value all Landings Total  729,689,621  729,447,669  730,809,324  639,940,653  ‐12%  200,795  329,188 
Value all landings, North Sea  729,193,880  728,972,409  655,441,945  573,286,536  ‐21%  200,659  294,900 
Value COD North Sea  87,159,875  83,444,710  54,566,487  55,753,011  ‐36%  23,985  28,680 
               
Weight all Landings Total  524910  392698  414105  468427  ‐11%  144,444  240,960 
Weight all landings, North Sea  524365  392115  382260  433133  ‐17%  144,294  222,805 
Weight COD North Sea  37697  32070  18525  24240  ‐36%  10,373  12,469 
               




Member State  Fishing Method  Vessel Length (m)  2006  2007  2008  2009  % change 2006‐9 
Belgium  TBB  24‐40  3.04  2.55  2.24  1.55  ‐49% 
Germany  DTS  12‐24  1.57  1.24  0.71  0.45  ‐72% 
Germany  DTS  over 24  6.18  4.83  4.14  5.29  ‐14% 
Denmark  DTS  12‐24  18.69  17.19  7.09  7.13  ‐62% 
Denmark  PGP  00‐12  14.07  11.88  3.57  2.08  ‐85% 
Denmark   PGP  12‐24  7.89  5.35  4.13  4.17  ‐47% 
Denmark  PMP  00‐12  2.85  2.86  0.62  0.39  ‐86% 
Denmark  PMP  12‐24  5.44  6.23  2.77  2.28  ‐58% 
Denmark  PTS  24‐40  4.18  5.34  3.89  3.86  ‐8% 
France  DTS  12‐24  0.44  0.53  0.00  2.20  406% 
France  DTS  24‐40  0.28  0.48  0.00  1.34  384% 
UK  DFN  12‐24  0.43  0.21  0.76  0.81  90% 
UK  DTS  12‐24  6.95  8.91  8.30  8.41  21% 
UK  DTS  24‐40  11.93  12.35  11.44  11.44  ‐4% 
UK  DTS  over 40  0.35  0.33  1.04  0.89  155% 
Netherlands  DTS  24‐40  0.20  0.38  0.72  0.81  309% 
Netherlands  TBB  12‐24  0.56  0.45  0.83  0.02  ‐96% 
Netherlands  TBB  24‐40  0.38  0.36  0.46  0.53  42% 










(m)  2006  2007  2008  2009 
Belgium   TBB   24‐40  3.1%  2.7%  3.8%  2.5% 
Germany   DTS   12‐24  1.6%  1.3%  1.2%  0.7% 
Germany   DTS   over 24  6.3%  5.0%  7.1%  8.5% 
Denmark   DTS   12‐24  19.0%  17.9%  12.2%  11.5% 
Denmark   PGP   00‐12  14.3%  12.4%  6.1%  3.4% 
Denmark    PGP   12‐24  8.0%  5.6%  7.1%  6.7% 
Denmark   PMP   00‐12  2.9%  3.0%  1.1%  0.6% 
Denmark   PMP   12‐24  5.5%  6.5%  4.8%  3.7% 
Denmark   PTS   24‐40  4.2%  5.6%  6.7%  6.2% 
France   DTS   12‐24  0.4%  0.5%  0.0%  3.6% 
France   DTS   24‐40  0.3%  0.5%  0.0%  2.2% 
UK   DFN   12‐24  0.4%  0.2%  1.3%  1.3% 
UK   DTS   12‐24  7.1%  9.3%  14.3%  13.6% 
UK   DTS   24‐40  12.1%  12.9%  19.6%  18.5% 
UK   DTS   over 40  0.4%  0.3%  1.8%  1.4% 
Netherlands   DTS   24‐40  0.2%  0.4%  1.2%  1.3% 
Netherlands   TBB   12‐24  0.6%  0.5%  1.4%  0.0% 
Netherlands   TBB   24‐40  0.4%  0.4%  0.8%  0.9% 






Member State    Vessel Length (m)  2006  2007  2008  2009  % change 2006‐9 
Belgium  TBB  24‐40  NA  NA  245  210  NA 
Germany  DTS  12‐24  161  149  107  96  ‐40% 
Germany  DTS  over 24  279  279  191  232  ‐17% 
Denmark  DTS  12‐24  544  383  552  495  ‐9% 
Denmark  PGP  00‐12  400  276  113*  115*  ‐71% 
Denmark   PGP  12‐24  286  159  109  84  ‐71% 
Denmark  PMP  00‐12  64  64  23*  21*  ‐67% 
Denmark  PMP  12‐24  140  111  129  107  ‐23% 
Denmark  PTS  24‐40  452  296  248  260  ‐42% 
France  DTS  12‐24  2309  2209  1463  1398  ‐39% 
France  DTS  24‐40  657  641  453  585  ‐11% 
UK  DFN  12‐24  NA  81  58  61  NA 
UK  DTS  12‐24  1970  1947  2394  2037  3% 
UK  DTS  24‐40  769  769  715  765  ‐1% 
UK  DTS  over 40  203  165  128  123  ‐40% 
Netherlands  DTS  24‐40  66  74  101  99  51% 
Netherlands  TBB  12‐24  498  503  505  505*  1% 
Netherlands  TBB  24‐40  203  194  155  177  ‐13% 






Member State    Vessel Length (m)  2006  2007  2008  2009  % change 2006‐9 
Belgium  TBB  24‐40  53  51  47  40  ‐25% 
Germany  DTS  12‐24  75  77  72  67  ‐11% 
Germany  DTS  over 24  25  20  24  24  ‐4% 
Denmark  DTS  12‐24  271  211  263  254  ‐6% 
Denmark  PGP  00‐12  1225  1153  363  368  ‐70% 
Denmark   PGP  12‐24  118  81  59  59  ‐50% 
Denmark  PMP  00‐12  122  127  48  43  ‐65% 
Denmark  PMP  12‐24  76  64  63  61  ‐20% 
Denmark  PTS  24‐40  86  67  51  46  ‐47% 
France  DTS  12‐24  493  484  460  396  ‐20% 
France  DTS  24‐40  117  116  107  95  ‐19% 
UK  DFN  12‐24  23  21  22  18  ‐22% 
UK  DTS  12‐24  495  492  509  491  ‐1% 
UK  DTS  24‐40  107  106  108  106  ‐1% 
UK  DTS  over 40  11  10  14  11  0% 
Netherlands  DTS  24‐40  14  15  19  24  71% 
Netherlands  TBB  12‐24  197  188  182  183  ‐7% 
Netherlands  TBB  24‐40  51  42  40  31  ‐39% 




Member State    Vessel Length (m)  2006  2007  2008  2009  % change 2006‐9 
Belgium  TBB  24‐40  75.38  61.18  52.85  39.29  ‐48% 
Germany  DTS  12‐24  13.24  13.13  9.14  8.10  ‐39% 
Germany  DTS  over 24  23.16  27.32  49.14  42.44  83% 
Denmark  DTS  12‐24  50.75  42.49  56.27  46.71  ‐8% 
Denmark  PGP  00‐12  30.64  24.28  10.43  8.93  ‐71% 
Denmark   PGP  12‐24  23.85  14.58  7.71  6.42  ‐73% 
Denmark  PMP  00‐12  5.17  6.62  3.86  3.13  ‐39% 
Denmark  PMP  12‐24  15.49  13.73  13.21  9.80  ‐37% 
Denmark  PTS  24‐40  60.41  43.73  39.10  34.01  ‐44% 
France  DTS  12‐24  244.82  245.97  175.16  158.03  ‐35% 
France  DTS  24‐40  76.41  79.38  65.45  66.03  ‐14% 
UK  DFN  12‐24  4.44  1.42  3.74  3.49  ‐21% 
UK  DTS  12‐24  148.99  176.10  125.60  109.28  ‐27% 
UK  DTS  24‐40  102.99  99.37  86.60  85.37  ‐17% 
UK  DTS  over 40  24.07  26.07  24.31  24.17  0% 
Netherlands  DTS  24‐40  6.86  9.27  14.67  10.74  57% 
Netherlands  TBB  12‐24  42.16  42.63  45.92  2.34  ‐94% 
Netherlands  TBB  24‐40  33.73  32.60  29.35  21.69  ‐36% 






Member State    Vessel Length (m)  2006  2007  2008  2009  % change 2006‐9 
Belgium  TBB  24‐40  22.69  20.20  39.59  32.72  44% 
Germany  DTS  12‐24  10.62  11.16  9.71  5.35  ‐50% 
Germany  DTS  over 24  22.91  20.45  19.50  21.34  ‐7% 
Denmark  DTS  12‐24  62.38  55.72  64.02  57.70  ‐8% 
Denmark  PGP  00‐12  30.84  27.57  11.60  9.31  ‐70% 
Denmark   PGP  12‐24  27.20  18.42  16.10  14.89  ‐45% 
Denmark  PMP  00‐12  6.34  6.64  3.45  2.52  ‐60% 
Denmark  PMP  12‐24  19.92  19.90  13.14  10.19  ‐49% 
Denmark  PTS  24‐40  81.36  58.74  50.24  46.35  ‐43% 
France  DTS  12‐24  5.11  6.36  0.00  30.71  501% 
France  DTS  24‐40  3.55  4.60  0.00  25.26  612% 
UK  DFN  12‐24  0.49  0.29  0.83  0.93  89% 
UK  DTS  12‐24  121.22  137.28  171.73  134.24  11% 
UK  DTS  24‐40  83.96  91.08  92.93  82.32  ‐2% 
UK  DTS  over 40  5.46  5.29  13.72  12.58  131% 
Netherlands  DTS  24‐40  6.33  9.97  21.71  15.51  145% 
Netherlands  TBB  12‐24  46.79  62.13  61.19  2.50  ‐95% 
Netherlands  TBB  24‐40  35.41  36.01  27.04  25.88  ‐27% 





























ments  from  the  Commission.  The  relevant  clauses  from  the  three  years  2008  to  2010 
referring to TACs to be set in 2009 to 2011 are tabulated (Table 1). This table indicates the 
with an asterix the clause that would apply by year for each stock. In general the North 
Sea stock  is expected  to  follow  the clause based on a  ‘know state of  the stock’ and  the 
stock being evaluated as ‘outside safe biological limits’. For the three other stocks no as‐
sessment was available for most years so it is assumed that STECF would follow the gen‐
eral  ICES  advice  for  ‘zero  catch’,  and  that  the  state  of  the  stock would  be defined  as 
‘unknown’. 











tions of potential  income  the  ‘no plan’ option  landings and  replace  the  landings under 
the plan. This is likely to be the case for ‘national’ allocations but may not be the case for 
individual  fleets.  Its difficult  to predict  income on a  fleet basis as what would happen 
may be different as fishermen may change strategy gears etc. in response the changes in 
landings. However, in the absence of any alternative information for individual fleets the 
ratio  of  ‘no  plan’  to  plan  landings  could  be  applied  provided  vessels  quota  remains 
within the same segments.  































o For Kattegat, West  of  Scotland  and  Irish  Sea  the  ‘no  plan’  regulation 


























ply quantifiable  changes  in  the  catch,  it  is not  clear  if  changes  in  effort  control would 





plan would have been  in general  similar or  lower TACs and  similar or greater  fishing 





























































































F 30%    *     
  STECF advises a 
zero catch, a 
reduction to the 
lowest possible level 
or similar advice. 
The TAC should be reduced by at least 
25%. 
Recovery measures should be implemented 
including effort reductions and introduction 
of more selective fishing gear. 

































Kattegat  2008  673            Unknown       
  2009  505  ‐25%  ‐25%  ‐25%  505  reduction unknown  Unknown  No difference  Unquantifiable   
  2010  379  ‐25%  ‐25%  ‐25%  379  reduction unknown  Unknown  No difference  Unquantifiable   
  2011  190  ‐50%  ??  ‐25%  284  reduction unknown  Unknown  50% increase    Basis of 50% unknown 
West of 
Scotland 
2008  402            11.5       
  2009  302  ‐25%  ‐25%  ‐25%  302  reduction unknown  14.9  No difference  Unquantifiable   
  2010  240  ‐21%  ‐21%  ‐25%  227  reduction unknown    6%  reduction  Unquantifiable  25% plan reduced to 21% 
change
  2011  182  ‐24%  ‐24%  ‐25%  170  reduction unknown    7% reduction    25% plan reduced to 24% 
change 
Irish Sea  2008  1199            1.5       
  2009  899  ‐25%  ‐25%  ‐25%  899  reduction unknown  1.2  No difference  Unquantifiable   
  2010  674  ‐25%  ‐25%  ‐25%  674  reduction unknown    No difference  Unquantifiable   
  2011  506  ‐25%  ‐25%  ‐25%  506  reduction unknown    No difference     
North Sea  2008  25290            3.3       
  2009  34590  +37%*  ‐25%  +35%  34015  No effort change  2.6  No difference  Unquantifiable  30% reduction in F 
  2010  40300  +17%  ‐10%  +5%  36320  No effort change    10% reduction  Unquantifiable  30% reduction in F 





Annex 17 Cod Recovery Plan: Survey of Fishing Vessel Owners and 




1. Introduction to the report 
This report describes the results from a small survey of fishing vessel operators and 
owners undertaken in June 2011.  The survey was undertaken in a short time frame 
using on-line questionnaires and telephone interviews.  Respondents are mainly op-
erators from the UK and France, but there are also submissions from two owners of 
multiple vessels.   
The work was undertaken for provide input to the Expert working group evaluation of 
multi-annual plans for Cod in the Irish Sea, Kattegat, North Sea, and West of Scot-
land being undertaken for the Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for 
Fisheries (STECF) in June 2011. 
2. Aims of the Survey 
There were four areas of exploration for the survey:  
• Describe effects of the Cod Recovery Plan on different fleet sectors 
• Identify specific measures of the plan that concern each vessel 
• Identify consequences of the Plan for each vessel and the business decisions 
being taken by vessel operator 
• Explore what is expected to happen for the vessel/operator if the Plan does 
not change 
A questionnaire was designed to explore the relevant areas of interest.  The question-
naire was developed for telephone and on-line delivery.   
3. Sample Description 
Fishing vessels were selected for sample inclusion by key stakeholders in each Mem-
ber State to provide a representative group of fishers using different gear in the areas 
covered by the Cod Recovery Plan.   Those sampled are thus not a random sample of 
fleets, but aimed at being ‘representative’ of current fishing effort.   
Vessel owners/operators were given the option of answering the questionnaire either 
on-line or through a phone conversation.  There were a total of 17 respondents.  Of 
these: 9 responses were received through the on-line questionnaire (5 complete and 4 
partially completed, 6 UK and 3 French) and 8 through telephone interviews.  There 
were also 2 e-mailed submissions (although not all questions were answered, 1 UK 




Fishing vessels in the survey identified the following as their main port of operation: 
Peterhead (7) 
Fleetwood  












The table below illustrates areas in which vessels are operating.  The majority of 
those in the sample were operating in the North Sea with smaller numbers in the West 
of Scotland, Eastern Channel (French vessels out of Boulogne), Faroes and other ar-
eas.  The North Sea numbers are inflated by one respondent operating 7 trawlers, five 
of which were targeting Saithe in the North Sea (and three of these five were also tar-
geting Cod).  Numbers in the table below indicate number of vessels rather than 












4. Analysis of Data 
Method of Fishing 
Methods of fishing varied and most vessels were using more than one type of gear 
depending on the fish species being targeted.  Table 1 below indicates that the major-
ity of respondents are demersal trawlers.   
Table 2 identifies the main types of species targeted by respondents.  The majority of 
vessels are targeting multiple species, for example Cod, Haddock and Whiting, or 
Saithe and Cod.  One or two vessels have a wider range of species but only appear to 
catch small amounts of each.  Cod, Haddock, Whiting and Saithe are the main target 
species with 10 boats targeting Cod.  Only limited information was available regard-
ing main sources of income and no real conclusions can be drawn.  There was some 
indication that several respondents had altered their target species and many fewer 
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were now targeting Cod, with resultant reduction in the significance of Cod as a 











































Monkfish  4    Halibut     










Scallops      Mackerel  1   
Prawn  1  90%  Dover sole  1  Winter target species 
 
Crew size 
Crew sizes tend to be small (less than 10) and in most cases crew size has altered over 
the past 3 – 5 years.  In several cases crew size had been reduced by one person (full 
time or seasonally, usually to save money), but sometimes more significantly, for ex-
ample:  
• One vessel reported a crew of six, down from 10 working non-stop on a rota-
tional basis.   
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• One vessel reported reducing from 5 to 3 as quotas have dropped to make it 
economic 
• One vessel reported a crew size of 14 with no changes. 
• One vessel reported increasing crew size by one as the crew was now from 
the Philippinnes and Indonesia rather than Scotland.  
• One vessel reported increasing crew size by 2 (from 5 to 7) 
• One vessel switched from white fish to Prawns and now takes on more crew 
in summer 
5. Impact of the Cod Recovery Plan (since 1 January 2009) on operation 
of vessels 
 
Key changes have been an increase in days spent in port and changes in species tar-
geted.  Nine respondents indicated they had switched target species to avoid Cod.  A 
large proportion of vessels reported switching from Cod to other target species in-
cluding Whiting, Haddock and Nephrops.  These respondents also indicated a key 
strategy has been to change the areas in which they fish to avoid catching Cod.  Ves-
sels report having to be more careful where they go, how far they go, and which days 
they go to sea in order to maximise revenue from fishing voyages.  It was clear from 
respondents that vessels spend more time in port and that fishing effort has been re-
duced in terms of number of days spent at sea.  An associated result has been changes 
in fishing patterns and greater consideration of when and where a vessel will go fish-
ing.   
 
Fewer vessels had switched gear, only six vessels reported changing gear as a result 
of the plan and only three respondents indicated any investment in new equipment as 
a result of the Plan.  For many fishermen, as revealed in later questions, the plan has 
created business uncertainties, which has decreased investments.  Some gear changes 
have occurred but this appear to be limited (e.g. moving to smaller mesh size) and 
respondents indicated that gear changes were limited in effectiveness.  The most 
common means of reducing Cod catch were to try and avoid areas where Cod were 
known to exist in abundance.   
 
Only one respondent indicated diversification into other activities to maintain income 
levels (e.g. offshore installation guard duties), although there were comments from 
other respondents that crew members were seeking work elsewhere, and the offshore 
oil industry provides an option for a more secure income stream. 
 
Respondents were asked about the effectiveness of their Cod avoidance measures.  
This was difficult for them to determine as the majority were trying to avoid Cod by 
not fishing in areas where they know they will usually find this species.  Those in the 
southern part of the North Sea and Eastern Channel were finding it easier as the per-
ception among respondents is that there are fewer Cod to be found there.  Those fish-
ing in the Northern North Sea and west of Scotland appear to be finding it more 
difficult to avoid cod even though they actively try to stay out of known Cod areas.   
The majority of respondents indicated they were actively avoiding Cod in some man-
ner, usually by ensuring they did not fish in zone where they knew Cod could be 
found, or through leaving areas when it was clear that they were catching too many 
Cod even though targeting other species.  Table 4 summarises some of the comments 



























































In terms of effectiveness – those fishermen that indicated they had changed mesh size 
reported limited utility of this measure.  The comments regarding nets suggest that 
fishermen find changes to mesh size to be of limited effectiveness and integrate any 
change with more active avoidance measures, such as trying to stay out of areas 
where they think there will be large numbers of Cod.   
 
Only one respondent indicated that additional avoidance measures were being con-
sidered, and that was to stay out of areas where Cod was known to exist.  The major-
334 
334 
ity of respondents were already taking what they considered to be the most effective 
Cod avoidance action, and did not seem able to consider further action.  Part of the 
issue here may be that fishermen perceive the reduction in effort also to be a Cod 
avoidance measure.  So although they indicate diversifying into other species, and 
trying to avoid areas of Cod abundance, it does not stop Cod being caught as the fo-
cus of fishermen is ensuring a profitable trip based on their target species.  If that re-
sults in excessive by-catch and discarding of Cod then the view of respondents is that 
the fault lies with the Recovery Plan and the limits on Cod quota which prevent them 
from landing the Cod that is caught.  There is insufficient data from the survey to 
draw any conclusions on whether ‘sufficient’ avoidance action is being taken, but the 
impression given by fishermen is that they are doing everything they can, within the 
financial constraints of their businesses.  More avoidance measures mean higher costs 
(e.g. new nets, higher fuel costs, higher wages) which inevitably are not looked on 
favourably.  Current actions, in particular avoiding areas of Cod abundance, are nec-
essary as catching Cod imposes a cost to vessels.  Catching more Cod means that 
more time and effort is required to obtain the target species, and discard the unwanted 
species.  Catching Cod imposes costs on vessel operations, and avoiding Cod also 
imposes costs (e.g. more fuel, lower levels of target species); the vessel operator 
needs to balance the costs and select the cheapest option – sometimes this will mean 
fishing in areas of cod abundance which may account to the high levels of discards 
still being reported.   
 
12 of 17 respondents indicated they discard Cod and 9 indicate discarding of other 
species.  The issue of discards is not related solely to Cod but with Cod the impres-
sion given by responses to the questions on discarding suggest that a significant 
amount of high grading is occurring.  Vessels are landing the best fish, which in-
crease the value of any particular fishing trip.  Discarding is not solely related to 
meeting quota allocations and catch composition rules, but also to maximising the 
return on each individual fishing trip.  It is not clear from the data in the survey how 
much of the discarding is the result of exceeding catch-composition rules, and how 
much is due to high-grading. 
 
Respondents were also asked to suggest other possible measures that might work bet-
ter.  There were few responses to this question, and most fishermen did not have any 
suggestions for change.  One respondent indicated that increasing mesh size would 
result in losses of smaller targeted fish.  Respondents from France indicated that rules 
needed to be more flexible and should not be applied uniformly across all fleets.  
Vessels need flexibility to be able to switch gear and adapt to relative abundance of 
species that are found.   
 
“It is necessary to think about the fishing activity rather than to have the same meas-
ures for all.  The closures in real time are not adapted to small boats with limited ar-
eas of activity.  They should think more in terms of productivity of each fishing 









































6. Financial impacts of the Cod Recovery Plan 
 
“We recruited cheaper labour, make virtually no investment in new equipment unless 
absolutely necessary, and buy as little supplies as possible, also we cost everything 
now, due to leasing costs of quota and low profitability we must market our catch as 
best as possible.  The future – I don’t see one at the moment.  Looks like things are 
going to get worse before they get better yet” 
(Scottish vessel operator) 
 
Profitability of vessels varies, for some operators the level of expenditure and revenue 
is about the same as previously, for others there are slight differences caused by a 
range of factors ranging from fish prices to undertaking needed repairs (e.g. £10 – 
15,000 better off for one boat due to ‘hard work’;  for another boat it was ‘same as 
previous due to need to spend money on mechanical failures’; slightly better than 
previous year despite fuel prices; slightly better due to Saithe prices; a lot less profit-
able but also partly due to fuel prices; loss of income from dumping of fish and more 
effort needed but no increase in expenditure; less profitable due to higher costs).  
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Vessels report fuel prices as having a major impact on their profitability.  This has 
impacted some boats more than others, depending on whether they have to go further 
to avoid catching Cod.  Fish landing value also has an impact on profitability of a 
boat.   
 
Few boats reported significant expenditure as a result of the Plan.  Three respondents 
indicated the need to buy new nets/equipment to catch species other than Cod 
(£5,000, £25,000, and £45,000), and some expenditure on buying extra quota (one 
indicated £200,000 for 2010).   Many other respondents indicated they were putting 
more effort into repairs than investing in new equipment.   
 
Vessel operators also reported a range of activities to deal with a more difficult finan-
cial climate.  One operator reported buying two <10m boats in order to diversify into 
other fisheries.  Another had taken on offshore guard duty to diversify income.  Only 
one or two interviewees reported any changes in terms of taking on part-time work, or 
family/crew members increasing the level of work they undertake.  The following 
additional activities were indicated by a small number of respondents:  
 
Number Activity        
1 increased effort put into crofting 
5 wife increased working hours 
3 some of crew taking on other casual work (e.g. oil industry) 
1 crew changed from being Scottish to foreign (due to low wages and  
 lack of security - could not retain local people as crew) 
1 loss of a crew member and salaries decreased 
2 loss of crew due to inability to pay sufficiently high wages (one reported 
losing  4 crew due to inability to pay wages and now employs East European 
labour) 
1 possibly stop one trawler before end of year to respect effort allocation 
1 Crew had to look for other work as do not go to sea for several weeks in 
summer 
 
The impact of the Cod Recovery Plan on business decisions has been more influen-
tial.  Table 5 below indicates that the main impacts are in terms of recruiting and 
keeping crews, investing in new equipment, and planning for the future.  Several ves-
sels indicated the difficulties of recruiting crew when future incomes are so uncertain, 
in particular the difficulties of getting young people and locals.  Interviewees also 
expressed concern over difficulties of planning for the future when regulations are 
changing all the time and there is no guarantee of whether there enterprise could be 
profitable in future.  Several interviewees indicated they had little optimism that they 
would be able to remain in business under current conditions.  This is resulting in a 
knock-on impact in terms of reducing investments in new equipment and making op-






















































7. Impact of Cod Recovery Plan regulations  
 
Many respondents indicated that both TAC and effort regulations were affecting their 
activities.  
“Both TAC and effort restrictions affect us.  In 2009 TAC was too low and 
that had the biggest impact.  Starting from 2010 the absence of flexibility 




In other cases they indicated either one or the other (TAC or effort restrictions) were 
having more impact.  The TAC results in lower quota for Cod which causes fisher-
men to catch their quota more quickly, they then indicate they must leave zones of 
productive fishing where they are targeting other species because of the by-catch and 
the need to discard Cod.  Reduced quotas are causing vessels to change their fishing 
patterns (where they go and when), but it is clearly still causing discards of Cod (as 
well as other species).  It is interesting to note that the responses are similar whether 
fishermen are from Scotland, England or France.   
 
Table 6 suggests that effort restrictions appear to have been more significant finan-
cially as they force boats to stay in port, reduce income and make it more difficult to 
recruit and retain crew who rely on a regular wage.  When boats do go out they indi-
cate they must work harder and be more productive as they have limited days at sea 
and catching Cod means discard rates are higher and they then have to spend longer 
at sea to catch their quota of other species.  There are also suggestions that more risks 
are being taken in order to maximise productivity during the limited days at sea.   
 
Respondents also indicated that if the plan continued unchanged the likely impacts 
could be severe in terms of going out of business and leaving the fishing industry.  
Respondents from all areas indicated that weaker businesses, or even quite estab-
lished ones, might go under due to difficulties of making a profit under current regu-
lations.  Respondents indicated that the future looks bleak, there are a lot of 
uncertainties, and this creates stress. 
 
Only two respondents indicated that the Recovery Plan was not significantly impact-
ing their operations as they were not targeting Cod, or had ample quota:   
 
“We only have 2% Cod so we are not hugely affected by the recovery plan.”  
 
When asked about the future impacts if the Recovery Plan stays the same the majority 
of respondents (13) indicated significant implications for their business.  Table 7 
summarises some of the comments from the questionnaires.  The Plan is making it 
difficult for fishermen to plan for the future and to make investments due to uncer-
tainties over changes in regulations and future restrictions.  Financial implications are 
significant and respondents refer to difficulties of keeping crew, switching to cheaper 































































































































8. Views on the sustainability of Cod stocks and the role of the Cod 
Recovery Plan 
 
Table 8 indicates respondent perceptions on impacts of the Recovery Plan on Cod 
Stocks.  Respondents suggested that reduction in the number of boats through de-
commissioning, reducing quotas, and natural cycles all played a part in the level of 
Cod stocks currently being seen. 
Seven respondents (around half) indicated that the Plan had helped to re-build Cod 
stocks – but they also suggested that decommissioning of a large number of boats 
prior to the plan had also had a significant impact.  A larger proportion of respondents 
(10) indicated the parts of the Plan had damaged Cod stocks, largely through cutting 
quota which increased the level of discarding that is occurring.  Many respondents 
indicated that they had discarded Cod and other species.  Eight respondents also indi-
cated that other species were being adversely affected by the Plan through increased 
targeting or through discarding.   
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Respondent suggested a variety of approaches to improving the Plan. These include 
increasing the quota in order to reduce the level of discards, and making the rules 
more flexible and more locally adaptable, even down the level of each vessel, in order 
to reflect the natural variability found in the sea.  One suggestion was for ‘set-aside’ 
payments similar to those paid to farmers to maintain land in a productive state.  Two 
respondents suggested improved decommissioning schemes to allow weaker busi-
nesses to exit the industry, something that is difficult to accomplish without some 
support.  One beam trawler suggested beam trawlers should not be affected by the 
Recovery Plan as they were not targeting Cod.   
 
Table 8. Respondent perceptions of impact of the Plan on fish stocks 












































































Table 9 illustrates the range of response when questions were asked about the effects 
of the Plan on discarding activity.   A large proportion of respondents (12) indicated 
they had discarded fish as a result of the Plan.  The fact the quota is so low and the 
fish abundant seems to create real problems for fishermen and lead to an increase in 
discarding.  Low quota is leading to some discarding as a result of high grading as 
well as simply staying within quota.  In some cases other species are also being dis-
carded (over half of respondents indicated this was an issue), Hake, Haddock and 
Whiting were mentioned in particular.  Increasing the quota was seen as the only vi-




Actions in relation to 
discarding 



























































9. Perception on the state of Cod stocks  
In contrast to the difficulties forecast by respondents if the Plan remains unchanged, 
and the impact of the Plan on Cod stocks, the majority of respondents are very posi-
tive about current state of the cod stock (and stocks of other species).  When asked if 
the Cod had increased in the areas in which they fished thirteen respondents per-
ceived an increase in the stock (Table 10).  Some respondents indicated the situation 
in recent years was the best that had seen for decades.  Whether the improvement is 
caused by the Recovery Plan is less clear and respondents cite decommissioning and 
reduction in fleet size as being significant casual factors through creating reductions 
in fishing pressure. 
Respondents were also asked for their views on the sustainability of Cod stocks.  
Eight of the respondents indicated positive responses when asked about sustainability 
of the stock, while none of the respondents indicated it was unsustainable.  The large 
decrease in the number of boats was one reason suggested, and the fact that some ar-
eas are now effectively no longer fished.   
 
Respondents were also asked whether they felt that the estimates of stocks, discards 
and landings were accurate.  The answers were fairly consistent; most respondents 
felt that Cod stocks were significantly underestimated, landing data was accurate, but 
there was some disagreement over the accuracy of discard estimates.  Some respon-
dents felt that discards were under-estimated, some felt they were over estimated and 
others that they were accurate or they did not know.  Perceptions of discarding seems 
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to be influenced by the personal attitudes of the respondents who clearly feel strongly 
about the issue – some claim they would never discard and will leave a good fishing 
area to avoid discards, others clearly engage in discarding to maximise income.  
There is insufficient information in the survey to determine the causes for this differ-
ence of opinion on the accuracy of discard measures.  Attitudes may be influenced by 
actions actually undertaken during fishing operations; those that engage in discarding 
may take the view that the level of discards are under-estimated; while those that 
more strenuously avoid catching cod may think that discards are over-estimated.   
Table 10. Perceptions on state of the Cod stock 
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Perceptions on ‘Black Fish’ (illegal landing) 
Respondents were asked for their views on ‘black fish’ (illegal landings).  The overall 
view on ‘Black fish’ is that it is not taking place in any of the areas in which the re-
spondents are based, with Cod or any other species.  The majority of respondents 
suggested it was no longer an issue because of enforcement improvements and they 
would be “surprised to find it was still occurring”.  Others suggested that if it was 
occurring it was only on a very small scale.  One respondent, for example, suggested 
that fish were eaten by the crew and small amounts might be landed as “...it is diffi-
cult to throw good fish overboard when they could be taking it home for their fami-
lies.”  One respondent indicated it was widespread from the East Coast round 







There appears to be some contradiction in the data regarding Cod avoidance measures 
and discarding.  Vessel operators report taking avoidance measures, yet also indicate 
high levels of discarding.  To some extent this is blamed on low quotas which mean 
such fish cannot be landed.  There are two possible answers, either levels of Cod are 
higher than anticipated in areas where fishing does take place (by those vessels trying 
to avoid areas of high Cod abundance), or the level of avoidance activity is limited in 
scope. 
The success of the Cod avoidance measures taken by vessels is difficult to measure 
given the limited amount of information collected in the survey.  There is a high level 
of agreement that discarding of Cod (and other species) is occurring, though respon-
dents are split on the accuracy of the measures of discards occurring.  It is clear that 
discards occur due to high grading in order to keep within quotas which are felt to be 
too low, and to comply with catch composition rules.  It is also clear that discarding is 
occurring despite vessels taking Cod avoidance measures, although again, it is diffi-
cult from the survey data to ascertain the full extent and nature of avoidance measures 
(for example, does cod avoidance take place on every trip, or only on selected trips?).  
What is clear is that vessel operators need to balance the costs of Cod avoidance (e.g. 
in terms of more fuel, or less favourable fishing conditions) with the costs of in-
creased fishing effort required if high levels of Cod are caught alongside target spe-
cies (e.g. longer time spent fishing, fuel and wage bills).  It is this balance that 
determines the level of avoidance measures taken. The survey is not able to answer 
the question of whether the current level of avoidance activity is ‘sufficient’; for ves-
sel operators the overriding aim is financial survival within a complex set of rules.   
The survey suggests that few fishermen invest in new nets (as an avoidance measure), 
due in part to the general reluctance to invest in any new or ‘un-necessary’ equip-
ment, but those that have purchased new nets with different mesh sizes as an avoid-
ance measure report limited effectiveness in avoiding Cod.   This contradiction 
between avoidance and discards is one area where a deeper level of research is re-
quired to fully understand the interactions between a vessel’s avoidance and discard-
ing activity. 
Figures 1 and 2 below summarise the main findings from the data.  In each case the 
larger the typeface represents similar views from a larger number of respondents.  
Figure 1 indicates the impacts of the Recovery Plan on respondent activities.  The two 
key aspects are TAC and effort limits.  The key factor coming out of the data is that 
the TAC results in low quotas which are causing higher levels of discards.  The effort 
limits result in more time in port, changes in patterns of fishing activity, more time 
due to catch composition rules and discarding, and knock-on effects making it harder 
to keep a crew.   
Figure 2 provides some views on stock levels.  Respondents over-riding perception is 
of an abundance of Cod and healthy stock levels, in some cases levels that have not 
been seen for a long time.  Respondents feel that Cod stocks are under-estimated and 
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that the level of discarding is increasing because of this abundance and quotas which 
are set too low.  There is recognition of the need for rules and quotas, but also that 
those rules must be more adaptable and flexible to reflect actual conditions in the 
natural world.   
To a certain extent these perceptions must be tempered by the experience of individ-
ual respondents.  In the North Sea historic fishing rates have been much higher in the 
past, which colours perceptions of those that have been fishing long enough to re-
member how it used to be, and influence perceptions of the current level of activity 
allowed and the level of stocks.  Two of the respondents, both of whom have been 
fishing for more than 30 years, made reference to the similarity between today’s 
situation and higher level of stocks from 20 – 25 years ago.  Again the catch level 
was set higher than today which may influence perceptions regarding the level of 
stocks currently available.  This is another area that requires deeper research in order 
to understand whether the perceived levels of abundance are realistic (e.g. reflecting 
underlying natural cycles in populations of various species (as other species are also 
indicated by fishermen to be present in high numbers), or whether vessel operators 
are misinterpreting the current population levels through comparing present observa-












Overall the outlook provided by a majority of the respondents is not very positive.  
The Cod Recovery Plan is creating financial difficulties, making it very difficult to 
retain a crew, plan for the future and make investments in new equipment.  There is 
genuine concern on the part of several respondents that they will have to leave the 
industry and/or go out of business. 
It is important to keep in mind that the data presented here represents a snapshot from 
a small sample of fishing vessels operating in the North Sea.  It does not pretend to be 
a random sample (since vessels were selected to be illustrative of the level and type of 
activity in each area where the Cod Recovery Plan is operating), nor representative as 
the respondents are a self-selected group that chose to respond to the questionnaire.   
The results of the survey are indicative of the views of fishermen operating under the 
Cod Recovery Plan.  The views expressed by respondents tend to be consistent, both 
within each questionnaire, and across the sample, thus raising confidence in the valid-
ity of responses that have been obtained.   Respondents, whether from Scotland, Eng-





APPENDIX I THE TELEPHONE QUESTIONNAIRE 
























We are mainly  interested  in  the operation of  the current plan  (since  January 2009 but we 
















Type of gear Tick those that apply / Comments 
Beam Trawl > =80mm  
Demersal trawl >=100mm  
Demersal trawl >=70-99mm  
Demersal trawl >=19-31mm  
Longline  
Static  


















approx %  





Cod   Sole   
Haddock   Lemon 
sole 
  
Whiting   Pollack   
Saithe   Turbot   
Sole   Plaice   
Monkfish   Halibut   
Herring   Other   
Nephrops      
Scallops      









North Sea  
Skagerrak  
Eastern Channel  
Kattegat  
West of Scotland  
























• Switch gear?       Yes / No 
• Switch target species?   Yes / No 
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A joint ICES / STECF meeting was held in Hamburg 20-24 June 2011, to prepare an impact 
assessment for Southern hake, Nerphrops and Angler fish and Baltic cod and an Evaluations of 
existing plans for Kattegat, North Sea, West of Scotland and Irish Sea cod. The meeting involved 
STECF, ICES scientists dealing with Economy and Biology and included Observers (Commission 
staff, Managers, Stakeholders). Three separate reports to the STECF were prepared by the EWG-11-
07, one on the Impact Assessment of Southern hake, Nerphrops and Angler fish (STECF 11-06) and 
another on the Impact Assessments for Baltic cod (STECF 11-05) and the third on the Evaluation of 
Cod in Kattegat, North Sea, West of Scotland and Irish Sea (STECF 11-07). All reports were reviewed 
by the STECF during its 37th plenary meeting held from 11 to 15 July 2011 in Copenhagen, Denmark. 
The observations, conclusions and recommendations, in this report represent the outcomes of the 
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 The mission of the JRC is to provide customer-driven scientific and technical support for the 
conception, development, implementation and monitoring of EU policies. As a service of the
European Commission, the JRC functions as a reference centre of science and technology for the
Union. Close to the policy-making process, it serves the common interest of the Member States, while
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The Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF) has been established by
the European Commission. The STECF is being consulted at regular intervals on matters pertaining
to the conservation and management of living aquatic resources, including biological, economic, 
environmental, social and technical considerations. 
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